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I.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(4), Appellant states as

follows: The Court of Appeals of Utah has appellate jurisdiction
over cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme
Court. Utah Code 78-2a-3(2)(j). The Supreme Court had
jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code 78-2-2(3) (j) as this case
presents an order, judgment, or decree of a court of record over
which the Court of Appeals did not have original appellate
jurisdiction.
II.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES & STANDARD OF REVIEW
Pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(5), Appellant states the

issues presented for review, the standard for review, and
demonstrates that each issue was preserved below.
With respect to Appellee Hales and Warner Construction,
Inc., hereinafter *Appellee H & W", the issue presented for
review is:
1. In Thompson v. Jess, 1999 Utah 22, 979 P.2d 322, 327(Utah
1999), the Supreme Court held that a principle employer is
subject to liability for injuries arising out of an
independent contractor's work if the employer is "actively
involved in, or asserts control over, the manner of
performance of the contracted for work." The issue presented
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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by this appeal is whether "active participation'' exists when
the principal employer becomes actively involved in or exerts
control over the performance and manner of the work of the
contractor, or sub-contractor, or whether active participation
exists only when the employer exerts control over the method
and choice to engage in the specific act that results in the
injury.
Citation to record showing that the issue was preserved in
the trial court: Appellants preserved this issue by raising and
arguing same in their Supplemental Memorandum in Opposition to
Motion for Summary Judgment of the Defendant Hales & Warner
Construction, Inc.'s and Supplemental Memorandum in Opposition
to Motion for Summary Judgment of the Corporation of the
Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day
Saints (alternatively referred to as "CPB"), See Record,
hereinafter referred to as "R," at 884.
Standard of Review: The record of this case must be viewed
in a light favorable to Appellants.

Summary judgment is

appropriate when there is no genuine issue of material fact and
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Hill v. Seattle First Nat'l Bank, 827 P.2d 241 (Utah 1992);
Jones v. Bountiful City Corp., 834 P.2d 556, 558 (Utah App.
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1992) . This Court must examine a trial court's grant of
summary judgment for correctness, with "no deference to the
trial court's legal conclusions." Jones, 834 P.2d at 558. This
is true whether the issue presented on summary judgment is one
of law or equity. See Town of Alta v. Ben Hame Corp., 836 P.2d
797 (Utah App. 1992) (applying summary judgment standard on
review of an injunction); Vergote v. K Mart Corp., 158 Mich.
App. 96, 404 N.W.2d 711 (Mich. App. 1987) (applying suiranary
judgment standard on claim for specific performance). When
reviewing a grant of summary judgment, the Court reviews the
record, including all inferences arising therefrom, in the light
most favorable to the party opposed to the motion. Hill, 827
P.2d at 242. As a matter of law, this case's entire record,
including any inferences that might arise from the facts in
favor of Appellant's argument, must be viewed in a light most
favorable to Appellants. See Richards v. Security Pac. Nat'l
Bank, 208 Utah Adv. Rep. 81, 849 P.2d 606, 608 (Utah 1993).
With respect to the Appellee CPB the issues presented for
review are:
2. Whether a principle employer is subject to liability for
injuries arising out of an independent contractor's work under
the "retained-control doctrine" by virtue of the existence of

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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a contract in which the principle employer retained sufficient
control over the manner or method of the work, without respect
to whether such contractual rights were in fact exercised.
Citation to record showing that the issue was preserved in
the trial court: Appellants preserved this in the same manner as
they preserved Issue No. 1 above,(by raising and arguing same in
their Memorandum in Opposition to the Motions for Summary
Judgment), See R. 884.
Standard of Review: The standard of review for this second
issue is the same as stated above for Issue No. 1.
3 . Whether the relationship of principle employer and independent
contractor can exist when the principle employer possesses the
right to accept or reject any subcontractor or employee
selected by the purported independent contractor.
Citation to record showing that the issue was preserved in
the trial court: Appellants preserved this in the same manner as
they preserved Issue No. 1 above,(by raising and arguing same in
their Memorandum in Opposition to the Motions for Summary
Judgment), See R. 884.
Standard of Review: The standard of review for this second
issue is the same as stated above for Issue No. 1.
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III.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 24(a) (7), Appellant states as

follows:
i.

Nature of the Case:

The Appellant brought a

wrongful death action on behalf of its decedent Jason Smith,
against the Appellee H & W and Appellee CPB. Jason Smith died on
a construction site. Appellee H & W was the general contractor
of the construction project, and Appellee CPB was the owner of
land as well as the building that Appellees constructed.
2.

Course of Proceedings:

The Appellant filed its

complaint. The Appellees each filed Answers.

Immediately after

discovery commenced, the Appellees each filed Motions for
Summary Judgment. Plaintiff filed a request pursuant to Utah R.
Civ. P. 56(f) to postpone consideration of the Motions, as well
as substantive responses. The court granted the Rule 56(f)
requests and discovery proceeded. At the conclusion of discovery
the Appellees renewed their Motions for Summary Judgment and
those motions were heard and decided by the Hon. Claudia Laycock
of the Fourth Judicial District Court.
3.

Disposition below and previously:

The district court

granted Appellee's respective motions for summary judgment and
this appeal followed. The Appellees each filed Motions for

7
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Summary Disposition in this Court, and each respective motion
was denied by this Court.
IV,

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(7), Appellant states as

follows: The Appellee CPB entered into a contract for the
construction of a house of worship known as the Highland 4 and
20 Project. Deposition of Dean Schick, hereinafter "Schick
Depo," at page 9, excerpts attached as Exhibit 1 to the
Addendum; Contract documents attached to the Addendum as Exhibit
2 ("Agreement"), and Exhibit 3 ("Conditions of the Contract").
There was an invitation to bid on the project and subsequently a
bid opening. CPB chose Appellee H & W as general contractor for
the project.

Hales and Warner entered into a contract with the

Appellee CPB for the construction of the Highland 4 and 20
Project. The Appellee CPB retained the right to approve or
reject any subcontractor of employee engaged by Appellee H & W
to complete the work or any part of the work. Conditions of the
Contract, attached as Exhibit 3, at Paragraph 5.1(B) through
(C), page 5 of 12, and Paragraph 6.1(A), page 6 of 12. Appellee
H & W commenced work on the project.
The Appellee H & W submitted a list of subcontractors that
it intended to use to perform the majority of the work required
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by the project and the Appellee CPB, along with Paul Evans, the
architect whom the Appellee CPB hired to assist it, reviewed the
list and approved of each subcontractor. Schick Depo at pages
30,31-32, attached as Exhibit 1; Deposition of Paul Evans,
hereinafter "Evans Depo," at pages 33-34, 80, excerpts attached
as Exhibit 8 to the Addendum.
The subcontractor chosen for the framing of the Highland 4
and 20 project was Third Party Defendant Brent Reynolds
Construction, Inc., hereinafter UBRC." BRC hired Egbert
Construction to perform the actual framing, but supplied the
materials necessary for the framing. See deposition of Brent
Reynolds, hereinafter

xx

Reynolds Depo," at page 8, excerpts

attached as Exhibit 4 to the Addendum. Defendant BRC, in the
course of the framing project, sent its own employees to assist
in the framing. Reynolds Depo at page 10, attached as Exhibit 4.
The Egbert Construction foreman, Ken Egbert, took direction and
instruction from Brent Reynolds, President of Brent Reynolds
Construction, Inc. Reynolds Depo at pages 25-27, attached as
Exhibit 4. Brent Reynolds testified that H & W Superintendent
Maurice Egbert continually interfered with the framing process
from beginning to end, and in the event that there was a dispute
with regard to framing methods or details, Brent Reynolds
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instructed Ken Egbert to do it the Hales & Warner way. Reynolds
Depo at pages 25-27 and 33, attached as Exhibit 4.
Appellants' decedent, Jason Smith, among others, became
employed by Ken Egbert to frame the Highland 4 and 20 Project.
Appellee CPB knew that Egbert Construction was the primary
framer on the Highland 4 and 20 Project and did not object or
disapprove of the use of Egbert construction. On August 13,
1999, while framing a wall, Jason Smith was killed when a wall
fell upon him and crushed his skull.
The Appellee H & W was actively involved in the framing
process, asserted control over the framing process, and asserted
control over the manner of performance of the contracted for
work. The following facts in the record demonstrate this active
participation and control:
a. Brent Reynolds, President of Third Party Defendant Brent
Reynolds Construction, Inc., stated as follows to Clifford
Hales, President of Appellee Hales & Warner:
From the very beginning, your superintendent, [Maurice
Egbert], interfered with the framing process, telling [the
framers] that they couldn't do it [the] way they were used to
framing and caused the framers many problems, costing extra
time and material. This interference continued through out the
framing of the building...
See Letter from Defendant BRC to Appellee H & W, Attached as
Exhibit 5 to the Addendum.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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b. Brent Reynolds testified about at least three different
specific instances where H & W manifested control over the
work of Egbert Construction's employees.

Reynolds Depo at

pages 46-47, attached as Exhibit 4.
c. Brent Reynolds stated that Maurice Egbert, the superintendent
of the project for Appellee H & W Construction, Inc., wouldn't
let his men frame walls the way they wanted to frame them.
Reynolds Depo, at page 25, attached as Exhibit 4;
d. Brent Reynolds stated that he, or Ken Egbert,(a framer more
particularly identified below, with little or no relationship
to Maurice Egbert),told Appellee H & W that it was not
effective to frame the building the way that Appellee H & W
wanted to frame it, but Appellee H & W made Brent Reynolds
Construction, Inc.,and Egbert, frame the building "the Hales &
Warner way." Reynolds Depo at pp 25-26, attached as Exhibit 4;
e. Brent Reynolds said that Appellee H & W would not let him
and/or Ken Egbert frame the building in the manner they wanted
to frame the building. See Reynolds Depo at 25, attached as
Exhibit 4, (emphasis supplied);
f. Appellee H & W began interfering with the framing process on
the day that the framing began. See Reynolds Depo at page 29,
attached as Exhibit 4;
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g. Brent Reynolds could not recall whether there was a single
aspect of the framing process with which Appellee H & W did
not interfere. See Reynolds Depo at page 28, attached as
Exhibit 4,(emphasis supplied);
h. The Appellee H & W's superintendent, Maurice Egbert, stated
that he ufound problems'' with the framing, including the
heights of walls, and that he made the framers tear one wall
apart and rebuild it the way Appellee H & W wanted it built.
See Deposition of Joel Warner, hereinafter "Warner Depo," at
pages 49-50, excerpts attached as Exhibit 6 to the Addendum;
Deposition of Maurice Egbert, hereinafter

vx

Egbert Depo," at

page 56, excerpts attached as Exhibit 7 to the Addendum.
i. H & W Superintendent Maurice Egbert testified how he became
especially watchful of the framers' work and directly ordered
much correction for the work of all of the framing employees.
Egbert Depo at pages 56-57, 65-66, 69, 70-71, 72-74, 76-77,
79, attached as Exhibit 7. Maurice Egbert says that several
times he would find error in the framers' work, and order them
to redo the job the way the way H & W wanted.

Id., at 70-71.

j. During Egbert Construction's first day on the job site, H &
W's Joel Warner questioned Ken Egbert at length about his work
experience, framing ability, his crew and all other aspects of
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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his ability to do the framing job. Warner Depo at pages 39-42,
attached as Exhibit 6.
k. H & W's superintendent (Maurice Egbert) learned that the
framers had no experience framing churches, and this is why
the framers got behind schedule. Maurice Egbert Depo at page
56, attached as Exhibit 7.
1. Maurice admits talking to Ken Egbert about framing and
learning that Egbert Construction was an inexperienced
company, and he therefore watched the framers very closely.
Maurice Egbert Depo at 76-77, attached as Exhibit 7. Maurice
Egbert also told Joel Warner about the framers inexperience
and errors, and Joel Warner then told Maurice to closely watch
the framers and to check their work. Id. at 79.
m. Joel Warner alleged that the Appellee CPB, through its
architect, Paul Evans, instructed Appellee H & W to tell the
framers to build the wall to a specified height. See Warner
Depo at 46, attached as Exhibit 6.
n. The architect, Paul Evans, testified that he never observed
any walls that needed to be torn down and did not give any
instruction to destroy any walls. Evans Depo at page 48,
attached as Exhibit 8.
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o. The architect, Paul Evans, admits receiving information about
interference by H & W into the framing process. Evans Depo at
pages 69-70, attached as Exhibit 8.

Evans read H & W's daily

reports and was aware of H & W's interference into the framing
process, which he reported to CPB. Evans Depo at pages 63-72,
attached as Exhibit 8.
p. Dean Schick, an employee of the Appellee CPB, also stated that
nothing was installed incorrectly on the project. Schick Depo
at page 24, attached as Exhibit 1.
q. Michel Lewis was an Egbert Construction employee and fellow
wall-lifter with Jason Smith.

Michael Lewis admits that

Egbert Construction employees were supposed to wear hard hats,
but nobody corrected them on their decision to not wear the
hats. Deposition of Michael Lewis, hereinafter "Lewis Depo,"
at pages 17-18, excerpts attached as Exhibit 19 to the
Addendum.

Jason Smith died partly as a result of not wearing

a hard hat.

Mr. Lewis states that Jason Smith was never

trained on how to do anything, and was just told to start
performing dangerous work without any supervision or training.
Lewis Depo at pages 24-25, attached as Exhibit 19. H & W's
Maurice Egbert gave daily orders to all the framers.
Depo at page 54, attached as Exhibit 19.
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Lewis

r. H & W bears responsibility for Jason Smith's death because
aside from manifesting control over all aspects of the framing
process that caused the death of Jason Smith, H & W held the
power to stop workers from working if they were too young or
inexperienced. Maurice Egbert Depo at pages 73-74, attached as
Exhibit 7. Jason Smith was too young and inexperienced for the
job site. Lewis Depo at pages 24-25, attached as Exhibit 19.
When Jason Smith suffered his injury and death, it was Maurice
Egbert who called for 911. Lewis Depo at pages 12-13, attached
as Exhibit 19.
s,H & W's VP Joel Warner admits that H & W general contractor
had a duty to keep a safe and clean site. Warner Depo at
pages 84-85, attached as Exhibit 6.
t. Appellee H & W told the framers (i) how many men to employ,
(ii) told the framers the time frame within which they had to
complete, or substantially complete, the framing, and (iii)
dictated the experience level of the men hired to actually do
the framing. This assertion is supported as by the following:
l.On August 11, 1999, Clifford Hales, President of the
Appellee H & W, sent a letter to Brent Reynolds which
stated as follows:
...You promised to have 12 men on the job. This has not
happened. If you continue with the same number of framers,
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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you will not meet the 7 week framing schedule. We feel you
need to immediately increase the number of framers, and
provide proper supervision so as to meet the 7 week framing
schedule. Please provide us a written framing schedule
outlining manpower and target dates such as wall framing,
roof framing, completion, etc.
See Letter dated August 11, 1999, attached to the Addendum
as Exhibit 9; (Also identified as Deposition Exhibit 34).
2. What Appellee H & W meant by "proper supervision" was that
they wanted * experienced" men/framers. Warner Depo at page
79, attached as Exhibit 6 .
3. On August 25, 1999, Clifford Hales again made the following
statement in a letter to Brent Reynolds:
This is a follow up to the letter dated August 11, 1999.
You still have not had 12 men on the job as promised, and
the job is getting further behind. Therefore, you are
hereby notified that you are in breech [sic] of [our
agreement]. Specifically, you have failed to employ
sufficient competent help to complete the work in a
reasonable time...Please...have sufficient men on the job site
(12 or more men) by August 27, 1999, and continue to have
sufficient men on each job day thereafter.
See Letter dated August 25, 1999, attached to the Addendum
as Exhibit 10;(Also identified as Deposition Exhibit 35).
4. Appellee H & W also gave oral instructions to Brent Reynolds
to put 12 or more framers on the job. Warner Depo at page 32,
attached as Exhibit 6.
5. Appellee H & W, through Joel Warner, controlled the time
schedules for the construction project. Warner Depo at pages
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18-19, attached as Exhibit 6. Thus, Joel Warner controlled the
time for beginning and completing the framing.
6. The contract between Appellee H & W and Brent Reynolds
Construction, Inc., did not provide for a specific number of
men (framers) to be on site. Warner Depo at 32, attached as
Exhibit 6.
Because Appellee H & W actively participated in, and
controlled the framing work, Appellee H & W is liable to
Appellants for the injuries arising from the work. Appellee CPB
is liable to the same extent as Appellee H & W.
V.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 24(a) (8), Appellants state as

follows: The district court erred when it granted the Appellee H
& W's Motion for Summary Judgment because Appellee H & W, the
principle employer/general contractor, actively involved itself
in, and asserted control over, the manner of performance of the
contracted for work of its independent contractor, Brent
Reynolds Construction, Inc. Appellee H & W is therefore subject
to liability for the damages suffered by Plaintiff, which are
injuries arising out of the independent contractor's, Brent
Reynolds Construction, Inc.'s, work. The district court
erroneously interpreted Thompson v. Jess, 1999 Utah 22, 979 P.2d
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322 (Utah 1999) in a narrow and restrictive fashion.

It imposed

a standard not required by Utah Law and granted the motions
because Appellant failed to demonstrate that one or both
Appellee's were on site assisting, instructing or directing
Appellants' decedent at the time he was killed. Thompson does
not impose such onerous requirements.
The district court erred when it granted the Appellee CPB's
Motion for Summary Judgment because the Apellee CPB was liable
under the retained control doctrine as defined in Thompson.
Appellee H & W did not have an independent contractor
relationship with respect to Appelle CPB because Appellee CPB
retained sufficient control over the manner and/or method of the
work to be performed by Appellee H & W. Because Appellee CPB
held an employer/employee relationship with Appellee H & W, it
became liable to the same extent as Appellee H & W.
Regardless of the retained control doctrine, Appellee H & W
was an employee of Appellee CPB, and not an independent
contractor because Appellee CPB had the contractual right to
accept or reject any subcontractor or employee selected by
Appellee H & W. Pursuant to Ludlow v. Industrial Commission, 65
Utah 168, 179, 235 P. 884, 888 (Utah 1925), and Lodge v.
Industrial Commission, 562 P.2d 227, 228 (Utah 1977), no
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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independent contractor relationship can exist under these
circumstances.
Thus, Appellee H & W is liable to the Appellants because
they actively participated in the framing process.

Appellee CPB

is vicariously liable to the Appellants by virtue of the acts
and omissions of its employee Appellee H & W.
VI.

ARGUMENT AND CITATION TO AUTHORITY
Pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 24(a) (9), Appellant states as

follows:
1. Appellees H & W and CPB are liable under the retained control
doctrine because one or both were actively involved in# and
asserted control over, the manner of the performance of the
framing.
The parties agreed below, and in the Motion for Summary
Disposition Pleadings, that the case of Thompson v. Jess, 1999
Utah 22, 979 P.2d 322 (Utah 1999), controls the issues presented
in this appeal. A copy of the Thompson case is attached as
Exhibit 11 to the Addendum. The issue presented is upon which
the trial court's decision turned, and which Appellant seeks to
present on appeal.

The issue is whether Appellee H & W (and/or

Appellee CPB), became liable under the "retained control
doctrine." Appellees became liable under the retained control
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doctrine if they actively participated in the contracted for, or
subcontracted for, work. The work in this case was the framing
of the Highland 4 and 20 project. Thompson describes the
"retained control doctrine" and "active participation" standard
as follows:
This Court has not had opportunity to determine the
precedential value of Dayton v. Free, 46 Utah 277, 148 P. 408
(Utah 1914), with respect to the retained control doctrine.
Several federal courts applying Utah law, however, have been
called upon to do so. Those courts uniformly have determined
that under Dayton, a principal employer is not subject to
liability for injuries arising out of its contractor's work
unless the employer "actively participates" in the performance
of the work. For instance, in Simon v. Deery Oil, 699 F. Supp.
257, 258 (D. Utah 1988), the court cited Dayton for the
proposition that a principal employer "retaining an
independent contractor to render services has no duty to warn
of train employees of the contractor, nor must the principal
protect the contractor's employees for the contractor's own
negligence, unless the principal has "actively participated in
the project." See Also Sewell v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 606
F.2d 274, 276, 1979 U.S. App. LEXIS 12266 (10th Cir. 1979),
cert, denied, 44 U.S. 1080, 62 L.Ed.2d 763, 100 S.Ct. 1031
(1980); Texaco, Inc. v. Pruitt, 396 F.2d 237, 240 (10th Cir.
1968); Erwin v. Kern River Gas Transmission Co., 1997 Tex.
App. LEXIS 6685, *8, (addressing Utah law on issue). We
believe the standard relied upon in these cases is correct,
and we formally adopt same. Elaboration on the contours of the
standard is needed, however.
Thus, by "formally adopting same," the law, as articulated
in Simon, Sewell, Texaco, and Erwin, became the law of Utah. The
district court below did not correctly interpret and apply
Thompson, Simon, Sewell, Texaco, and Erwin. The district court,
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based on its interpretation of Thompson, granted summary
judgment based on the following facts:
Egbert Construction hired and trained Jason Smith, Michael
Lewis, and Jose Louis. On August 13, 1999, an Egbert
Construction supervisor instructed Jason Smith, Michael Lewis,
and Jose Louis to "put up" a wooden framed wall Egbert
Construction had built. On August 13, 1999, Jason Smith,
Michael Lewis, and Jose Louis raised the wooden framed wall,
and were in the process of putting the wall onto bolt studs
when the wall started to fall and fell on Jason Smith causing
Jason Smith's death (hereinafter the "Accident")...
The Court finds that Jason Smith, Michael Lewis, and Jose
Louis were not under the direction, supervision, instruction
or control of (H & W) or the CPB prior to and at the time of
the Accident.
The Court finds that there is no evidence that
Jason Smith, Michael Lewis and Jose Louis were ever under the
direction, supervision, instruction, or control of (H & W) or
the CPB.
The Court finds that there is no evidence that [H & W] or the
CPB instructed Egbert Construction or its employees (or [Brent
Reynolds Construction] or its employees) to do the work being
performed at the time of the Accident
in a different manner or
by way of a different method.
The Court finds that there is no evidence that [H & W] or the
CPB exerted control over the means utilized by Jason Smith,
Michael Lewis, or Jose Louis, in doing the work Jason Smith,
Michel Lewis and Jose Louis were performing at the time of the
Accident
or that [H & W] or the CPB interfered with that work.
The Court finds that the employee of [H & W] on the site at
the time of the Accident was in the construction trailer and
had no involvement as the work being performed, and the wall
being put into place, by Jason Smith, Michael Lewis and Jose

Louis at the time of the

Accident.

The Court also finds that there was no employee or
representative of the CPB on the site at the time of the
Accident, and no employee or representative of the CPB had any
involvement in the work being performed by Jason Smith,
Michael Lewis, and Jose Louis at the time of the
Accident.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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The Court finds that the evidence indicates that it was Egbert
Construction who was controlling the means utilized and the
manner of performance of the work being performed by Jason
Smith, Michael Lewis, and Jose Louis at the time of the

Accident.
[H & W] and the CPB did not exert affirmative control over the
method or operative detail of the work and did not directly
manage the means and methods of Egbert Construction's work nor
provide the specific equipment used by Egbert Construction as
to the work Jason Smith was performing at the time of the

Accident.
See Order of Summary Judgment in favor of H & W Construction,
Inc., and the Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, hereinafter
referred to as "Order of Summary Judgment," attached as
Exhibit 12 to the Addendum, at page 3-5, (emphasis
supplied) .See Also Order for Summary Judgment, R. 1043.
The district court concluded, based on Thompson, that:
[T]he exertion of control over the means utilized must relate
to the 'injury causing aspect of the work.'[citing Thompson].
[H & W] and the CPB did not exert control over the means
utilized as to the 'injury causing aspect of the work' of
Jason Smith..., rather, Egbert Construction controlled the means

utilized as to the work Jason Smith was performing

at the

time

of the Accident.
The activities of [H & W] and the CPB to
which Appellants refer did not relate to, and were not an

exertion of control over, the work Jason Smith was performing
at the time of the accident,
and did not cause the accident
and death of Jason Smith.
Order for Summary Judgment, at page 7, attached as Exhibit
12,(emphasis supplied). See Also R. 1043.
Simon, Sewell, Texaco, and Erwin, do not support the
district court's conclusion.

The district court interpreted

Thompson in a manner unsupported by the precedent relied upon
and "formally adopted" as the law of Utah: Simon, Sewell,
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Texaco, and Erwin. In short, the district court's focus and
reliance on the acts and omissions that occurred at the time of
the accident,

and limiting the consideration to the exertion of

control that occurred over the manner of means utilized by Jason
Smith in the process of lifting a specific wall onto a set of
particular bolts, was too narrow and unsupported by the holdings
of Thompson, Simon, Sewell, Texaco, and Erwin.
Appellees are liable under Thompson if they actively
participated or exerted control over the framing process, even
if they did not exert control over method or choice to lift the
particular wall that fell upon and killed Jason Smith (a
particular and specific element of the framing process) at the
day and time that the procedure and resulting injury occurred.
Thompson, and its adopted precedent, Simon, Sewell, Texaco, and
Erwin, require that, if an entity like H & W wants to avoid
liability for the harm caused to another by the acts and
omissions of an independent contractor, such as the framers in
this case, it must not exert control over, or actively
participate in, the manner, method or means by which the
independent contractor performs the work of framing. Thompson,
and its precedents, do not require that Appellants demonstrate
that one or both, of the Appellees stood next to Jason Smith and
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ordered him to pick up the wall and then stood underneath it as
it fell upon his head.

The district court erred when it so

held. All that Thompson requires is that Appellants demonstrate
that Appellees were actively involved in the framing process.
Based on the facts above, Appellant demonstrated this
participation and the district court did not find otherwise.
Simon, a copy of which is attached to the Addendum as
Exhibit 13, provides for liability on behalf of Appelees because
they participated in the framing project, as detailed above.
Simon held the employer of an independent contractor was not
liable unless he "actively participated in the project." Simon,
699 F. Supp. at 258, citing

Dayton, Sewell, and U.S. v. Page,

350 F.2d 28, 31 (10th Cir. 1965) . Simon made no mention, express
or implied, that the employer might participate to some extent,
short of participating in the particular aspect of the work that
caused the injury, and still avoid liability. In fact, Simon was
not even limited to a particular type of work, but imposed
liability as soon as the employer participated in the "project."
Simon does not support the district court's conclusion that
liability could only be imposed against Appellees if there was
active participation in the manner and means by which Jason
Smith lifted or dropped the wall that fell upon and killed him.
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Instead, Appellees sacrificed protection from liability when
they actively participated in the *framing project." As detailed
above, Appellee H & W actively participated in the framing
project and are therefore liable under Simon, and the district
court erred when it failed to appreciate the meaning and import
of Simon.
The Sewell decision, which is attached as Exhibit 14 to the
Addendum, provides little detail or procedural history, and
merely holds that the lower court committed harmful error
because it gave a jury instruction on retained control that
failed to explain the necessity for active participation by the
defendant/principal employer. Sewell, 606 F.2d at 276. Sewell is
most persuasive because of what it did NOT hold. Sewell,
formally adopted by the Supreme Court as the law of Utah, did
not require the lower court to explain, in its jury instruction,
that active participation must be shown with respect to the
particular aspect of the work from which the injury arose, but
rather, Sewell held only that active participation was required.
Like Simon, there was no limitation or requirement that the
participation at issue relate to the particular injury causing
aspect of the work. Active participation or control, in any
respect, was all that was required. Sewell, as well as Simon,
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was not as restrictive as the district court thought them to be.
Contrary to the conclusion of the district court, they merely
require active participation in some aspect of the (framing)
project. Appellants demonstrated that Appellees were involved in
the framing of the project, and thus, they are not insulated
from liability under Thompson.
Texaco, which is attached as Exhibit 15 to the Addendum,
was the first case to explain with specificity the degree of the
participation on behalf of the principal employer that will
create liability. Texaco held that the principal employer must
exercise direction or control of the particular work being
performed. Texaco, 396 F.2d at 240. Texaco suggests that if an
employer in a construction project exercises direction or
control over the landscapers, it will not owe any duty to the
bricklayers, but only to the landscapers. Similarly, Appellees
exercised direction and control over the framers and thus owe a
duty to the framers, but not the other independent
(sub)contractors. The district court did not attempt to
reconcile its unduly restrictive interpretation of Thompson,
with the clear holding of Texaco, or Simon and Sewell for that
matter. Neither Thompson, nor Texaco, supported the district
court's restrictive conclusion that Appellee H & W might only be
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liable to Appellants if, and only if, an agent of Appellee was
standing behind Jason Smith and barking orders and instructions.
Thompson is not so restrictive, and should not be interpreted so
restrictively. This Court should not allow the district court's
order to stand.
Last, Erwin, attached as Exhibit 16 to the Addendum, held
that a principal employer is liable to employees of an
independent contractor, if, and only if, the employer reserved
the contractual right to direct, control, or superintend the
independent contractor's work, or in fact directed or controlled
the time and manner of the work, or the means and methods by
which the results were accomplished. Erwin, 1997 Tex. App. LEXIS
6685 at page 9. Again, as with Simon, Sewell, and Texaco, there
is no language or dicta

in the holding to support the

restrictive interpretation that the "active participation" must
relate directly to the aspect of the work that resulted in the
injury, as concluded by the district court below.
As noted by the Thompson Court, immediately after adopting
the cases of Simon, Sewell, Texaco, and Erwin as the law of
Utah, "elaboration of the contours of the standard is needed."
Thompson, 979 P.2d at 327. The Thompson Court elaborated as
follows:
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Under the "active participation" standard, a principal
employer is subject to liability for injuries arising out of
its independent contractor's work if the employer is actively
involved in, or asserts control over, the manner of
performance of the contracted work. See Conklin v. Chen, 287
So.2d 56, 60, 1973 Fla. LEXIS 4019 (Fla. 1973) (holding that
under "active participation" standard, principal employer must
directly influence manner in which work is performed; no duty
arises from vxpassive nonpart icipat ion") .
This passage provides no support for the restrictive
interpretation of Thompson rendered by the district court.
Appellants demonstrated that Appellants were actively involved
in, and asserted control over, the framing process and framing
project (the work). The Thompson Court further elaborated the
"contours" of the active participation standard as follows:
Such an assertion of control occurs, for example, when the
principal employer directs that the contracted work be done by
use of a certain mode or otherwise interferes with the means
and methods by which the work is to be accomplished. See e.g.
Lewis v. N.J. Riebe Enterprises, Inc., 170 Ariz. 384, 825 P.2d
5, 7-8 (Ariz. 1992)(imposing liability where subcontractor's
employee was injured as a result of the new, less safe method
of work required by general contractor); Redinger v. Living,
Inc., 689 S.W.2d 415, 418, 1985 Tex. LEXIS 825, 28 Tex.
Sup. J. 404 (Tex. 1985) (imposing liability where
subcontractor was ordered to operate backhoe dangerously close
to plaintiff).
Thompson, 979 P.2d. at 327. (emphasis supplied).
The Thompson Court referred consistently to "the work." In
the case at bar, "the work" is framing. Thompson does not
express, or imply, any limit, such as that imposed by the trial
court, that the participation in "the work," or in the framing,
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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relate to the particular aspect of the framing that ultimately
caused the plaintiff's damages. Furthermore, the above quote
ended the Thompson Court's elaboration of the contours of the
active participation standard. The Thompson Court did go on to
state that the comments to § 414 of the Second Restatement of
Torts provided guidance, but did not, as it did with Simon,
Sewell, Texaco, and Erwin, "formally adopt" the comments to §
414 as the law of Utah. It is from the comments, particularly,
comment c, that the district court based its erroneous
conclusion that it was the particular detail of the work,
(lifting the specific wall onto the particular bolts), that the
Appellant must prove the Appellee was actively participating, in
order to survive Appellees' summary judgment motion. The nature
of the district court's error was two fold. First, the lower
court misunderstood the Restatement (Second) of Torts §414
(1965), attached as Exhibit 20 of the Addendum, to be the law of
Utah. The Thompson Court specifically did not adopt the
Restatement as the law of Utah, but the district court
nevertheless assumed the Restatement to be the law. Second,
ignoring the non-controlling legal nature of the Restatement,
the district court misinterpreted the meaning of the Restatement
and its comments-.
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The Restatement (Second) of Torts § 414 has never been
adopted as the law of Utah.

Thompson, 1999 UT at P16.

Thompson

specifically declined to formally adopt this persuasive-only
material.

Id.

In the other 49 States of the Union,

Restatements are secondary authority only, and are not the law,
unless specifically adopted by a State's legislature or Supreme
Court.

See Hoffman Constr. Co. v. Active Erectors & Installers,

Inc., 969 F.2d 796, 800 (9th Cir. 1992); Picker Fin. Group L.L.C.
v. Horizon Bank, 293 B.R. 253, 257, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
8716, 16 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. D 376 (M.D. Fla. 2003); Dee v.
Marriott Int'l, Inc., 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16159, 10 (E.D. Pa.
1999). § 414, like any Restatement, is useful as a research tool
or study aid, but nothing more until adopted by a State's
Supreme Court. See Hoffman, supra.

The lower court therefore

erred when it applied comment (c) to § 414 to this case as if it
was the law of Utah.
Second, as illustrated in the following passage, comment
(c) of § 414 of the Restatement, (upon which the district court
so heavily relied), concerns itself with a general contractor's
interference with any part

of the work of the subcontractor, not

just the specific task that caused the injury. § 414, attached
as Exhibit 20, provides:
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One who entrusts work to an independent contractor, but who
retains the control of any part of the work, is subject to
liability for physical harm to others for whose safety the
employer owes a duty to exercise reasonable care, which is
caused by his failure to exercise his control with reasonable
care.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 414, at 388 (1965).
Added.

Emphasis

H & W's consistent and extensive exercise of control over
the framing process constituted control over "any part of the
work." H & W is therefore liable under § 414.
Comment (a) of the Restatement 2d imposes liability that
exceeds the law of Agency:
If the employer of an independent contractor retains control
over the operative detail of doing any part of the work, he is
subject to liability for the negligence of the employees of
the contractor engaged therein, under the rules of that part
of the law of Agency which deals with the relation of master
and servant. The employer may, however, retain a control less
than that which is necessary to subject him to liability as
master. He may retain only the power to direct the order in
which the work shall be done, or to forbid its being done in a
manner likely to be dangerous to himself or others. Such a
supervisory control may not subject him to liability under the
principles of Agency, but he may be liable under the rule
stated in the Section unless he exercises his supervisorycontrol with reasonable care so as to prevent the work which
he has ordered to be done from causing injury to others.
Restatement (Second) of Torts §414, comment a, at 388 (1965).
The lower court never even considered whether H & W's
control over the framing process was performed with reasonable
care as to prevent the causing of injury to others, but instead
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incorrectly focused on whether H & W actually directed the
lifting of the wall that killed Jason Smith. See Order for
Summary Judgment, attached as Exhibit 12, (continuous references
to the "time of the Accident").
Comment (b) of the Restatement 2d provides that H & W is
liable if they (1) superintended the job, (2) knew or should
have known that its subcontractors were performing their work in
a manner unreasonably dangerous to others, and (3) injury or
death results from that dangerous work:
The rule stated in this Section is usually, though not
exclusively, applicable when a principal contractor entrusts a
part of the work to subcontractors, but himself or through a
foreman superintends the entire job. In such a situation, the
principal contractor is subject to liability if he fails to
prevent the subcontractors from doing even the details of the
work in a way unreasonably dangerous to others, if he knows
work is being so done, and has the opportunity to prevent it
by exercising the power of control which he has retained in
himself. So too, he is subject to liability if he knows or
should know that the subcontractors have carelessly done their
work in such a way as to create a dangerous condition, and
fails to exercise reasonable care either to remedy it himself
or by the exercise of his control cause the subcontractor to
do so.
Restatement (Second) of Torts §414, corranent b, at 388 (1965).
(Emphasis Added) .
This is clearly what happened in this case.

H & W's

superintendent Maurice Egbert superintended the entire job. The
H & W Superintendent, Maurice Egbert, knew or should have known
that inexperienced and young subcontractor employees were being
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

32

hired to perform extremely, dangerous work. The inexperience of
these employees resulted in death and injury to Jason Smith. The
lower court didn't consider these factors and instead, narrowly
focused only on whether H & W directly ordered young Jason to
lift the wall that killed him.
Finally, the *retained control" concept is explained in
comment (c) to § 414, which provides:
In order for the rule stated in this Section to apply, the
employer must have retained as least some degree of control
over the manner in which the work is done. It is not enough
that he has merely a general right to order the work
stopped or resumed, to inspect its progress or to receive
reports, to make suggestions or recommendations which need
not necessarily be followed, or to prescribe alterations
and deviations. Such a general right is usually reserved
for employers, but it does not mean that the contractor is
controlled as to his methods of work, or as to operative
detail. There must be such a retention of a right of
supervision that the contractor is not entirely free to do
the work in his own way.
Restatement (Second) of Torts §414, comment c, at 388
(1965), (Emphasis Added).
Accordingly, if the general contractor entrusts the work to
the subcontractor, but retains control of the work being done to
the degree provided for in the Restatement, it owes a duty of
care for the safety of the subcontractor's employees.

Here, H

& W went far beyond a ''general right" of merely inspecting
progress, receiving reports or making suggestions.

H & W took

the burden and liability upon itself to directly order specific
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work tasks on at least three different occasions. At the very
least, the lower court should have considered whether or not the
H & W orders to Egbert Construction, on at least three different
occasions, exceeded the "general right" referred to in the
Restatement.
The above several paragraphs illustrate the lower court's
failure to properly interrupt and apply Restatement (Second) of
Torts §414 (1965) . However, Appellants note again that its
argument regarding the misapplication of the Restatement is
academic because the Restatement has not been adopted by the
Utah Supreme Court or the Utah Legislature, and therefore,
unlike Simon, Sewell, Texaco, and Erwin, is not the law of Utah.
The amount of control and participation of Appellee H & W
was adequate to create a genuine dispute of material facts such
that summary judgment was inappropriate. There was a genuine
issue as to whether the control and participation demonstrated
amounted to "active" under Thompson, such that a reasonable jury
could impose liability upon Appellee H & W. In the case at bar,
Appellee H & W entrusted a part of the work to a subcontractor,
Brent Reynolds Construction, Inc., (who hired Egbert
Construction and its employees to perform the work), but through
its employee, Maurice Egbert, superintended the entire framing
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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job. Appellee H & W interfered

in the framing process "from the

very beginning." See Letter from Brent Reynolds, attached as
Exhibit 5 to the Addendum; See Also Brent Reynolds Depo at page
20, attached as Exhibit 4 to the Addendum. Appellee H & W would
not let the framers uframe some of the walls the way they wanted
to frame them." Reynolds Depo at pages 25-26, attached as
Exhibit 4 to the Addendum. After Brent Reynolds and/or Ken
Egbert told Appellee H & W that it was not effective to frame
the walls the way that Appellee H & W wanted them framed,
Appellee H & W told Brent Reynolds (and the framers), that the
framers "could not

frame [the walls] in the manner that they

wanted." Reynolds Depo at page 25, attached as Exhibit 4 to the
Addendum, (emphasis added). In the event of a dispute regarding
the framing process or an aspect of framing, and there were such

disputes, the framers

did it

the Hales & Warner way. Reynolds

Depo at page 26, attached as Exhibit 4, (emphasis supplied). In
fact, Brent Reynolds could not recall whether there was single
aspect of the framing process with which Appellee H & W did not
interfere. Reynolds Depo at page 20, attached as Exhibit 4.
Joel Warner, an executive of Appellee H & W, kept a daily
log of the activities and happenings on the construction site.
On August 5, 1999, Joel Warner noted as follows:
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Ken Egbert (framer) is concerned with the manner in which
we, [Appellee
H & W], want the [building] framed.£rent Reynolds
with whom our contract is with (framing) told Ken he shouldn't
do it that way because of extra labor cost. At my, [Joel
Warner's] request, Ken [Egbert, and] Brady (another framer who
always does his Church framing this way) met to discuss this
method of framing. Ken [and] I also went up to a Church with
the same floor plan directly North of us to see the framing of
it. Ken is proceeding as we, [Appellee H & W], have requested
until final decision from Brent Reynolds is given.
See Log for August 5, 1999, attached as Exhibit 17 to the
Addendum, (emphasis supplied); also referred to as Deposition
Exhibit 30.
Other aspects of participation and control exercised by H &
W included the following:
Appellee H & W established the time frame within which the
work would be completed, and also established the time frame
for various stages of the framing to be completed, See Warner
Depo at pages 18-19, attached as Exhibit 6 to Addendum.
Thus, Appellee H & W determined the pace of the framing as
well as the date on which the framing would begin and end.
Deposition of Clifford Hales, hereinafter "Hales Depo," at
page 28, attached as Exhibit 18 to the Addendum.
Appellee H & W dictated the number of framers that would be on
site doing the framing (12 or more men). See Letter dated
August 11, 1999, attached as Exhibit 9 to the Addendum; See
Also Letter dated August 25, 1999, attached as Exhibit 10 to
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the Addendum; See Also Warner Depo at page 32, attached as
Exhibit 6 to the Addendum;
iv.

Appellee H & W dictated the general qualifications of the
framers and mandated, or attempted to mandate, that they be
"experienced./# Warner Depo at page 79, attached as Exhibit 6
to the Addendum.
Whether the amount of control exercised or retained is

sufficient control over the performance of the relevant item of
subcontracted for work is a question of fact that should
ordinarily be left to the jury. Lewis v. N.J. Riebe Enterprises,
Inc., 170 Ariz. 384, 825 P.2d 5, 7-8 (Ariz. 1992), cited
approval

by,

Thompson, supra1.

with

Because there is some evidence of

control and participation, the district court erred when it
granted summary judgment and this honorable Court should reverse
the ruling of the district court.
2. Appellee CPB remains liable to Appellant under the ^retained
control doctrine" because there was a contract in which the
Appellee CPB, as principle employer, retained sufficient
control over the manner or method of the work.

1

Lewis, in turn, cited the following cases as authority for this principle: Barker v. General Petroleum Corp., 72 Ariz.
187,195,232 P.2d 390, 395 (1951); Hughes v. Shanafelt, 203 Okla. 80, 218 P.2d 350, 352 (1950); Rabar v. E.I, duPonte de Nemours & Co., 415 A.2d 499, 507-508, (Del. Super. 1980); Weber v. Northern Illinois Gas Co., 10
Ill.App.3d 625, 641, 295 N.E.2d 41,49 (1973); Corsetti v. Stone Co., 396 Mass 1, 11,483 N.E.2d 793 (1985);
Powell v. General Tel. Co., 85 Mich.App. 84, 94-95, 270 N.W.2d 711, 716 (1978); Riggins v. Bechtel Power Corp.,
44 Wash.App. 244, 252, 722 P.2d 819, 823 (1986).
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In Thompson v. Jess, the Supreme Court addressed the
retained control doctrine as discussed at length above, and
after articulating the elements and details of the *active
participation'7 standard, stated and explained as follows:
We note that the term "retained control" is somewhat of a
misnomer. Under the standards announced herein, a duty of care
is imposed if the principal employer asserts affirmative
control over or actually participates actively in the manner
of performing the contracted for work. uRetained," to the
extent the word implies passivity or nonaction, is inapt.
The term "retained control" may have a more syntactically
correct application to sophisticated parties who, by contract,
stipulate which party will control the manner or method of
work or the safety measures to be taken—such as in contracts
between general contractors and subcontractors involved in
construction projects. See Dayton v. Free, 46 Utah 277, 148 P.
408, 411-12 (Utah 1914)], at 411, (noting that under terms of
contract, principal employer did not reserve right to direct
or control prosecution of work or any of contractor's
workers). The issue, however, of whether a duty of care may be
imposed solely as a result of such a contractual reservation
is not before us.
Thompson, 1999 Utah at 26, note 3, 979 P.2d at 328, note 3.
The district court's findings on this issue were as
follows:
The Court also finds that (H & W) and its employees were not
employees of the CPB; the Court finds that (H & W) was an
independent contractor of the CPB. Further the contracts and
their provisions do not preclude summary judgment in favor of
(H & W) and the CPB.
Order for Summary Judgment, at Page 7, attached to the
Addendum as Exhibit 12; See Also R. 1043.
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Appellee CPB's motion for summary judgment should have been
denied because, under the contract documents, Appellee CPB
retained control over the construction and particulars of the
work such that it was not insulated from liability. Appellants
identify the following contractual provisions that demonstrate
Appellee CPB retained adequate control such that it may be
liable to Appellants:
a. The Contract provided that Appellee CPB would establish the
property lines and benchmarks for grading. See Conditions of
the Contract, at Paragraph 2.1(A), page 2 of 12, attached as
Exhibit 3 to the Addendum. Appellee did in fact assert this
right. See Schick Depo at page 22, attached as Exhibit 1 to
the Addendum; See Also Evans Depo at page 24, attached as
Exhibit 8 to the Addendum.
b. The contract provided that the Appellee CPB furnished
information and services that were required for the orderly
progress of the work. See Conditions of the Contract, at
Paragraph 2.1(B), page 2 of 12, attached as Exhibit 3 to the
Addendum. Appellee furnished numerous information and services
through its agent, Dean Schick, and its architect, Paul Evans.
See Schick Depo at page 22, attached as Exhibit 1 to the
Addendum.
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c. The Contract provided that the Appellee CPB could inspect the
work and progress of the work at any location and at any time.
See Conditions of the Contract, at Paragraph 2.2, page 2 of
12, attached as Exhibit 3 to the Addendum.
d. The Appellee CPB's architect inspected the work no less than
once a week. See Deposition Exhibit 27, weekly and monthly
reports authored by Paul Evans); See Also Evans Depo at pages
44-45, attached as Exhibit 8 to the Addendum.
e. The Appellee CPB's Project director, Dean Schick inspected the
work approximately once every two or three weeks. Schick Depo
at page 33, attached as Exhibit 1 to the Addendum.
f. The contract gave the Appellee CPB a right to stop the
activities of the Appellee H & W Construction, Inc., or any
portion its activity, until the Appellee CPB determined that
Appellee H & W Construction, Inc. was performing its
obligations in the manner that Appellee CPB deemed
appropriate. See Conditions of the Contract, at Paragraph 2.3,
page 2 of 12, attached as Exhibit 3 to the Addendum.
g. The contract provided that the Appellee CPB, and its agent,
"the Architect,'' (Paul Evans), had access to the work wherever
located. See Conditions of the Contract, at Paragraph 3.12,
page 4 of 12, attached as Exhibit 3 to the Addendum.
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h. The contract provided that the Appellee CPB could condemn and
remove any portion of the work that Appellee CPB determined
did not comply with the contract or which Appellee CPB
determined was unsuitable because of a method of installation
or protection that the Appellee CPB determined was
inappropriate. See Conditions of the Contract, at Paragraph
4.2(E), page 5 of 12, attached as Exhibit 3 to the Addendum.
i. The contract provided that the Appellee CPB, through its agent
u

the Architect," (Paul Evans), had the authority to stop work

in order to ensure the performance of the work in a manner the
Appellee CPB deemed proper. See Conditions of the Contract, at
Paragraph 4.2(F), page 5 of 12, attached as Exhibit 3 to the
Addendum.
j . The contract provided that the Appellee CPB had final and
ultimate authority to reject any subcontractor and/or
employees, chosen by Appellee H & W Construction, Inc., and no
substitutions of Subcontractors could be made without approval
of the Appellee CPB. See Conditions of the Contract, at
Paragraph 5.1(B) through (C), page 5 of 12, attached as
Exhibit 3 to the Addendum. (Appellant discusses in the section
below, Section V(3), facts regarding the approval and
rejection of subcontractors and employees).
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k. The contract provided that the Appellee CPB could perform any
an all portions of the construction project, or enter into a
separate contract with other parties to perform any portion of
the work otherwise required by the contract. See Conditions of
the Contract, at Paragraph 6.1(A), page 6 of 12, attached as
Exhibit 3 to the Addendum.
1. The Appellee CPB installed its own seating (pews), carpet and
possibly certain other materials, (marker boards). Evans Depo
at page 81, excerpts attached as Exhibit 8 to the Addendum.
m. The contract provided that the Appellee CPB could enter the
job site and conduct any cleaning or removal of waste, and
allocate the cost of such clean up to whomever it wanted. See
Conditions of the Contract, at Paragraph 6.3, page 6 of 12,
attached as Exhibit 3 to the Addendum.
n. The contract provided that the Appellee CPB could instruct the
Appellee H & W, to make any changes of any nature in the work
so long as it paid for the additional cost of such changes.
See Conditions of the Contract, at Paragraph 7.1(A) through
(F), page 6 of 12; Paragraph 7.5(A), page 7 of 12; Paragraph
7.6(A) through (E), page 8 of 12, attached as Exhibit 3 to the
Addendum.
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o. The contract provided that the Appellee H & W had to obtain
specific permission from Appellee CPB to take measures to
safeguard persons or property, except in cases of emergency.
See Conditions of the Contract, at Paragraph 10.3, page 10 of
12, attached as Exhibit 3 to the Addendum,
p. The contract provided that the Appellee CPB could select the
materials used in the construction of the building. See
Conditions of the Contract, at Paragraph 15.4, page 12 of 12,
attached as Exhibit 3 to the Addendum.
Last, Appellee CPB and the Appellee H & W included a
variety of indemnity provisions in the contract they entered
with one another. These provisions were included because
Appellee CPB and Appellee H & W contemplated that Appellee CPB
would be liable for various acts and omissions committed by the
general contractor and subcontractors. This expectation was
based on the control that Appellee CPB retained, by contract,
over the methods, means and details of the work. The provisions
existed not to limit or remove the Appellee CPB's control, but
to allocate the cost (as opposed to liability and duty) of the
damages proximately caused by these acts and omissions to the
Appellee H & W. For assuming this indemnification obligation, as
well as other obligations, Appellee H & W was paid
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$1,633,900.00. See Agreement, at Article III, attached as
Exhibit 2 to the Addendum.
The indemnification provisions are located as follows in
the Contract, (Conditions of the Contract), attached as Exhibit
3 to the Addendum: Paragraph 3.2(C), page 3 of 12; Paragraph
3.13, page 4 of 12; Paragraph 3.14(A) through (E), page 4
through 12. These provisions should be read as important and
meaningful. If Appellee CPB truly believed and fully expected
that it would incur no liability because it had no control over
the activities of Appellee H & W, and that Appellee H & W was in
fact an independent contractor, it would not have inserted, or
agreed to the insertion of, these indemnity provisions. The
district court, in granting the Appellees7 Motion for Summary
Judgment, impliedly concluded that these provisions were
meaningless and unnecessary.
Additional provisions that demonstrate Appellee's
understanding and expectation that it was exercising sufficient
control over Appellee H & W, such that it would be liable for
any acts and omissions committed by Appellee H & W, include
provisions similar to the indemnification provisions identified
above. These provisions provide that Appellee H & W would be
"responsible to" Appellee CPB for losses and acts and omissions
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that cause damages to persons. See Conditions of the Contract,
at Paragraph 10.1, page 10 of 12, attached as Exhibit 3 to the
Addendum. Again, if Appellee CPB actually anticipated that it
would incur no liability because it had no control over the
activities of Appellee H & W, it would not have inserted, or
agreed to the insertion of, these provisions.
Appellee CPB's contemplated liability is also demonstrated
by the fact that Appellee CPB required Appellee H & W to name
Appellee CPB as an "insured" under the insurance policies
Appellee H & W, had to obtain. See Conditions of the Contract,
at Paragraph 11.1(A) (3) (c) and Paragraph 11.1.(B)(1) (a), page 10
of 12, attached as Exhibit 3 to the Addendum. Again, if the
contract and the contracting parties actually contemplated that
Appellee CPB would have no liability by virtue of any purported
lack of control, these provisions would not have been placed in
the contract.
The amount of control, and the extent of the rights,
retained in the contract, and otherwise exercised by Appellee
CPB, is such that the Appellee CPB remains liable under the
retained control doctrine as articulated by Thompson.

The

district court erred when it ruled that "the contracts and their
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provisions do not preclude summary judgment in favor of H & W
and the CPB.
3. Appellee CPB did not hold a relationship of principle-employer
and independent-contractor with Appellee H & W. Appellee CPB
possessed the right to right to accept or reject any
subcontractor or employee selected by Appellee H & W.
Appellants argued to the district court that the Appellee H
& W was an employee or agent of the Appellee CPB, and is
therefore liable for any acts or omissions committed on behalf
of Appellee H & W, as well as any acts and omissions committed
by itself. The district court erroneously found otherwise and
ignored clear Utah precedent. (See Order for Summary Judgment,
at page 7, attached as Exhibit 12); See Also, R. at 1043.
In Ludlow v. Industrial Commission et. al., 65 Utah 168,
179, 235 P. 884, 888 (Utah 1925), the Supreme Court of Utah held
that xxan independent contractor can employ others to do the work
and accomplish the contemplated result without the consent of
the contractee, while an employee cannot substitute another in
his place without the consent of his employer." This principle
was affirmed by the Supreme Court in Lodge v. Industrial
Commission, 562 P.2d 227, 228, 1977 Utah LEXIS 1082 (Utah
1977). Pursuant to the contract documents executed between
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Appellee CPB, and as revealed in the discovery identified below,
(and attached as Exhibits 2 and 3 to the Addendum), the Appellee
CPB retained and exercised the right to choose those employees
and subcontractors who would perform the work, or any portion of
the work, as well as reject any subcontractor chosen by Appellee
H & W. See Conditions of the Contract, attached as to the
Addendum as Exhibit 3, at Paragraph 5.1(B) through (C), page 5
of 12, and Paragraph 6.1 (A) , page 6 of 12.
The Supreme Court impliedly held that this employment power
was the sine

qua non2 of an independent contractor and it is this

authority and power that Appellee CPB withheld from Appellee H &
W Construction, Inc. (See Ludlow, supra

at 179, in which the

Court describes the authority to employ others as the "crux" of
the case; See Also Lodge, supra

at 228, in which the Lodge Court

quotes the Ludlow Court). Thus, because Appellee CPB had the
authority to hire and fire employees and subcontractors of
Appellee H & W, it lacked the sine

qua non of the independent

contractor relationship with Appellee H & W.
Other determinative factors in the independent contractor
analysis is whether the employer, (Appellee CPB), controlled,
directed, supervised or retained the right to control, direct or
2

sine qua non is a Latin phrase meaning "that without which the thing cannot be; an indispensable requisite or
condition." Black's Law Diet.
47
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supervise, the entity employed, (Appellee H & W Construction,
Inc.). Lodge, supra,

citing

Sommerville v. Industrial

Commission, 113 Utah 504, 196 P. 2d 718, 720 (Utah 1948). These
elements mirror those articulated by Thompson, and Plaintiffs
identify above, in Section V(2), the contractual provisions and
acts of Appellee CPB that indicate control, direction and
supervision over Appellee H & W. Thus, Appellee CPB did not hold
an independent contractor relationship with Appellee H & W, and
the district court erred when if found that such a relationship
existed.
VII.

CONCLUSION
The district court erred when it granted the Appellees'

respective motions for summary judgment.

This Court should

reverse the trial court and instruct it to deny the motions and
allow Appellants' case to proceed for trial on the merits.
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Respectfully submitted,

Shandor S. Badaruddin (9999)
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IX.

ADDENDUM AND INDEX THERETO
The Addendum follows this brief immediately after the

signatures and certificate of service. The Addendum contains the
following, as described in the Table of Contents:
Exhibit 1

Excerpts from the Deposition of Dean
Schick (Schick Depo)

Exhibit 2

The Agreement (Contract Document)

Exhibit 3

Conditions of the Contract (Contract
Document)

Exhibit 4

Excerpts from the Deposition of Brent
Reynolds (Reynolds Depo)

Exhibit 5

Letter from Brent Reynolds to Hales &
Warner

Exhibit 6

Excerpts from the Deposition of Joel
Warner (Warner Depo)

Exhibit 7

Excerpts from the Deposition of Maurice
Egbert (Egbert Depo)

Exhibit 8

Excerpts from the Deposition of Paul
Evans (Evans Depo)

Exhibit 9

Letter dated August 11, 1999 from
Clifford Hales to Brent Reynolds

Exhibit 10

Letter dated August 25, 1999 from
Clifford Hales to Brent Reynolds

Exhibit 11

Copy of Thompson v. Jess, 1999 Utah 22,
979 P.2d 322 (Utah 1999)

Exhibit 12

Order for Summary Judgment
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Exhibit 13

Copy of Simon v. Deery Oil, et. al., 699
F. Supp. 257 (Utah Dist. 1988)(Anderson,
J.)

Exhibit 14

Copy of Sewell v. Phillips Petroleum
Company,

606 F . 2 d 274

cn
( 1 0 tE~
Cir.

1979

Exhibit 15

Copy of Texaco, Inc. v. Pruitt, 396 F.2d
237 (10th Cir. 1968)

Exhibit 16

Copy of Erwin v. Kern River Gas
Transmission Co., Court of Appeals of
Texas, 1st Dist., (Case No. 01-96-00204CV, Decided December 18, 1997),1997 Tex.
App. LEXIS 6685

Exhibit 17

Hales & Warner Log for August 5, 1999

Exhibit 18

Excerpts from Deposition of Clifford
Hales

Exhibit 19

Excerpts from Deposition of Michael Lewis

Exhibit 20

Restatement (Second) of Torts §414(1965).
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A Project manager.
Q And what does a project manager do for the LDS
Church?
A Oversees construction projects.
Q Construction proj ects of what nature?
A New buildings, remodels, parking lots and HVAC
work.
Q Do you manage projects other than construction
or renovation or expansion of religious sites? In other
words, is it only churches or is it other things?
A No.
Q And how long have you been-was it project
manager?
A Yes.
Q How long have you been a project manager?
A About eight years.
Q Is there more than one proj ect manager at the
LDS Church?
A Yes.
Q Can you describe for me the structure of your
employer? In other words, there's you, and do you
manage other people and report to other people?
A I report to a regional project manager, and
he, in turn, reports to the DTA or director of temporal
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A Construction background.
Q And could you be more specific about
"construction background"?
A Myself?
Q Yes, sir. Why don't we start with your
education and work experience.
A I spent 15 years as a brick mason, six years
in manufacturing and producing blocks and building
retaining walls.
Q For one or more A Other entities.
Q And what, if any, education do you have?
A Two years of college. General ed.
Q And what was your first position with the LDS
Church?
A I was called a PM supervisor, preventative
maintenance supervisor.
Q And where did you go from PM supervisor?
A I was then hired as an area field rep, which
that title then changed to project manager.
Q And you've been a project manager for eight
years?
A Yes.
Q What exactly does a project manager do?
A We hire the architect and engineers on the
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bishopric.
Q And are all of those people located in the
same building?
A No.
Q Where is your office?
A American Fork.
Q And where is the regional manager's office?
A Currently, in our office.
Q And then he reported to a DTA.
A Yes.
Q His office would be where?
A Salt Lake.
Q Okay. Are there employees equal to you, other
project managers, in your office?
A Yes.
Q What do they do?
A The same thing.
Q In the same area?
A Yes.
Q And what, if any, training or qualifications
do you have, or education do you have, that allows you
to do your job?
A Are you talking about college education?
Q Well, what do you need to have to be a project
manager for the LDS Church?
.... ,
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projects.
Q How do you know you have a project? Do you
decide what projects will be built or does someone tell
you, We want to do something?
A No, that comes out of Salt Lake.
Q Well, let's talk about this project at which
Jason Smith lost his life.
What is the name of that project? The
Highland project, can I call it that?
A Highland 4 and 20.
Q How did the Highland 4 and 20 project come to
exist?
A There's a department called planning, and they
decide who should get a building. And once that
happens, then they issue a work order to us, and then I
go out and hire the architect to design the building.
Q How do you know whether to make the building
as big as this room or as big as this entire building?
A The Church has a standard plan.
Q They build the same building everywhere they
go?
A It's cookie cutter, yes.
Q Regardless of the size of the congregation
that they're going to serve?
A Yes.
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A You can just tell, looking at it, observing.
Q I was reviewing Exhibit 23, and there's an
indication in there that the owner would establish the
property lines and bench marks for grading.
Do you know what I'm talking about?
A Yes.
Q What does that mean?
A The surveyor comes out and says, Here's the
bench line for this project, which establishes the
height or elevation of the building, and then he'll
establish where the corners of the building are at.
Q And then the general contractor fills in the
rest?
A Yes.
Q And there's also a provision in the contract
about furnishing information and services required for
the orderly progress of work.
If you need to review it, it's paragraph
2.1 B. What does that mean? It's Exhibit 23,2.1 B.
A Sometimes we'll have delays, for example, in
the building permit. Sometimes we have things that we
order, meaning the Church, for example, the pews and the
carpet we order, and those are items that we have to
order and make sure they get there on time.
Q Okay. Did you ever stop Hales & Warner from

Q And look at the work that had been done?
Inspect it? What exactly did you do?
A We'd look at it, observe it.
Q And would you compare it to your plans or
designs?
A Yes.
Q For what purpose?
A Make sure it was installed correctly.
Q In the Highland 4 and 20 project, was anything 1
installed incorrectly?
A No.
Q Were all the components as you specified in
your designs or otherwise?
A When you say "all," you know, we're all human.
I couldn't have caught everything, but to my knowledge,
yes.
Q Do you recall whether or not you made any
change orders?
A Yes.
Q Did you make any change orders?
A I always do. I have yet to build one that we
don't.
Q What sort of change orders did you make?
A I don't remember right offhand. I'd have to
look back on that project. It's been too long ago to
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working on any part of the Highland 4 and 20 project,
because whatever it was they might be doing or the
subcontractors were doing didn't meet your standards?
A No.
Q Did you inspect the Highland 4 and 20 project
at any time after the work began?
When I say "work," I mean construction.
A Let's put it this way; I observed. I don't
inspect.
Q Okay. What exactly did you do? You drove out
there; right?
A We would hold monthly meetings.
Q Where?
A On the site.
Q Where?
A In the construction trailer.
Q In a trailer? And what did those entail?
A We would review the schedule, mostly payment
requests, any subcontractor problems or change orders,
things of that nature.
Q And what else, if anything, did you do?
A We would go out and look at the work that had
been done.
Q You would walk around the site?
A Yes.
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remember how many we had there.
Q Earlier on, we were talking about Mr. Evans,
the architect. Did his involvement in the Highland 4
and 20 project end after he made the designs and plans?
A No.
I
Q What sort of involvement did he have?
A He has what we call "contract administration"
from that point on.
Q And what is "contract administration"?
A It's to basically make sure that that building
is built as per plans and specs.
Q Did he report to you?
A Yes.
Q How often did he report to you?
A We would - every month we would talk about
things, and he would send a report every week.
Q To?
A Tome.
Q And the report was in writing, was it not?
A Yes. It's a job site report.
Q Is that what it says at the top of it, job
site report?
|
A I believe that's sort of - every architect
does it differently, but it is a weekly report; maybe
his visit to the site.
1
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A No.
Q Were there any standards that you imposed on
Hales & Warner in the selection of their subcontractors?
A No.
Q Were there any subcontractors that Hales &
Warner tried to use that you told them they couldn't?
A Not that I recall.
Q Did you have to hire any subcontractors to
complete any portion of the work at Highland 4 and 20?
A No.
Q Had you known that the subcontractors were
using untrained laborers, would you have had an opinion
or desire about that?
A Probably not.
Q Were you familiar with any safety rules or
regulations at the Highland 4 and 20 project?
A You mean like their safety meetings and stuff
like that?
Q That's a good start, yes.
A I knew they had some. I don't know the
frequency.
Q Do you know who was in charge of conducting
the safety meeting?
A Maurice.
Q Of course, you never attended one of these
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A We usually like to review it.
Q Why?
A To see if there's anybody on there we don't
want to have to deal with.
Q Did you see anybody on the subcontractor list
that you didn't want to have to deal with?
A Not that I recall.
Q Did you make any inquiry or investigation
regarding any of the subcontractors on the contractor
list?
A Not that I recall on that one.
Q Did all of them meet your standards with
regard to minimum limits and length of time in business, 1
and ability to meet this timing schedule and the quality 1
of their work? Did they meet all of those standards?
A That's up to the general contractor.
Q You trusted the general contractor to make an
appropriate selection?
A Yes.
Q And in this case, that was Hales & Warner.
A Yes.
I
Q When you would visit the site, did you tell
Hales & Warner or anybody else that you were coming?
A No.
Q Did you go at the same time every month?
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safety meetings.
A No.
Q How do you know they had them?
A They just told me they did.
Q Do you know whether Hales & Warner was using
subcontractors?
A Yes.
Q Were they using subcontractors?
A Yes.
Q How do you know?
A Because they don't have that many guys that
they employ to do all of that work.
Q Couldn't they just hire a bunch of people to
do it all on a non-permanent basis?
A I guess they could if they wanted. They'd be
insane, but...
Q I'm wondering how you knew they were using
subcontractors?
A Just because they gave us a subcontractor
list.
Q Did they? And did you review the list?
A Yes.
Q And how often did you receive the list?
A Just at the bid opening.
Q Why did they give you a subcontractor list?
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A No.
Q How often did you go?
A Just depended on my schedule.
Q Looking back, approximately how much did you
visit the site?
A Probably every two or three weeks.
Q And when you got there, did anyone show you
around or did you show yourself around?
A No, Maurice would go with me.
Q How would you know that he would be there and
be available?
'1
A Because he was always there.
Q How did you know he would be available?
A He just made himself available.
Q Did you determine whether or not the
subcontractors on the subcontractor list were licensed
or permitted to do whatever it was they were doing?
A No.
Q Now, for example, with installing the
electrical work or system, how do you know it's being
done by an electrician as opposed to somebody who thinks
they know how to do wiring?
A It's up to the general contractor.
Q You would agree with me, would you not, that
you'd want a competent professional to install the

—
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1

AGREEMENT

2
3

This Agreement made and entered into this /

day of M&Y

in the year Nineteen

4

Hundred and Ninety-nine by and between the CORPORATION OF THE PRESIDING BISHOP OF THE

5

CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST OF LATTER-DAY SAINTS, A Utah Corporation Sole, hereinafter called

6

"OWNER" and HALES& WARNER CONSTRUCTION, INC. hereinafter called ,,CONTRACTORn.

7

WITNESSETH:

8

WHEREAS: Owner intends to have certain work performed as outiined below, and

9

WHEREAS: Contractor is able and willing to perform such work.
NOW THEREFORE: Owner and Contractor for the considerations hereinafter provided agree

10
11

as follows:

12

ARTICLE I. SCOPE OF WORK

[3

Contractor shall furnish all of the materials and equipment and perform all of the labor

4

necessary to complete all of the work as required in the Contract Documents entitled HIGHLAND 4, 20

5 II WARDS; HIGHLAND 4, 20 WARDS as prepared by BUTLER & EVANS ARCHITECTS, L.L.C. hereinafter
6

referred to as "ARCHITECT".

7 | | ARTICLE II. THE CONTRACT DOCUMENTS
The General Conditions of the Contract, Supplementary Conditions, the Manual entitled
9 [J HIGHLAND 4, 20 WARDS numbered Divisions 01 through 13, 15, 16, dated January 1999, Addenda No. 1,
3 2, 3, and the Drawings dated January 1999 entitled HIGHLAND 4, 20 WARDS and numbered G1.0 - G1.6,
i jj SD1.1, SD1.2, Ll.l - LL4, Al.l - A1.6, A2.1, A2.2, A3.I - A3.7, A4.1 - A43, A5.1 - A5.4, A6.1 - A6.6, A7.1
A7.3, A8.1, Fl.l, F2.1, F2.2, F3.1, F3.2, S1.0 - Sl.4, S2.1 - S2.8, S3.1, S3.2, P l . l , P1.2, P2.1, P3.1, Ml.l.
\ || M2.1, M3.1, M4.1,M4.2, M5.1, ME1.1, ME2.1 - ME2.4, El.l - E1.3, E2.1, E2.2, E3.1, E4.1, E4.2, AV1.1,
|| AY1.2 together with this Agreement form the Contract and are as fully a part thereof as if attached hereto or
repeated herein.
ARTICLE HI. THE CONTRACT SUM
Owner shall pay and contractor shall accept as full payment of this Contract the sum of ONE
MILLION SIX HUNDRED THIRTY THREE THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED AND NO/100 DOLLARS
($1,633,900.00), subject to additions and deductions provided in the Contract.
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ARTICLE IV. TIME OF COMMENCEMENT AND COMPLETION
Work under this Contract shall commence upon written notice to proceed from Owner, and
be completed and ready for Owner's final inspection within 300 calendar days from the date of such notice.
Time is of the essence.
ARTICLE V. INSPECTION
The fact that any particular work has been, inspected shall not be considered a waiver of the
requirements of strict compliance with the Contract Documents.
ARTICLE VI. CONTRACTOR NOT AGENT OF OWNER
It is expressly agreed that Contractor is not the agent or employee of Owner, but that he is an.
independent Contractor.
ARTICLE VII. PROGRESS PAYMENTS. FINAL ACCEPTANCE AND FINAL PAYMENT
Payments shall be made in accordance with the applicable Sections of the Contract Documents.
ARTICLE VIII. ASSIGNS
Neither party to the Contract shall assign the Contract or sublet it as a whole without, the
written consent of the other. Contractor shall not assign any monies due or to become due to him hereunder
nor shall he pledge or attempt to pledge the credit of Owner or bind the Owner to any third party.
ARTICLE IX. ACCEPTANCE
The work shall be inspected for acceptance by Owner promptly upon receipt of notice from
Contractor and Architect that all work is complete and ready for inspection. The building and all materials
and work connected therewith shall be at Contractor's risk until accepted by Owner in. writing.
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ARTICLE X, DEFAULT1 AND ATTORNEY'S FEES
Should any dispute arise between the parties hereto, with regard to the performance of their
respective obligations under the Contract Documents, which dispute cannot be settled between the parties and
litigation is commenced, then the losing party in the litigation agrees to pay all costs and attorney's fees of the
prevailing party.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have executed this Agreement, the day and year
first above written, binding themselves, their heirs, successors, executors, administrators and representatives
to the full performance of the contract.

REVIEWED

ACCEPTED
OWNER:

ARCHITECTURAL AND ENGINEERING
DIVISION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
PHYSICAL FACILITIES FIELD
OPERATION SUPPORT SECTION

CORPORATION OF THE PRESIDING BISHOP
OF THE CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST OF
LATTER-DAY SAINTS,
A Utah Corporation Sole

By.

By.
Member, Executive Staff

&
yjt^^T
A&0* £"~x\n^\s^^
Goo^ges^I-Ronnet, Authorized Agent

CONTRACTOR:
HALES& WARNER CONSTRUCTION, INC.
1460 NORTH MAIN, UNIT 1
SPANISH FORK, UT 84660

4/ Mfe' ^ W » / '
Name and TitleLicense Number
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GENERAL CONDITIONS
.

(FIXED SUM)

ARCHITECTURAL AND ENGINEERING SERVICES DIVISION
TEMPLE CONSTRUCTION DEPARTMENT
THE CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST OF LATTER-DAY SAINTS
TABLE
SECTION 1
SECTION 2
SECTION 3
SECTION 4
SECTION 5
SECTION 6
SECTION 7
SECTION 8

OF CO PJTENTS

GENERAL PROVISIONS
OWNER
CONTRACTOR
ADMINISTRATION OF THE
CONTRACT
SUBCONTRACTORS
CONSTRUCTION BY OWNER OR
BY SEPARATE CONTRACTORS
CHANGES IN THE WORK
TIME

SECTION 9
SECTION 10
SECTION 11
SECTION 12
SECTION 13
SECTION 14
SECTION 15

PAYMENTS AND COMPLETION
PROTECTION OF PERSONS AND
PROPERTY
INSURANCE AND BONDS
UNCOVERING AND CORRECTION
OF WORK
RESOLUTION OF DISPUTES
TERMINATION OR SUSPENSION
OF THE CONTRACT
MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS

SECTION 1 - GENERAL PROVISIONS

Contract in the form of a:
1. Change Order;

1.1

2. Construction Change Directive; or
3. Field Change.

A.

DEFINITIONS
Agreement: The Agreement is the document entitled
"Agreement Between Owner and Contractor" executed by
the Owner and the ContraStdr f or performance of the Work.

B.

Architect: The Architect is the entity identified as such in
the Agreement.

C.

Change In The Work: A Change in the Work is:
1.

A modification to the requirements of the Contract
Documents or a delay in Substantial Completion
resulting from' an instruction from the Owner or
Architect to the Contractor;

2,

A modification to the requirements of the Contract
Documents or a delay in Substantial Completion
resulting from an event or circumstance other than an
instruction from the Owner or Architect to the Contractor.

D-

Contract: The Contract Documents form the Contract.

E.

Contract Documents: The Contract Documents consist of
the documents identified as such in the Agreement.

P-

Contractor. The Contractor is the entity identified as such
in the Agreement.

G.

Contract Sum: The Contract Sum is the total amount
stated in the Agreement as amended by Modifications
payable by the Owner to the Contractor for performance
of the Work.

H.

Contract Time: The Contract Time is the period of time
stated in the Agreement as amended by Modifications for
Substantial Completion of the Work.

L

J.

, .

L.

Owner: The Owner is the entity identified as such in the
Agreement.

M.

Protect: The Project is the total construction designed by
the Architect of which the Work performed under the
Contract Documents may be the whole or a part.

I\J.

Product Data: Product Data consists of standard illustrations, schedules, performance charts, instructions, brochures, diagrams, and other information furnished by the..
Contractor to illustrate details regarding materials or
equipment to be used in the Work, o r the manner of
installation, operation, or maintenance of s u c h materials or
equipment.

0.

Project Manual: The Project Manual is the volume assembled for the Work which includes the bidding requirements,
sample forms, the Conditions of the Contract, the Specifications, and other information.

P.

Samples And Mock-ups: Samples and Mock-ups are
physical examples which illustrate materials, equipment, or
workmanship and establish standards b y which the Work
will be judged.

Q.

Shop Drawings: Shop Drawings are drawings, diagrams,
illustrations, schedules, performance charts, fabrication and
installation drawings, setting diagrams, patterns, templates,
and other data which are specially prepared by the Contractor or any Subcontractor, manufacturer, supplier, or
distributor. Shop drawings illustrate s o m e portion of the
Work and confirm dimensions and conformance to the
Contract Documents.

R.

Specifications: The Specifications consist o f the documents
identified as such in the Agreement.

Oav: The term "day" means calendar day unless otherwise
S.
Subcontractor: A Subcontractor is any entity supplying
specifically defined.
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Drawinas: The Drawinas consist of the documents

for the Work from the local governmental authority having
jurisdiction over the Work and the Work is sufficiently
complete that Owner can use the Work for its intended
purpose. The date of Substantial Completion is the substantial completion date certified by the Architect in
accordance with the Contract Documents.
U.

Work: The Work includes all labor, materials, equipment
and construction required by the Contract Documents.

V.

Written Notice: Written-notice is notice in writing given
from one party to the other. Written Notice shall be
effective:
1. On the date of personal delivery to the other party;
2. On the date sent by facsimile transmission to the other
party provided receipt of the facsimile is verified by
telephone or an electronic confirmation report by the
party sending the facsimile transmission;
3. Three days after the date of mailing by first class mail
postage prepaid to the other party's last known
business address; or
4. Or the date of receipt by the other party as stated on
the return receipt if sent by registered or certified mail,
or by courier.

B.

The Owner will furnish to the Contractor any information
or services it is required to furnish under the Contract
Documents with reasonable promptness to avoid delay in
the orderly progress of the Work,

C.

The Owner will furnish to the Contractor up to thirty-six (36)
copies of the Drawings, the Project Manual, and the
Addenda.

2.2
[

OWNER'S RIGHT T O INSPECT THE W O R K
The Owner and its representatives shall have the right to
inspect any portion of the Work wherever located at any
time.

2.3

O W N E R ' S RIGHT T O STOP THE W O R K
If the Contractor fails to carry-out the W o r k in accordance
with the Contract Documents or fails to correct Work which
is not in accordance with the Contract Documents in a
timely manner, the Owner may order the Contractor in
writing to stop the Work, or any portion thereof, until the
cause for such order has been eliminated.

SECTION 3 - CONTRACTOR
1.2

EXECUTION, CORRELATION, A M D INTENT
3.1

A.

B.

By executing the Agreement, the Contractor represents that
it has visited the site, familiarized itself with the local
conditions under which the. Work is to be performed, and
correlated its own observations with the requirements of
the Contract Documents.
The intent of the Contract Documents is to include all labor,
materials, equipment, and other items necessary for the
proper execution and completion of the Work.
The
Contract Documents are complementary and what is
required by any one shall be as binding as if required by all.
Performance by the Contractor shall be required only to the
extent consistent with the Contract Documents and
reasonably inferable from them as being necessary to produes the.intended result.

C.

The organization of the Contract Documents is not intended
to control the Contractor in dividing the Work among
Subcontractors or to establish the extent of the Work to be
performed by any trade..

D.

Words used in the Contract Documents which have well
known technical or trade meanings are used therein in
accordance with such recognized meanings.

E.

In the interest of brevity, the Contract Documents may omit
modifying words such as "all" and "any" and articles such
as "the" and "an," but the fact that a modifier or an article
is absent from one statement and appears in another is not
intended to affect the interpretation of either statement.

1.3

AND

FIELD

A.

The Contractor shall carefully compare the Contract Documents with each other and with other information relating
to the Project prior to commencing the W o r k and during
performance of the Work and shall immediately report to the
Architect errors, inconsistencies, and omissions discovered.

B.

Should the Contractor or any of its Subcontractors become
aware of any question regarding the meaning or intent of
any part of the Contract Documents prior to commencing
that portion of the Work about which there is a question,
the Contractor shall request an interpretation or clarification
from the Architect before proceeding. T h e Contractor
proceeds at its own risk if it proceeds with the Work
without first making such a request and receiving an
interpretation or clarification from the Architect. If neither
the Contractor nor the affected Subcontractors become
aware of the question until after w o r k on the relevant
portion of the Work has commenced, then the following
precedence shall govern for purposes of determining
whether resolution of the question constitutes a Change in
the Work:
1. The Agreement takes precedence over all other documents.
2 . The Supplementary Conditions take precedence over the
General Conditions.
3. The General Conditions and Supplementary Conditions
. take precedence over the Drawings and the Specifications.
4 . A n Addendum or Modification takes precedence over
the document(s) modified by the Addendum or Modification.
5. The Specifications take precedence over the Drawings.
6. Within the Drawings, larger scale drawings take precedence over smaller scale drawings, figured dimensions
over scaled dimensions, and noted materials * over
graphic indications.

,
•
.:
•
•
!

OWNERSHIP A N D U S E OF C O N T R A C T D O C U M E N T S
The Drawings, the Project Manuals, and copies thereof are
the property of the Owner. The Contractor shall not use
these documents on any other project. The Contractor may
retain one copy of the Drawings and the Project Manual as
a Contract record set and shall dispose of all remaining
copies following final .completion of the Work.

It is not the Contractor's responsibility to ascertain that the
Contract Documents are in accordance with requirements
of governing public authorities. However, if the Contractor
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SECTION 1 - OWNER
2.1

REVIEW OF CONTRACT DOCUMENTS
C O N D m O N S BY CONTRACTOR

C.

laws, regulations, and ordinances have been effected. The
Contractor shall be fully responsible for any work knowingly
performed contrary to such laws, regulations, and ordinances and shall fully indemnify the Owner against loss and
bear all costs and penalties arising therefrom.
D.

E.

The Contractor shall take field measurements and verify
field conditions and shall compare such field measurements
and conditions and other information known to the Contractor with the Contract Documents before ordering any
materials or commencing construction activities. The
Contractor shall immediately report errors, inconsistencies,
and omissions which it discovers to the Architect. If the
Contractor orders materials or commences construction
activities before taking field measurements and verifying
field conditions, the Contractor shall not be entitled to any
compensation for additional costs to the Contractor
resulting from field measurements or conditions different
from those anticipated by the Contractor which would have
been avoided had the Contractor taken field measurements
and verified field conditions prior to ordering the materials
or commencing construction activities.

C.

The Contractor is fully responsible for the Project an{
materials and work connected therewith until the Owner
accepted the work in writing. The Contractor shall repl
or repair at its own expense any materials or work dama
or stolen, regardless of whether it has received payment
such work or materials from the Owner.

D.

The Contractor shall remedy all damage or loss to i
property caused in whole or in part by the Contractor, i
Subcontractor, or anyone directly or indirectly employed
any of them, or by anyone for whose acts any of them rr
be liable.

3.4

The Contractor warrants to the Owner that the materii
and equipment furnished under the Contract will be
specified quality and new unless otherwise required
permitted by the Contract Documents, that the Work w
be free from defects, and that the Work will conform wi
the requirements of the Contract Documents. Work n>
conforming to these requirements, including substitutior
not properly approved and authorized, may be considere
defective. If required by the Architect, the Contractor shf
furnish satisfactory evidence as to the kind and quality c
the materials and equipment used in performing the Worl

If site conditions indicated in the Contract Documents differ
materially from those the Contractor encounters in performance of the Work, the Contractor shall Immediately notify
the Architect in writing of such differing site conditions.
3.5

3.2
A.

B.

The Contractor shall supervise and direct the Work using
its best skill and attention. The Contractor shall be solely
responsible for all construction means, methods, techniques, sequences, and procedures and for coordinating all
portions of the Work.
The Contractor shall be responsible for:
1. The proper observance of property lines and set back
requirements as shown in the Contract Documents; and
2. The location and layout of the Work as shown in the
Contract Documents with respect to the position of the
Work on the property and the elevation of the Work in
relation to grade.
The Contractor shall be responsible to the Owner for the
acts and omissions of the Contractor's employees,
Subcontractors, and their agents and employees, and other
persons performing pohi6ns of the Work under a contract
with the Contractor or any Subcontractor.

D.

The Contractor shall not be relieved of its obligation to
perform the Work in accordance with the Contract Documents either by the activities or duties of the Architect in
the Architect's administration of the Contract, or by tests,
inspections, or approvals required or performed by persons
other than the Contractor.

3.3
A.

B.

TAXES

SUPERVISION OF CONSTRUCTION PROCEDURES

C.

E.

WARRANTY

The Contractor shall be responsible for inspection of
portions of the Work already performed under the Contract
to determine that such portions are in proper condition to
receive subsequent portions of the Work.

A.

The Contractor shall pay ail sales, use, consumer, payroll
workers compensation, unemployment, old age pension
surtax, and similar taxes assessed in connection with thi
performance/of the work.

B.

The Owner will pay all taxes and assessments on the rea
property comprising the Project site.

3.6
A.

The Owner will obtain and pay for ail permanent easements
necessary for completion of the Work.

EL

The Owner will pay the cost of permits, fees, and improvement bonds required by local agencies necessary for the
proper execution and completion of the Work. The Owner
will arrange for issuance of permits and the Contractor shall
be responsible for picking up the permits from the local
agencies.

C.

The Contractor shall obtain and pay the cost of licenses
necessary for the proper execution and completion of the
Work.

D.

The Contractor shall secure any certificates of inspection
and of occupancy that may be required by authorities having
jurisdiction over the Work. The Contractor shall deliver
. these certificates to the Architect prior to execution of the
Certificate of Substantial Completion.

E.

The Contractor shall comply with and give any notices required by the laws, ordinances, rules, regulations, and
lawful orders of any public authorities bearing on performance of the Work.

LABOR A N D MATERIALS
Unless otherwise provided in the Contract Documents, the
Contractor shall provide and pay for all labor, materials,
equipment, tools, water, .heat,, utilities, transportation, and
other facilities and services necessary for the proper
execution and completion of the Work.

PERMITS, FEES, AND NOTICES

3.7

CONTRACTOR'S ON-SITE REPRESENTATIVE

The Contractor shall employ a competent representative to
supervise the performance of the Work. This representative
shall be in attendance at the Project site during the performance of the Work. This representative shall represent the
The Contractor shall
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the Work and shall
the Owner. All communications will be confirmed in

3.8

CONTRACTOR'S CONSTRUCTION SCHEDULES

A.

The Contractor shall prepare and submit for the Owner's
and the Architect's information the Contractor's construction schedule for the Work. The schedule shall cover
the time limits stated in the Contract Documents, shall be
revised at specified intervals, shall relate to all of the work,
and shall provide for the expeditious and practicable
execution of the Work.

B.

The Contractor shall prepare and keep current a submittal
schedule which is coordinated with the Contractor's
construction schedule and which allows the Architect
specified times to review submittals.

3.13

The Contractor shall pay all royalties and license fees
required by the Work or by the Contractor's chosen method
of performing the Work. The Contractor shall defend and
hold the Owner harmless from all suits or claims for
infringement of any patent or license rights or any loss on
account thereof.
3.14

3.9

A.

DOCUMENTS A N D SUBMITTALS A T T H E SITE
The Contractor shall keep at the Project site for use by the
Owner, the Architect, or their representatives, a record
copy of the Project Manual, the Drawings, all Addenda, and
all Modifications. These documents shall be maintained in
good order and currently marked to record changes and
selections made during construction. In addition, the
Contractor shall keep at the Project site one copy of all
Product Data, Shop. Drawings, Samples, and similar
submittals requited by the Contract Documents.

3.10

PRODUCT D A T A , S H O P DRAWINGS, A N D S A M P L E S

A.

Product Data, Shop Drawings, Samples, and similar
submittals are not Contract Documents and do not alter the
requirements of the Contract Documents unless incorporated into the Contract Documents b/a Modification.
The Contractor shall review, approve, and submit to the
Architect Product Data, Shop Drawings, Samples, and
similar submittals in accordance with the Contract Documents, Submittals not required by the Contract Documents
may be returned without action. By approving Product
Data, Shop Drawings, Samples, and similar submittals, the
Contractor represents that it has determined and verified
field measurements, field construction criteria, materials,
catalog numbers, and similar data, and that it has checked
and coordinated each submittal with the requirements of
the Work and of the Contract Documents or will make such
determination, verification, check, and coordination prior
to commencing the relevant portion of the Work.

C.

The Contractor shall not perform any portions of the Work
requiring submittals until the respective submittal has been
reviewed and accepted by the Architect.

D.

The Contractor shall not be relieved of responsibility for
deviations from the requirements of the Contract Documents by the Architect's acceptance of submittals unless
the Contractor has specifically informed the Architect in
writing of such deviations at the time of submission and the
Architect has incorporated the deviation into the Contract
Documents by a Modification. The Contractor shall not be
relieved of responsibility for errors or omissions in submittals by the Architect's acceptance of the submittal.

ZA1

CUTTING AND

The Contractor shall indemnify and hold harmless the
Owner, the Architect, their consultants, and the agents and
employees of any of the foregoing from and against any and
all claims, damages, liability, demands, costs, judgements,
awards, settlements, causes of action, losses and expenses,
including but not limited to attorneys fees, arising out of or
resulting from performance of the Work, attributable to
bodily injury, sickness, disease, or death, or tD injury to or
destruction of tangible or real property, including loss of use
resulting therefrom, but only to the extent caused in whole
or in part by the negligent acts or omissions of the Contractor, any Subcontractor, anyone directly or indirectly
employed by them, or anyone for whose acts they may be
liable, regardless of whether such claim, damage, loss, or
expense is caused in part by a party indemnified hereunder.
In the event that any such claim, damage, loss, or expense
is caused in part by a party indemnified hereunder, that
party shall bear the cost of such claim, damage, loss, or
expense to the extent it was the cause thereof, in the event
that the claimant asserts a claim for recovery against any
party indemnified hereunder, the party indemnified hereunder may tender the defense of such claim to the Contractor.
If the Contractor rejects such tender of defense and it is
later determined that the party indemnified hereunder did
not cause any part of the claim, damage, loss, or expense,
the Contractor shall reimburse the party indemnified
hereunder for costs and expenses incurred by that party in
defending against the claim. The Contractor shall not be
liable hereunder to indemnify any party for damages
resulting from the sole negligence of that party.
in addition to the foregoing, the Contractor shall be liable
to defend the Owner in any lawsuit filed by any Subcontractor relating to the Project. Where liens have been filed
against the Owner's property, the Contractor and/or its
bonding company which has issued bonds for the Project,
shall obtain Hen releases and record them in the appropriate
county and/or local jurisdiction and provide the Owner with
a title free and clear from any liens of Subcontractors. In
the event that the Contractor and its bonding company are
unable to obtain a lien release, the Owner in its absolute
discretion may require the Contractor to provide a bond
around the lien or a bond to discharge the lien at the
Contractor's sole expense.

C.

in addition to the foregoing, the Contractor shall indemnify
and hold the Owner harmless from any claim of any other
contractor resulting from the performance, nonperformance
or delay in performance of the Work by the Contractor.

D.

No subcontract shall relieve the Contractor of any of its
liability or obligations to the Owner under the Contract
Documents. The Contractor agrees that it is fully responsible to the Owner for acts or omissions of Subcontractors
and of persons either directly or indirectly employed by
them.

PATCHING

ACCESS T O W O R K

INDEMNIFICATION

B.

The Contractor shall be responsible for any cutting, fitting,
and patching that may be required to complete the Work
and make its parts fit together properly.
S.T2

ROYALTIES AND PATENTS

E.

In claims against any person or entity indemnified under this
Article 3.14 by an employee of the Contractor or any
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
The Contractor shall provide the Owner and the Architect
Subcontractor or anyone employed directly or indirectly by
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Subcontractor under worker's compensation acts, disability
benefit acts, or other employee benefit acts.

review of submittals shall not relieve the Contractor of its
obligations under the Contract Documents. The Architect's
review of submittals shall not constitute acceptance of
safety precautions or construction means, methods, techniques, sequences or procedures. The Architect's acceptance of a specific item shall not indicate acceptance of an
assembly of which the item is a component.

SECTION 4 - ADIVliNIStRATlOM OF THE CONTRACT
4.1

ARCHITECT
In case of the termination of the employment of the
Architect, the Owner shall appoint in writing an Architect
against whom the Contractor makes no reasonable
objection, whose status under the Contract Documents
shall be that of the former Architect in all respects.

4.2
A.

B.

C.

D.

E.

H.

The Architect has authority to order Construction Change
Directives and Field Changes in accordance with Section 7.

I.

The Architect will conduct inspections to determine the
dates of Substantial Completion and final completion, will
receive and review written guarantees and related documents required by the Contract and assembled by the
Contractor, and will review and approve or reject the
Contractor's final payment request.

J.

The Architect shalf be the interpreter of the performance
and requirements of the Contract Documents. The Archit e c t ' s interpretations shall be in writing or in the form of
drawings.

K.

The Architect's decisions in matters relating to artistic
effect will be final if consistent with the Contract Documents.

ARCHITECT'S ADMINISTRATION OF THE C O N T R A C T
The Architect shall be the Owner's representative during
the construction period. He shall have authority to act on
behalf of the Owner only to the extent provided in the
Contract Documents.
'*
The Architect will make frequent visits to the site to
familiarize itself generally with the progress and quality of
the Work and to determine if the Work is proceeding in
accordance with the Contract Documents. Although the
Architect is required to make periodic inspections, it is not
required to make exhaustive or continuous onsite inspections. On the basis of its observations while at the site, the
Architect will keep the Owner informed of the progress of
the Work and will endeavor to guard the Owner against
defects and deficiencies in the Work. The fact that the
Architect has failed to observe a defect or deficiency in the
Work shall not relieve the Contractor of its duty to perform
the Work in accordance with the Contract Documents.
Communications between the Contractor and the Owner
relating to the Work shall be through the Architect. Communications between the Owner or the Contractor with the
Architect's consultants relating to the Work shall be
through the Architect. Communications between the
Owner or the Architect and the Subcontractors relating to
the Work shall be through the Contractor. Communications
between the Contractor and any separate contractor shall
be through the Architect, except as otherwise specified in
the Contract Documents.
The Architect will review the Contractor's Payment
Requests and determine the amounts due the Contractor
in accordance with Section 9.
The Owner and/or the' Architect shall have the right to
condemn and require removal of the following at the
Contractor's expense:
1. Any portion of the Work which does not meet the
requirements of the Contract Documents.
2. Any portion of the Work damaged or rendered unsuitable during installation or resulting from failure to
exercise proper protection.

SECTION 5 - SUBCOWTTWCTORS
5.1

A W A R D OF SUBCONTRACTS A N D OTHER
CONTRACTS FOR PORTIONS OF T H E WORK

A.

The Contractor shall enter into contracts with Subcontractors to perform all portions of the Work that the Contractor
does not customarily perform with its own employees.

B.

The Contractor shall not contract with any Subcontractor
who has been rejected by the Owner. The Contractor will
not be required to contract with any Subcontractor against
whom it has a reasonable objection.

C.

If the Owner refuses to accept any Subcontractor proposed
by the Contractor, the Contractor shall propose an acceptable substitute to whom the Owner has no reasonable
objection.

D.

The Contractor shall not make any substitution for any
Subcontractor which has been accepted by the Owner and
the Architect without the prior written approval of the
Owner and the Architect.

5.2
A.

SUBCONTRACTUAL RELATIONS
T h e Contractor's responsibility for the Work includes the
work and materials of all Subcontractors including those
recommended or approved by the Owner. The Contractor
.shall be responsible to the Owner for proper completion and
guarantee of all workmanship and materials under any •
subcontracts. Any warranties required for such work shall
be obtained by the Contractor in favor of the Owner and
delivered to the Architect. It is expressly understood and
agreed that there is no contractual relationship between the
Owner and any Subcontractor, and under no circumstances
shall the Owner be responsible for the non-performance or
financial failure of any Subcontractor or any effects
therefrom.

F.

The Architect shall have authority to stop the Work, with
concurrence of the Owner, whenever such stoppage-may
be necessary in its reasonable opinion to insure the proper
performance of the Work.

G.

The Architect will review the Contractor's submittals such
as Product Data, Shop Drawings, Samples, and Mock-ups
and shall accept or take other appropriate action regarding
the submittals. The Architect's review of the submittals
shall be for the limited purpose of checking for general
B.
The Contractor agrees to pay the Subcontractors promptly
conformance with the Contract Documents and shall not
upon receipt of payment from the Owner for that portion
be conducted for the purpose of determining the accuracy
of the funds received which represents the Subcontractor's
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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quantities, or for substantiating instructions for installation
tion for which payment was made b v the Owner.

C.

The Contractor shall require each Subcontractor to:
1. Be licensed by the state in which the Project is located
where such licensing is required by the governing
authority;
2. Be bound by the terms of the Contract Documents as
far as they are applicable to the Subcontractor's work;
3. Assume toward the Contractor the same obligations
the Contractor has...assumed toward the Owner,
including the prompt payment of its employees,
subcontractors, and materialmen;
4. Submit its applications for payment to the Contractor
in time to permit the Contractor to make timely application to the Owner;
5. Execute claim or lien releases or lien waivers for
payments made by the Contractor; and
6. Make all claims for extra work done or for extensions
. of time to the Contractor in the same manner as the
Contractor is required to make such claims to the
Owner. ;

A.

B.

If the Contractor receives an instruction from the Owner or
the Architect which the Contractor considers a Change in
the Work, the Contractor before complying with the
instruction shall notify the Architect in writing that the
Contractor considers such instruction to constitute a
Change in the Work.
The Contractor agrees that if it
complies with the instruction without first giving such
written notice to the Architect, the Contractor is not entitled
to any adjustment in the Contract Sum or the Contract Time
as a result of the instruction and waives any claim therefor.

C.

If the Contractor claims that it is entitled to an adjustment
in the Contract Sum (except for costs related to a time
extension) as a result of an instruction by the Owner or the
Architect, the Contractor shall furnish a proposal for a
Change Order containing a price breakdown itemized as
required by the Owner. The breakdown shall be in sufficient <
detail to allow the Owner to determine any increase or
decrease in direct costs (materials, labor, equipment,
insurance, bonds r and subcontract costs) as a result of
compliance with the instruction. A n y amount claimed for
subcontracts shall be supported by a similar price breakdown and shad itemize the Subcontractors'" profit and
overhead charges. Profit and overhead shall be subject to
the following limitations.
1. The Subcontractors' profit and overhead shall not
exceed twelve (12) percent of its direct costs.
2. The Contractor's profit and overhead on worlc performed
by its own crews shall not exceed twelve (12) percent
of its direct costs.
3. The Contractor's profit and overhead mark up on work
performed by its Subcontractors shall not exceed frve
(5) percent of the Subcontractor's charges for such
work.
4. On credit changes, profit and overhead on the originally
estimated work will not be credited back to the Owner.

SECTION 6 - CONSTRUCTION BY OWNER OR
SEPARATE CONTRACTORS
6.1

OWNER'S RIGHT T O P E R F O R M W O R K OR A W A R D
SEPARATE CONTRACTS

A.
!

The Owner reserves the right to perform work itself or to
award other contracts in connection with other portions of
the Project.

B.

When separate contracts are awarded for different portions
of the Project, "the Contractor" in the Contract Documents
in each case shall mean the contractor who signs each
separate contract.

6.2

M U T U A L RESPONSIBILITY

A.

The Contractor shall afford other contractors reasonable
opportunity to place and store their materials and equipment on site and to perform their work and shall properly
connect and coordinate its Work with theirs where
applicable.

B.

If any part of the Contractor's Work depends upon the work
of any other separate contractor for proper performance or
results, the Contractor shall inspect and promptly report to
the Architect any apparent discrepancies or defects in such
work that render it unsuitable for such proper performance
and results. Failure of the Contractor to so inspect and
report shall constitute an acceptance of the work of the
other contractor as fit and proper to receive the Contractor's Work, except as to defects not then reasonably
discoverable.

t

C.

6.3

D.

If the Contractor claims that it is entitled to an adjustment
in the Contract Time as a result of an instruction from the
Owner or the Architect, the Contractor shall include in its
proposal justification to support the Contractor's claim that
compliance with the instruction will delay Substantial
Completion.

E.

The Contraqtor's proposal for a modification, together with
the price breakdown and time extension justification, shall
be furnished within ten (10) days of the date the Architect
gives written notice requesting the proposal.

The Contractor shall promptly remedy damage caused by
the Contractor or any Subcontractor to the completed or
.partially completed work of other contractors or to the
property of the Owner or other contractors.
OWNER'S RIGHT T O C L E A N UP
If a dispute arises among the Contractor and separate
contractors as to the responsibility under their separate
contracts for maintaining the Project free from waste
materials and rubbish, the Owner may clean up the Project
and allocate the cost among those responsible as the
Owner and the Architect determine to be just.

If the Owner or the Architect gives the Contractor an
instruction which modifies the requirements of the Contract
Documents or delays Substantial Completion of the Work,
the Contractor may be entitled to an adjustment in the
Contract Sum and/or the Contract Time. If compliance with
the instruction affects the cost to the Contractor to perform
the Work, the Contract Sum shall be adjusted to reflect
such increase or decrease in cost subject to the conditions
set forth in Article 7 . 1 , Paragraphs B through F. If compliance with the instruction delays Substantial Completion,
the Contract Time shall be extended for a period of time
commensurate with such delay subject to the conditions set
forth in Article 7.3, Paragraph A and the Contractor shall
be paid liquidated damages for the delay as set forth in
Articfe 7.3, Paragraph B.

F.

If the Contractor is required to perform work which it claims
constitutes a Change in the Work but w h i c h the Owner and
the Architect do not agree constitutes a Change in the
Work, the Contractor may submit its claim for additional
SECTION? - CHANGESDigitized
IN THE
WORK
compensation,
additional
by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben
Clark Law School,
BYU. time, or both as a dispute pursuant
Section 13 within thirty (30) days of completion of the
Machine-generated OCR, may containtoerrors.
7.1
CHANttFS IN THP WORK" RPSIU TlteK PROM A N IMftTRflfi.

that the change does nv
.rtitle it to additional compensation or time extensions and waives any claim therefor.

in the Contract Time as a result of an event or ci
stance, the Contractor include with its claim copies a;
logs, letters, shipping orders, delivery tickets, P
schedules, and other supporting information necess;
justify the Contractor's claim that the event or circurns
delayed Substantial Completion. If the Contractor is en
to a time extension as a result of an event or circumst
caused by the wilful or negligent act or omission o
Owner or the Architect, the Contractor shall be compel
ed for all costs related to the delay in accordance
Article 7.3, Paragraph B.

CHANGE m THE WORK RESULTING F R O M A N EVENT OR
CIRCUMSTANCE
If an event or circumstance, other than an instruction from
the Owner or the Architect affects the cost to the Contractor of performing the Work or delays Substantial Completion
of the Work, the Contractor may be entitled to an adjustment in the Contract Sum and/or the Contract Time. If the
circumstance or event affects the cost to the Contractor
to perform the Work and is caused by a wilful or negligent
act or omission of the Owner or the Architect, the Contract
Sum shall be adjusted to reflect such increase or decrease
in cost subject to the conditions set forth in Article 7.2,
Paragraphs B through F. If the event or circumstance
delays Substantial Completion and is described in Article
7.3, Paragraph A , the Contract Time shall be extended for
a period of time commensurate with such delay subject to
the conditions set forth in such article. If the circumstance
or event delays Substantial Completion of the Work and is
caused by a wilful or negligent act or omission of the
Owner or the Architect, then the Contractor shall be
compensated for costs incident to the delay in accordance
with Article 7.3, Paragraph B. The Contractor shall not be
entitled to any adjustment to the Contract Sum or other
damages from the Owner as a result of any event or
circumstance unless the event or circumstance results from
a wilful or negligent act or omission of the Owner or the
Architect.
ff a Change in the Work results from any event or circumstance caused by the wilful or negligent act or omission of
the Owner or the Architect, the Contractor shall give the
Owner written notice of such event or circumstance within
twenty-four hours after commencement of the event or
circumstance so that the Owner can take such action as
is necessary to mitigate the effect of the event or circumstance. The Contractor shall not be entitled to any
adjustment in either the Contract Time or the Contract Sum
based on any damages or delays resulting from such event
or circumstance during a period more than twenty-four
hours prior to the Contractor giving such written notice to
the Owner.
The Contractor shall submit any claims for an adjustment
in the Contract Time and/or the Contract Sum resulting
from a Change in the Work (other than a change resulting
from compliance with an instruction from the Owner or
Architect) within the time Hmits set. forth below. In the
event that the Contractor fails to submit its claim within the
limits set forth above, then the Contractor agrees it shall
not be entitled to any adjustment in the Contract Time or
the Contract Sum or to any other damages from the Owner
due to the circumstance or event and waives any claim
therefor.
1. Claims for an adjustment in the Contract Time due to
inclement weather shall be made by the tenth (10th)
of the month following the month in which the delay
occurred.
2. Claims for an adjustment in the Contract Time and/or
the Contract Sum due to any other circumstance or
event shall be submitted within seven (7) days after the
occurrence of the circumstance or event.

Within thirty (30) days after receipt of the Contract
claim, the Architect shall either approve or deny the ch
If the Architect approves the claim, the adjustment in
Contract Time and/or Contract Sum shall be reflected i
Change Order pursuant to Article 7.5 or a Construe!
Change Directive pursuant to Article 7.6. If the Archit
denies the Contractor's claim, the Contractor may sub;
its claim as a dispute pursuant to Section 13 within thi
(30) days of receipt of the Architect's denial of the clai
If the Contractor fails to submit its claim for resoluti
pursuant to Section 13 within the thirty (30) day tir
period, then the Contractor agrees it is not entitled to a
adjustment m the Contract Time and/ or Contract Sum
any other damages as a result of the event or circumstam
from the Owner and waives any claim therefor.
7.3

EXTENSIONS OF TIME

A.

If Substantial Completion of the Project is delayed becaus
of any of the following causes, then the Contract Time sha
be extended by Change Order for a period of time equal t
such delay.
1. Labor strikes or lock-outs;
2 . fnclement weather;
3 . Unusual delay in transportation;
4. Unforeseen governmental requests or requirements;
5. A Change in the Work pursuant to Article 7.1; or
6. A n y other event or circumstance caused by the wilful
or negligent act or omission of the Owner or the
Architect.

B.

If any delay referred to in Article 7.3, Paragraph A , subparagraphs 4, 5 or 6 is caused by the wilful or negligent act or
omission of the Owner or the Architect, the Contractor shall
be paid liquidated damages in the amount per day set forth
in the Supplementary Conditions to compensate the
Contractor for all damages resulting from the delay,
including but not limited to general conditions costs,
additional job site costs, additional home office overhead
costs, disruption costs, acceleration costs, increase in labor
costs, increase in subcontract costs, increase in materials
costs, and any other costs incident to the delay. The
Contractor shall be entitled to no other compensation
relating to the delay.

7.4

DOCUMENTATION OF CHANGES IN T H E WORK
If the Owner, the Architect and the Contractor reach
agreement regarding the adjustment in Contract Sum, if any,
and the adjustment in the Contract Time, if any, resulting
from a Change in the Work, then the parties shall execute
a Change Order pursuant to Article 7.5. if the O w n e r , the
Architect and the Contractor cannot reach agreement
regarding the adjustment in Contract Sum or the adjustment
in Contract Time resulting from a Change in the Work, then
the Owner and the Architect shall issue a Construction
Change Directive pursuant to Article 7.6.

If the Contractor claims that it is entitled to an adjustment
in the Contract Sum (except for costs related to a time
extension) because of an event or circumstance resulting
from the wilful or negligent act or omission of the Owner
or the Arch'rtect (other than an instruction), the Contractor
7.5
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1. The occurrence of a Change;
2. The amount of the adjustment in the Contract Sum, if
any, as a result of the Change; and
3. The extent of the adjustment in the Contract Time, if
any, as a result of the .Change.
B.

7.6
A.

B.

C.

The Contractor's signature upon a Change Order is the
Contractor's acknowledgment that it is not entitled to any
additional adjustment in the Contract Time or the Contract
Sum or any other damages or compensation as a result of
the Change in the Work other than that provided for in the
Change Order, irrespective of whether a subsequent claim
for additional compensation or time extensions relating to
the Change in the Work is described as a change in the
requirements of the Contract Documents, a delay, a
disruption of the Work, ah acceleration of the Work, an
impact on the efficiency of performance of the Work, an
equitable adjustment, or other claim and irrespective of
whether the impact of the Change in the Work is considered singly or in conjunction with the impact of other
Changes in the Work.

A.

The Architect is authorized to order minor changes during
the course of the Work which will not involve extra cost or
time and which are consistent with the general intent of the
Contract Documents. Further, the Architect is authorized
to order on-the-spot minor Changes in the Work of a value
of $1,000 or less and resulting in no time extension in order
to avoid delaying the Work. The price of such Field Change
will be mutually agreed upon between the Architect and the
Contractor before the Contractor proceeds with the change
and shall be recorded on a Field Change form.

B.

The Contractor will proceed with the changed work
forthwith. The Field Change will subsequently be reduced
to a Change Order.

7.8

The Contractor shall not be entitled to any adjustment in the
contract Sum or the Contract Time or for any damages of
any kind whatsoever resulting from an instruction from the
Owner or the Architect, any event or circumstance, or any
act or omission of the Owner or Architect and. the Contractor expressly waives any and all claims therefor, except as
set forth in Articles 7 . 1 . through 7.3.

CONSTRUCTION C H A N G E DIRECTIVES
A Construction Change Directive is a written order,
prepared by the Architect and signed by the Owner, stating
a proposed basis for adjustment, if any, in the Contract
Sum, the Contract Time, or both resulting from a Change
in the Work. A Construction Change Directive-shall be used
to order a Change in the Work if the terms of a Change
Order cannot be agreed upon prior to performance of a
Change in the work described in Article 7.1 or after the
occurrence of an event or circumstance described in Article
7.2.
Upon receipt of a Construction Change Directive, the
Contractor shall immediately perform the changed work
with due diligence.
Pending final resolution of any adjustment in the Contract •
Sum or Contract Time relating to a Construction Change
Directive, the amounts proposed by the Owner in the !
Construction Change Directive may be included in the
Contractor's Payment Requests once the work relating
thereto is completed. Amounts due the Owner as a result
of a Construction Change Directive shall be the actual net
savings to the Contractor from the Change in the Work as
confirmed by the Architect. If both additions and credits
are involved in a single Change in the Work, overhead and
profit shall be figured on the basis of net increase, if any,
related to that Change in the Work.

WAIVER OF CLAIMS

SECTION 8 - TIME
E.1

TIME IS OF T H E ESSENCE
All time limits stated in the Contract Documents are of the
essence of the Contract. By executing the Agreement, the
Contractor confirms that the Contract Time is a reasonable
period for performing the Work. T h e Contractor shall
proceed expeditiously with adequate forces and shall
achieve Substantial Completion within the Contract Time.

8.2

COMIViENCEfVIENrr OF THE WORK
The Contractor shall not commence work on the Project site
until the date set forth in the written Notice To Proceed.
However, the Contractor may enter into subcontracts and
secure material for the Project after receipt of the Agreement with the Owner's authorized signature. The Owner
will issue the Notice To Proceed within forty-five (45) days
after the Owner receives acceptable bonds and evidence of
insurance pursuant to Section 11 unless the Owner earlier
terminates the Agreement pursuant to Section 14.

5.3
A,:

DELAY IN COMPLETION Or THE W O R K

' '

For each day after the expiration of the Contract Time that
the Work is not substantially complete, the Contractor shall
pay the Owner the amount set forth in the Supplementary
Conditions as liquidated damages for the Owner's Joss of
use of the Project and the added administrative expense to
the Owner to administer the Project during the period of
delay. In addition, the Contractor shall reimburse the Owner
for any additional Architect's fees and legal fees incurred
by the Owner as a result of the delay. The Owner may
deduct any liquidated damages or reimbursable expenses
from the money due or to become d u e to the Contractor.
If the amount of liquidated damages and reimbursable
expenses exceeds any amounts due to the Contractor, the
Contractor shall pay the difference to t h e Owner within ten
(10) days after receipt of a written request from the Owner
for payment.

D.

If after the changed work is completed the Owner, the
Architect, and the Contractor reach agreement on adjustments in the Contract Sum, Contract Time, or both, such
agreement shall be reflected in an appropriate Change
Order.

E.

If the parties do not reach agreement regarding an adjustment to the Contract Sum, Contract Time, or both relating
to the Construction Change Directive within thirty (30) days
of the completion of the changed work, then the Contractor
may submit its claim for an adjustment pursuant to Section
13 within thirty (30) days of the completion of the changed
work. In the event that the Contractor fails to submit its
claim for resolution pursuant to Section 13 within thirty
(30) days of completion of the changed work, then the
Contractor shall be deemed to acknowledge that it is not
B.
At the time the Architect certifies the Project is substantially
entitled to additional compensation or time extensions ':
completed, the Architect shall identify the remaining items
resulting from the Change in the Work except as set forth
to be
completed
for final
completion of t h e Project and shall
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben
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Contractor exceeds the time allowed for completion of the
items set forth in the Certificate of Substantial Completion,
the Contractor shall pay to the Owner as liquidated
damages for additional administrative expenses the amount
set forth in the Supplementary Conditions. In addition, the
Contractor shall reimburse the Owner for any additional
Architect's fees and legal fees incurred by the Owner as
a result of the delay.

upon Substantial Completion, to results of subsequi
and inspections, to minor deviations from the (
Documents correctable prior to completion, and to
qualifications expressed b y the Architect. H o w e
approval of the payment request shall not cons
representation that the Architect has:
1. Conducted exhaustive or continuous on-site insp
to check the quantity or quality of the Work;
2 . Reviewed construction means, methods, techr
sequences, or procedures;
3. Reviewed copies of requisitions received from Si
tractors or other data requested by the Owr
substantiate the Contractor's right to payment; i
4 . Made examination to ascertain how or for what pu
the Contractor has used money previously pai
account of the Contract Sum.

SECTIONS - PAYMENTS AND COMPLETION
5.1

SCHEDULE O F VALUES
The Contractor shall submit to the Architect a schedule of
values which allocates the Contract Sum to various portions
of the Work. The schedule of values shall be supported by
such data to substantiate its accuracy as required by the
Architect- This schedule, when accepted by the Architect,
shall be used as a basis for reviewing the Contractor's
payment requests.

3.2
A.

B.

-3.3
A.

B.

9.4

i

A.

PAYMErTT R E Q U E S T S
Once each month, the Contractor shall submit to the
Architect for its approval a payment request for the
estimated value of the Work completed, materials stored
on the site, and for materials stored offsite as approved by
the Owner as of the date of the payment request as
specified in Division 0 1 .
1. The estimate shaff be in. accordance with the schedule
of values submitted by the Contractor.
2. Such payment requests may include requests for
payment for Change Orders and for the Changes in the
Work which have been authorized by Construction
Change Directives, but not yet included in Change
Orders.
3. Such payment requests may not include requests for
payment of amounts the Contractor does not intend to
pay to a Subcontractor because of a dispute or other
reason.
The Contractor warrants and guarantees that upon the
receipt of payment for work, materials, and equipment
covered b y each payment request, whether incorporated in the Project or not, titfe to such work, materials,
and equipment shaff pass to the Owner free and clear
of afl liens, claims, security interests, or encumbrances.
The Contractor further warrants that no work, material,
or equipment covered by a payment request has been
acquired by the Contractor or by any other person
performing the Work or furnishing material and equipment for the Work, subject to an agreement under
which an interest therein or an encumbrance thereon
is retained by the seller or otherwise imposed by the
Contractor or such other person.

'

The Architect may disapprove a payment request in w
or in part to the extent reasonably necessary to protect
Owner if, in the opinion of the Architect, the representati
to the Owner required by Article 9.3, Paragraph B can
be accurately made. If the Architect is unable to cer
payment in the amount of the payment request, 1
Architect will notify the Contractor and the Owner
provided in Article 9.3, Paragraph A . If the Contractor a
the Architect cannot agree o n a revised amount, t
Architect will promptly approve a payment request fortl
amount for which the Architect rs able to make such repr
sentations to the Owner. The Architect may also decide m
to certify payment or, because o f subsequently discovere
evidence or subsequent observations, may nullify the whol
or a part of a payment request previously approved, to sue
extent as may be necessary in the Architect's opinion ti
protect the Owner from loss because of:
1. Defective Work not remedied;
2. Third-party claims filed or reasonable evidence indicatinc
probable fifing of such claims;
3 . Failure of the Contractor to make payments properly to
Subcontractors for labor, material or, equipment;
4 . Reasonable evidence that the Work cannot be completed for the unpaid balance of the Contract Sum;
5. Damage to the Owner or another contractor for which
the Contractor is responsible;
6. Reasonable evidence that the Work will not be completed within the Contract Time and that the unpaid balance
would not be adequate to cover the cost of completing
the Work and actual or liquidated damages for the
anticipated delay; or
7. The Contractor's persistent failure to carry out the Work
in accordance with the Contract Documents.

B.

PAYMENT REQUEST APPROVAL
The Architect will, within seven (7) days after receipt of the
Contractor's payment request, forward to the Owner the
payment request approved for such amount as the Architect determines is properly due, and notify the Contractor
and the Owner in writing of the Architect's reasons for
withholding certification of any part of the payment request.

DECISIONS T O WTTHHOiD A P P R O V A L A N D PAYW

9.5
A.

The Owner reserves the right to withhold payments to the
Contractor, subsequent to the Architect's approvaf of any
payment request, in order to protect the Owner from loss
due to any condition described in Article 9.4, Paragraph A,
Subparagraphs 1 through 7. Upon satisfactory removal of
any such grounds for withholding, payments so withheld
will be made.
PROGRESS P A Y M E N T S
Subject to the Owner's right to withhold payment set forth
in Article 9.4, Paragraph B, the O w n e r shall pay to the
Contractor ninety (90) percent of t h e amount certified by
the Architect, less previous payment thereon within fifteen
(15) days after receipt of the payment request from the
Architect. However, at any time after fifty (50) percent of
the Work has been completed, the O w n or -~~.- — •-

The approval of the payment request will constitute a
representation by the Architect to the Owner based upon
the Architect's observations at the site and the data
comprising the payment request, that the Work has progressed to the point indicated and that, to the best of the
Architect's knowledge,
belief, Law
the Library,
qualitv J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Digitizedinformation,
by the Howardand
W. Hunter
of the Work is in ar^nr<~i~-~~
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

B.

Upon receipt of any payment from the Owner, the Contractor shall pay to each Subcontractor the amount paid to the
Contractor on account of such Subcontractor's portion of
the Work.
v

SECTSON11 - INSURANCE AMD BONDS
11.1
A.

C.

The Contractor shall maintain a copy of each payment
request at the Project site for review by the Subcontractors.

D.

No payment made under the Contract, either in whole or
in part, shall be construed to be an acceptance of defective
or improper materials or workmanship.

9.6

FINAL P A Y M E N T

A.

The Owner shall make full and final payment of the Contract Sum within thirty (30) days of the completion of all
of the following requirements:
1. The Architect has declared to the Owner in writing that
the Work is complete;
2, The Architect has received ail final lien waivers and/or
releases of lien from all Subcontractors;
3, • The Architect has received the Affidavit of Contractor
and Consent of Surety on the Owner's prescribed form
fully executed by the Contractor and its surety; and
4. The Owner has accepted the Work in writing.

B.

Acceptance of final payment by the Contractor or any
Subcontractor shall constitute a waiver of claims by that
payee except those previously made in writing pursuant to
Sections 7, 8, or 9 and identified by the Contractor on the
Affidavit of Contractor and Consent of Surety as being
unsettled at the time of the final payment request.

SECTION 10 - PROTECTION OF PERSONS AND
PROPERTY
10.1

SAFETY P R E C A U T I O N A N D

PROGRAMS

The Contractor shall be responsible to the Owner for
initiating and supervising all safety programs in connection
with the performance of the Work.
10.2

SAFETY OF PERSONS A N D PROPERTY

A.

The Contractor shall take reasonable precautions to prevent
damage, injury, or loss to:'
1. All persons on the site;
2. The Work and materials and equipment to be incorporated into the Work; and
3. Other property at the site or adjacent to it.

B.

The Contractor shall give notices and comply with applicable laws, ordinances, rules, regulations, and other lawful
requirements of public authorities bearing on the safety or
protection of persons and property.

C.

10.3

B.

CONTRACTOR'S LIABILITY INSURANCE
The Contractor shall obtain the following insurance and
provide evidence thereof as described below prior to
commencement of the Work or within ten (10) days after
signing the Agreement, whichever is earlier:
1. Workers Compensation and Employers Liability Insur• ance with limits and coverages as required by the law
of the state in which the Project is located.
2. Commercial General Liability Insurance - ISO Form CG
00 01 (10/93) or equivalent Occurrence Policy, with:
a. Limits of not less than:
1) $2,000,000 General Aggregate;
2) $2,000,000 Products- Comp/OPS Aggregate:
3) $1,000,000 Personal and Advertising Injury:
4) $1 r 000,000 Each Occurrence;
5) $50,000 Fire Damage (any one fire); and
6) $5,000 Medical Expense (any one person).
b. Endorsements attached thereto" including the
following or their equivalent:
1) ISO Form CG 25 03 (10/93), Amendment Of
Limits of insurance (Designated Project or
Premises), describing the subject Contract and
specifying limits as shown above.
2) ISO Form CG 20 10 (10/93), Additional Insured
— Owners, Lessees, Or Contractors (Form B),
naming the Owner as an additional insured and
containing the following statement:
"This
Endorsement Also Constitutes Primary Coverage
In The Event Of Any Occurrence, Claim, Or
Suit".
c. Automobile Liability Insurance, with:
1) /s[ minimum limit of $1,000,000 Combined
Single Limit per accident; and
2) Coverage applying to " A n y Auto."
3. All-Risk Builders Risk Insurance Policy - ISO Form CP
00 20 (10/91)), Builders' Risk Coverage (or equivalent)
and ISO Form CP 10 30 (10/91), Causes of LossSpecial, including Additional Coverage-Collapse and
Additional Coverage-Extensions (or equivalent) with
Limits of Insurance not less than the Contract Sum. A n
installation floater may be used, if approved in writing
by Owner.
a. Policy shall cover materials stored at temporary
storage locations and materials in transit.
b. Policy shall not cover Flood or Earthquake. Rood
and Earthquake coverage will be provided by the
Owner.
J
c. Include the Owner and all Subcontractors as
Insureds with the Contractor on the policy.

The Contractor shall provide evidence of such insurance to
the Owner as follows
1. Deliver to the Owner a Certificate of Insurance, on .
ACORD 2S-S (3/93) Form, or equivalent:
The Contractor shall designate a responsible member of its
a.. Listing the Owner as a Certificate Holder and
organization at the site whose duty shall be the prevention
Additional Insured on general liability and any
.of accidents. This person shall be the Contractor's superinexcess liability policies;
tendent unless otherwise designated in writing by the
b. Listing the endorsements set forth above. (Note:
Contractor to the Owner and the Architect.
If forms other than ISO forms are used, copies of
the non-ISO forms shall be attached to this certifiEMERGENCIES
cate);
c. Identifying the Project;
In case of an emergency endangering life or threatening the
d. Containing a cancellation clause of the certificate
safety of any person or property, the Contractor may,
amended to read: "Should any of the above
without waiting for specific authorization from the Architect
described policies be cancelled before the natural
or the Owner, act at its own discretion to safeguard
expiration date thereof, the issuing company will
persons or property. The Contractor shall immediately
mail
thirty
(30)BYU.
days' written notice to the certificate
by the Howard
W. and
Hunter
Law Library, J. Reuben Clark
Law
School,
notify the Architect of Digitized
such emergency
action
make
Machine-generated
a full written report to the Architect within
five (5) daysOCR, may contain errors.holder named to the left";

2.

C.

insurance shall be rated _ r' Class VHP or better,
in the A . M . Best Company Key Rating Guide-Property-Casualty, current edition); and
f.
Bearing the name, address and telephone number
of the "Producer" and an original signature of the
authorized representative of the Producer.
(Facsimile or mechanically reproduced signatures
will not be accepted.)
Upon request, provide copy of All-Risk Builder's Risk
Insurance Policy for Owner's approval.

The Contractor shall maintain such insurance in effect from
the commencement of the Work until the expiration of the
time period covered by the warranty specified in Article
11.2, paragraph B. and the completion of any repairs
covered by said bonds.

D.

The Owner reserves the right to reject any insurance
company, policy, endorsement, or certificate of insurance
with or without cause.

E.

The cost of insurance as required above shall be the
obligation of the Contractor.

11.2

PERFORMANCE BOND AND LABOR A N D MATERIAL
P A Y M E N T BOND

A.

Prior to commencing the Work or within ten days after
signing the Agreement, whichever is earlier, the Contractor
shall furnish to the Owner a performance bond and a labor
and material payment bond each in an amount equal to one
hundred (100) percent of the Contract Sum as security for
all obligations arising under the Contract Documents. Such
bonds shall:
1. Be written on Form A l A Document A 3 1 2 .
2. Be issued by a surety' dompany or companies licensed
in the state in which the Project is located and holding
valid certificates of authority under Sections 9304 to
9308, Title 31, of the United States Code as acceptable sureties or reinsurance companies on federal
bonds.
3. Have a penal sum obligation not exceeding the authorization shown in the current revision of Circular #570
as issued by the United States Treasury Department,
Le. the "Treasury List".
4. Be accompanied by a certified copy of the Power of
Attorney stating the authority of the Attorney-in-fact
executing the bonds on behalf of the Surety.

B.

The Owner reserves the right to reject any surety company,
performance bond, or labor and material payment bond with
or without cause.

C.

The cost of such bonds as required above shall be the
obligation of the Contractor..

12.2

CORRECTION

WORK

A.

The Contractor shall promptly correct any portion of the
Work which is rejected by the Architect or which fails to
conform to the requirements of the Contract Documents,
whether observed before or after Substantial Completion
and whether or not fabricated, installed, or completed. The
Contractor shall bear the costs of correcting such rejected
Work, including additional testing and inspection costs,
compensation for the Architect's services, and any other
expenses made necessary thereby.

B.

The Contractor shall remedy any defects due to faulty
materials, equipment, or workmanship which appear within
a period of one year from the date of Substantial Completion
or within such longer period of time a s may be prescribed
by law or by the terms of any applicable special warranty
required by the Contract Documents. T h e Contractor shall
pay all costs of correcting faulty work, including additional
Architect's fees when incurred.

C.

Nothing in the Contract Documents shall be construed to
establish a period of limitation within which the Owner may
enforce the obligation of the Contractor to comply with the
Contract Documents. The one year period specified above
has no relationship to the time within which compliance
with the Contract Documents may b e sought to be enforced, nor to the time within which proceedings may be
commenced to establish the Contractor's liability with
respect to the Contractor's obligations.

12.3

ACCEPTANCE OF NONCONFORMING WORK

A.

If the Owner prefers to accept work not in conformance
with the Contract Documents, the Owner may do so instead
of requiring removal and correction of the nonconforming
Wotk. In that event, the Contract S u m will be reduced by
an amount agreed upon by the parties which reflects the
difference in value to the Owner between the Work as
specified and the nonconforming w o r k . Such adjustment
may consider increased maintenance costs, early replace• ment costs, increased inefficiency of u s e , etc. and shall be
effective whether or not final payment has been made.
Such adjustment shall be reflected in a Change Order
pursuant to Article 7.5.

B.

Temporary or trial usage by the Owner or the Architect of
mechanical devices, machinery, apparatus, equipment, or
other work or materials supplied under this Contract prior
to written acceptance by the Architect, shall not constitute
the Owner's acceptance.

SECTION 13 -RESOLUTION OF DISPUTES
A.

In the event any claim asserted under Section 7 or any '
dispute regarding any other provision of the Contract
SECTION 12 - UNCOVERING AF\SD CORRECTION
Documents cannot be resolved by agreement between the
Owner and the Contractor, either party may submit the
OF WORK
claim as a dispute to the Owner's Director of Facilities
Magement Department (the "Director") who will review the
12.1
UNCOVERING OF WORK
matter and render a written decision resolving the dispute.
A copy of the Director's written decision will be provided
The Contractor shall notify the Architect at least 24 hours
to the parties. The decision of the Director will be final and
in advance of performing work which would cover up work
conclusive of the dispute unless within thirty (30) days after
or otherwise make it difficult to perform inspections
the Contractor receives the Director's written decision, the
required by the Specifications or by applicable governing
Contractor mails or otherwise delivers to the Director a
authorities. Should any such work be covered without
written notice of appeal addressed to t h e Presiding Bishopproper notification having been given to the Architect, the
ric, Attention: Counselor for Physical Facilities. If a notice
Contractor shall uncover that"work for inspection at its own
of appeal is filed, the Presiding Bishopric shall review the
expense.
matter and render its written decision regarding the matter
and deliver a copy thereof to the Contractor. The decision
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben
Clark
Law School,
BYU. shall be final and conclusive of
of the
Presiding
Bishopric
Machine-generated OCR, may contain
theerrors.
dispute unless within thirty (30) day's after the Contrac-

Contractor commences legal action for adjudication of the
dispute. Submission of the dispute to the Director and the
Presiding Bishopric as outlined above is a condition precedent to the right to commence legal action to adjudicate any
dispute. In the event that the Contractor commences legal
action to adjudicate any dispute without first submitting the
dispute to the Director and the Presiding Bishopric, the
Owner shall be entitled to obtain an order dismissing the
litigation without prejudice and awarding the Owner any
costs and attorneys fees incurred by the Owner in obtaining
the dismissal. In the event that the Contractor commences
legal action to adjudicate a dispute, the decisions of the
Director and the Presiding Bishop shall be deemed to be
settlement proposals to the Contractor which the Contractor rejected and are admissible as evidence only to extent
that settlement negotiations are admissible, but not
admissible as evidence of liability. However, the initial
action or inaction by the Owner giving rise to the dispute
as well as the Owner's initial response to any claim by the
Contractor are not settlement proposals and shall be
admissible subject to the customary objections provided by
law.
B.

14.2

SECTION 15 - MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS
15.1

TERMINATION B Y T H E OWNER FOR C A U S E

GOVERNING L A W
The Contract shall be governed by the law of the State
where the Project is located.

15.2

NO WAIVER
No action or failure to act by the Owner, the Architect, or
the Contractor shall constitute a waiver of a right or duty
afforded them under the Contract, nor shall such action or
failure to act constitute approval of or acquiescence in a
breach thereunder, except as may be specifically agreed in
writing.

15.3

AUTHORSHIP
The Owner "and the Contractor agree that the Contract
Documents shall be deemed to be the product of both the
Owner and the Contractor and shall not be construed
against either the Owner or the Contractor because of
authorship.

TERMINATION B Y T H E CONTRACTOR
In the event the Owner materially breaches any term of the
Contract Documents, the Contractor may give written
notice of the breach to the Owner. If the Owner fails to
cure the breach within ten {10) days of the written notice,
the Contractor may terminate this Contract by giving written notice to the Owner and recover from the Owner the
percentage of the Contract Sum represented by the Work
completed as of the date .of. termination together with any
loss other than unearned profits it has sustained with
respect to materials and equipment as a result of the
termination prior to completion of the Work.. The Contractor shall not be entitled to any other compensation or
damages as a result of the termination.

TERMINATION B Y THE OWNER FOR CONVENIENCE
The Owner may, without cause and in its absolute discretion, terminate the Contract at any time. In the event of
such termination, the Contractor shall be entitled to recover
from the Owner the percentage of the Contract Sum represented by the Work completed as of the date of termination
together with any loss it has sustained other than unearned
profits with respect to materials, equipment, and tools as
a result of the termination prior to completion of the Work.
The Contractor shall not be entitled to any other compensation as a result of the termination.

Pending final resolution of a dispute hereunder, the
Contractor shall proceed diligently with the performance of
the Contract and in accordance with the Architect's
decision.

SECTION 14 - TERMINATION OR SUSPENSION '
OF THE CONTRACT
14.1

14.3

15.4
A.

TESTS A N D INSPECTIONS
The Owner and the Architect have the right to have tests
made when they deem it necessary. Tests conducted by
the Owner or the Architect shall be paid for by the Owner. *
Should a test reveal a failure of the W o r k to meet Contract
Document requirements, the cost of the test as well as
subsequent tests related to the failure necessary to determine compliance with the Contract Documents will be paid
for by the Owner, with the cost thereof deducted from the
Contract Sum by Change Order.

B.
Where necessary, tests shall be made in accordance with
Should the Contractor fail to provide the Owner with the
recognized standards by a competent, independent testing
bonds and certificate of insurance required by Section 11
laboratory. Materials found defective or not in conformity
within the time specified in Article 11.1 and Article 11.2,
with Contract Document requirements shall be promptly
make a general assignment for the benefit of its creditors,
replaced or repaired at the expense o f the Contractor.
fail to apply enough properly skilled workmen or specified
materials to properly prosecute the Work in accordance
C.
The Owner and the Architect have the right to obtain
with the approved construction schedule, or otherwise
samples of materials to bo used in t h e Work and to test
materially breaches any provision of the Contract, then the
samples
for determining whether they meet Contract DocuOwner may, without any prejudice to any other right or
ment requirements. Samples required for testing shall be
remedy give the Contractor written notice of Owner's
furnished by the Contractor and selected as directed by the
complaint. If the Contractor fails to satisfy the Owner's
Architect. Samples may be required from the sample's
complaint within ten (10) days, the Owner may terminate
source, point of manufacture, point of delivery, or point of
the Contract by giving written notice to the Contractor and
installation at the Architect's discretion. Samples not
take possession of the premises and all material, tools, and
required as a submittal in a specification section shall be
appliances thereon, and finish the Work by whatever
paid for by the Owner. Should tests reveal a failure of the
method the Owner deems expedient. In such case, the
sample to meet the Contract Document requirements, the
Contractor shall not be entitled to receive any further
Contractor shall provide other samples which comply with
payment until the Work is finished. If the unpaid balance
the
requirements of the Contract Documents.
of the Contract Sum exceeds the expense of finishing the
Work, including compensation for additional administrative,
Digitized such
by theexcess
Howard shall
W. Hunter
Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
architectural, and legal services,
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SUPPLEMENTARY

CONL/TIONS

ITEM 1 - LIQUIDATED DAMAGE AMOUNTS:
1.

The amount of liquidated damages to be paid to the Contractor for delays under General
Conditions Article 7.3, Paragraph B is $325 per day.

2.

The amount of liquidated damages to be deducted by Owner from final payment for delays in
Substantial Completion of the Work under General Conditions Article 8.3, Paragraph A is $225
per day.

3.

The amount of liquidated damages to be deducted by Owner from final payment for delays in
completing work itemized on the Substantial Completion Certificate under General Conditions
Article 8.3, Paragraph B is $75 per day.

ITEM 2 - PERMITS
1,

Delete General Conditions Article 3.6, Paragraph B and replace with the following:
B.

The Contractor will pay the cost of permits, fees, and improvement bonds required by
local agencies necessary for the proper execution and completion of the Work. Prior to
bid opening the Owner will arrange for issuance of permits to the selected Contractor.
The Contractor shall be responsible for picking up the permits from the local agencies.

ITEM 3 - LIABILITY INSURANCE
1.

For Projects involving removal of asbestos-containing roof materials, add the following to
Article Section 11.1, Paragraph A , 2 d.

Contractor's general liability insurance shall not have an asbestos exclusion
clause.

ITEM 4 - UTAH STATE NOTICE OF COMMENCEMENT FILING:
1.

In compliance with Section 38-1-27 Utah Code Annotated, Contractor shall file with County
Clerk of county in which Project is located a Notice of Commencement. Notice shall be filed
within 30 days of date of Notice to Proceed. Notice of Commencement shall include, but not
be limited to, following a.
Name and address of Owner.
b.
Name and address of Contractor.
c.
Name and address of surety providing payment bond for Project.
d.
Project name
e.
Legal description of Project.

2,

The parties to the Contract agree that any breach or failure to comply with this Section by the
Contractor shall constitute a breach of Contract and the Contractor shall be liable in any direct,
indirect, or consequential damages to the Owner flowing from said breach.

END OF DOCUMENT
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A Bid limit.
Q I'm sorry?
A Bid limit, their bid limit was higher.
Q Mindful of the bid limit, you could basically
perform all sorts of general contracting services.
A Yes.
Q Did you have any involvement in the
Highland 4 and 20 project?
A To a point, yes.
Q Okay. And let me ask you this. Do you know
what the Highland project is?
A Yes.
Q What is the Highland project?
A It's an LDS chapel.
Q And the Highland 4 and 20 project, that's a
sufficiently specific reference to that project for you
to know what I'm talking about?
A Yes.
Q What was your involvement in the Highland 4
and 20 project? And when I say "your," I mean BRC's.
A I was the framing contractor on the job. I
bid the work and acquired the bid for that work.
Q You say you bid the work?
A Yes.
Q And what does that mean, "bid the work"?
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Egbert to do the work?
A I called him up and asked him if he'd be
interested in doing this job.
Q Who is Ken Egbert?
A A contractor.
Q Is he an employee of yours?
A No.
Q Is he a friend of yours?
A He's an acquaintance.
Q Is he a business associate?
A Yes.
Q And what did Mr. Egbert say about doing some
framing for you?
A He said he would be interested in doing it.
Q I was looking at Exhibit 32. There's more
than framing; am I correct?
A Yes.
Q Did you ask Mr. Egbert to help you out with
all aspects of the work described on Exhibit 32 or just
the framing? What did you ask Mr. Egbert to do?
A Just the framing on it. I told him I would
still supply the material and he could do theframingon
it.
Q And what is "framing"?
A Putting the frame structure together, the
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boards.
Q The boards?
A The structure of it.
Q And the structure -- you've got to understand
I don't know as much about the construction business as
you do.
A Build the walls, put the roof on.
Q That's something I can understand. You wanted
Mr. Egbert to build the walls?
A Yes.
Q And stand them up?
A Yes.
Q What about the roof?
A Do the roof, too.
Q And you were going to supply him all the wood
and nails that he needed to build these walls?
A He supplied the nails.
Q Okay. And what about the men who were going
to do all of this work?
A His employees.
Q What, if any, involvement did you have in the
selection of those men?
A None.
Q Did you tell him how many men you needed?
A I told him he would need 12 to 14 men.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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A I gave Hales & Warner a bid to do the framing
on the job.
Q I want to show you Exhibit 32.
(Exhibit No. 32 is marked for identification.)
Q (BY MR. BADARUDDIN) Can you take a look at
Exhibit 31 for me.
A This says 32.
Q That's what I meant, Exhibit 32. Just
checking to see if you're paying attention.
Could you please take a look at Exhibit 32.
A Yes.
Q Is Exhibit 32 the bid you sent to Hales &
Warner?
A Yes.
Q For the framing?
A Yes.
Q And what happened next?
A They sent me a contract, and I signed it and
sent it back to them.
Q And then what?
A I was busy and didn'tfinishup some other
work that I had going and couldn't get to this one.
They scheduled it, and so I got Ken Egbert to do the
work.
Q How exactly did you go about getting Ken
•
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Q And did he provide 12 to 14 men?
A Not all the time.
Q And what, if anything, did you do about that?
A I sent some men down there - my men down
there, under his direction and payroll, to supplement
his workers.
Q And they were to do what, these men?
A Help him with the framing.
Q Did you have an agreement with Ken Egbert?
A Yes.
Q What was your agreement?
A That he would do it for a certain price.
Q What was the certain price?
A I think it was about $72,000.
Q And did you have this agreement in writing?
A No.
Q How was the agreement made?
A Verbal.
Q Did you shake hands on it?
A Yes.
MR. DAVENPORT: I'm going to ask you to speak
up a little bit. There's some type of motor over there.
Just speak up a little bit.
Q (BY MR BADARUDDIN) So you said you shook
hands on it; correct?

of the business.
A Yes.
Q I mean project, but okay.
So do you remember when theframingstarted?
A Day-wise, I don't remember.
Q Do you remember whether anyone contacted you
and said, Mr. Reynolds, let's get started framing?
A Hales & Warner contacted me and I told them
that I couldn't do it, but I had this other ~
Mr. Egbert that was going to do it. And they weren't
sure they wanted him to do it. And they got back with
me and said that that would be fine. And so I sent him
down and met with the superintendent, and he worked with
their schedule.
Q Who was the superintendent, if you recall?
A I don't remember.
Q Did you meet with them before any framing
began?
A I met with him on the preconstruction meeting
before anything on the project started.
Q Did you meet with him subsequent to the
preconstruction meeting but prior to beginning framing?
A The only time I met with them was the
preconstruction meeting.
J
Q Okay. Had you ever done any work for the
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A Yes.
Q So you were in person?
A Pardon?
Q The discussion occurred standing face-to-face,
in person?
A Yes.
Q Not on the telephone?
A Originally on the telephone. Then I gave him
some plans and we went over it and agreed and shook
hands on it.
Q What plans did you go over?
A Plans for the building down there.
Q And where did those plans come from?
A From Hales & Warner.
Q And do you know if they were stamped by an
architect or anything like mat, the plans?
A They were the architectural plans for the
building.
Q And whether they were stamped or not, those
contained the specifications for your framing work?
A There was a specifications book that goes with
them.
Q And you reviewed that book?
A Yes.
Q At least as it related to the framing portion

- — — — —

.

__

.

LDS Church?
A Yes.
1
Q Do you know whether or not you were favored or 1
approved or disapproved as a subcontractor by the
LDS Church?
A Not exactly.
Q But how many occasions did you do work for the 1
LDS Church?
A I framed about 10 buildings. I was
superintendent on six or seven other buildings in
Hawaii.
Q Did they ever complain about your work?
A No.
Q At least not to you?
A Right.
Q And do you know Paul Evans?
A No.
Q Do you know Dennis Butler?

A No.

ft

Q Are you familiar with the architectural firm
of Butler & Evans Architects, LLC?
A I've heard of it.
Q Do you know whether or not you've done any
work that may have been under their supervision?
A Not that I'm aware ofrightnow.
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some more men down there?
A I felt that there needed to be more men down
there.
Q Whether they were provided by you or Egbert?
A Yes.
Q Well, did you subsequently provide a written
framing schedule outlining manpower and target dates?
A No, I did not. I told Ken to.
Q Do you know whether he did?
A I don't know.
Q Okay. Did you ever call Cliff Hales to
discuss this letter of August 11 with him?
A I don't know.
Q Did you ever talk to Ken Egbert about bis
hiring criteria?
A No.
Q Do you know what his hiring criteria was?
A No.
Q Do you know if Ken Egbert had experienced men
on his crew?
A No.
Q Do you know how many men Ken Egbert had on his
crew?
A No.
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A All I know is according to this and what I
talked with Ken about.
Q But you don't think that the job was right on
schedule and Mr. Hales was just being unreasonable?
A No.
Q And then it talks about your construction
subcontract, and I don't have any questions about that.
What, if anything, did you do after you
received this letter?
A I called Ken Egbert.
Q And told him?
A That he needed more men on the job.
Q Did you do anything else?
A I think about this time I told him I would
send some men down off of my crew, and on his payroll,
and he could use them however he saw fit.
Q And these men of yours, were they experienced
or inexperienced, or did it vary?
A They were experienced on churches.
Q And on framing?
A Framing churches.
Q How many men did you send?
A I don't remember. I think there was four or
five.
Q Okay. Let me ask you about what I'm going to
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Mr. Egbert had a crew or if he hired people as needed.
Do you know if Ken Egbert had employees on
staff or did he hire people according to the job he
might have to do?
A I don't know.
Q Let me ask you about what I'm going to have
marked as Exhibit 35.
(Exhibit No. 35 is marked for identification.)
Q (BY MR. BADARUDDDSf) If you could take a look
at what's been marked as Exhibit 35, a copy of exactly
what you were reading; is that correct?
A Yes.
Q And, again, there's some allegations in the
letter that I'd like to ask you about.
The second sentence says, "You still have not
had 12 men on the job as promised, and the job is
getting further behind."
Do you know how many men were on the job?
A I talked to Ken a couple of times about how
many men he had on the job, and he told me he would get
the men to do the job, and he evidently didn't.
Q Did you tell him he needed more men?
A Yes.
Q And do you know whether the job was, in fact,
getting behind?
^——
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have marked as Exhibit 36.
(Exhibit No. 36 is marked for identification.)
Q (BYMR.BADARUDDIN) Have you had an
opportunity to review Exhibit 36?
A Yes.
Q And what is Exhibit 36?
A It — basically it's a back charge to me of
$12,825 for delay of the project.
Q And this letter is much later than Exhibit 35,
is it not? It's dated March 30, 2000.
A Yes.
Q I guess the project would be about finished by
then, would it not?
A Yes.
Q And what does all that mean, "back charge"?
A It means they charged meforthe extra time it
took to build the building.
Q And essentially, are they saying that you
caused a delay in the project and that you have to pay
this amount of money as they've calculated?
A That's what they say.
Q Did you respond to this letter; do you know?
A Yes, I did.
Q And let me show you Exhibit 37.
(Exhibit No. 37 is marked for identification.)
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Q (BYMR.BADARUDDIN) What is Exhibit 37?
A It's my response to their back charge..
Q And it's dated April 3, 2000.
A Yes.
Q I wanted to ask you about some of the
allegations in the letter. Did you write this letter?
A Yes.
Q In the first sentence, it says, "Before the
framing on the project was started, I called you and
told you I was having difficulty and could not frame
your project."
That's something we already discussed; is that
right?
A Yes.
Q And then you mention, "I told you that another
framer was available and could frame the building."
I don't remember asking you about that. Is
that what you told Mr. Hales or Mr. Warner?
A Mr. Hales.
Q You recommended another framer? I don't
understand. Can you tell me what you meant by that, "I
told you that another framer was available"?
A That's when I asked Ken Egbert to do the job.
Q You're referring to Egbert.
A Right.
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supplement the work force there and try and get your
project framed."
What are you talking about there, getting in
hot water?
A I was in trouble on another job. It slowed me
down on another project I was on.
Q So that you could help him?
A Yes.
Q Do you know what sort of timeframewe're
talking about there where you were in hot water and
you're sending your men to help him with his job?
A What do you mean?
Q Like a date, a month, a year?
A How long my men were down there, or what?
Q Let me say this. You know who Jason Smith is?
A No.
Q Did you know whether or not Mr. Egbert had a
man on his crew that died?
A I knew that. Mr. Hales called me and told me
that when it happened.
Q And his name, for your information, was Jason
Smith.
A Right.
Q Do you know what day he died?
A No.
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Q Did you, in fact, mention to Mr. Hales or
Mr. Warner that Ken Egbert would not be able to meet the
timeframefor theframing?And I'm in the third
sentence now.
A I don't remember. I must have.
Q And do you know whether Hales & Warner were
looking for otherframersbut couldn't find any?
A Yes.
Q Yes, you know they were looking for them?
A Yes.
Q And yes, you know they couldn't find any?
A Yes.
Q How do you know that?
A Cliff told me.
Q You called him Cliff. Is he afriendof
yours?
A Mr. Hales.
Q You can call him Cliff if you like. I'm just
wondering — you also mentioned "Dear Clifford." I'm
wondering if y'all arefriendsor if it's just a
21 familiar term.
22
A Just a term.
23
Q I'd like to ask you about the last sentence of
24 thefirstparagraph. "I even got myself in hot water on
25 another job in order to send some of my men there to
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Q It was August 13 of 1999.
Do you know whether you were sending men to
Hales & Warner's Highland 4 and 20 project before and
afterAugustl3ofl999?
A It was after that.
Q Let me ask you about the second paragraph of
Exhibit 37. It says, "From the very beginning, your
superintendent interfered with theframingprocess."
Who is the superintendent?
A I don't know.
Q Well, do you remember what he was doing, how
he was interfering with theframingprocess?
A Ken called me and told me that they wouldn't
let himframesome of the walls the way he wanted to
frame them, told him it wasn't effectiveframingthe way
they wanted themframed,and they wouldn't let him frame
them in that manner. And I tried to help him out by
calling down there and talking to ~ I don't remember if
I called Cliff Hales or who I called.
Q Do you know how Egbert wanted to frame?
A Yes.
Q How did he want to frame?
A Well, the walls we're talking about is ~ he
wanted toframethem ~ they had a rake on them to
follow the roof joist in one area, and he wanted to
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frame them that way, and they didn't want him to until
the roof joists were up so they could make sure the rake
on the wall matched the joist.
MR. DAVENPORT: Let me ask him, if you don't
mind, did you say "rake"?
THE WITNESS: Slope on the wall, the rake on
the wall.
Q (BYMR.BADARUDDIN) What is a "rake"?
A Slope.
Q Okay. That's the way Ken Egbert wanted to do
it; correct?
A Yes.
Q How did the superintendent want him to do it?
A He wanted him to run the studs along and stand
the wall, and when the joists were up, cut the studs off
and put the top plates on.
Q Okay. And how was that difference resolved?
In other words, who won out, Ken Egbert or the
superintendent?
A The superintendent. He wanted it done his
way, and I told Ken he had to do it his way if he
couldn't resolve it.
MR. MINNOCK: "Do it his way," you mean do it
the superintendent's way?
THE WITNESS: Do it the superintendent's way.
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Q I've got you.
In the second sentence of the second
paragraph, it says, "This interference continued
throughout theframingof the building."
What did you mean by that?
A I don't remember right now.
Q Was there some aspect offramingthat the
superintendent didn't interfere with?
A I don't know.
Q This paragraph seems to sayfromthe very
beginning that the superintendent interfered, and then
it goes on, and then it says the interference continued
through theframingof the building. The way I
interpreted it is that the superintendent was
interferingfromthe beginning to the end of your
framing process.
MR. DAVENPORT: I'm going to object. You're
asking him to speculate. As I understand his prior
testimony, he wasn't even on the job site. I guess I
just object to the lack of foundation. He doesn't have
any personal knowledge as to what actually occurred.
MR. BADARUDDIN: I'm asking him to interpret
his writing, if he's able to do so.
MR. MINNOCK: Do you understand what his
question was? He was asking you what you meant by that
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Q (BY MR BADARUDDIN) Well, then the sentence
continues, referencing, I think, the superintendent
"telling them that they couldn't do it the way they were
used toframingand caused theframermany problems,
costing extra time and material."
Is that what you've told me about or is there
something else the superintendent was doing?
A It just cost extra material toframeit that
way, because you can use shorter boards and it costs
more time toframeit with -- standing the wall and then
cutting the studs off later.
Q Was there some other aspect of the framing
that the superintendent was interfering with?
A They wanted toframethe outside walls an inch
higher and not cut the studs off; the superintendent
didn't want them to do that.
Q And what did the plans or specifications call
for, as far as one inch this way or that?
A You have to meet the specified elevations.
Q Sure. So Ken Egbert wanted to build it, say,
one inch higher than the superintendent; correct?
A Yes.
Q What did the plans say?
A The plans said it was supposed to be one inch
lower than Ken wanted to build it.
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in terms of the duration the interference lasted.
THE WITNESS: I don't remember other
specifics. Those are the two specifics I remember. Ken
told me that they weren't being able to frame like they
wanted to, and so I put that in there to try and help
Ken out.
Q (BY MR. BADARUDDIN) Okay. And what I'm
really wondering is ~ tell me if this is correct. Did
the superintendent interfere with the framing process
from the very beginning?
MR. DAVENPORT: Objection; lacks foundation.
He's already testified he wasn't there.
MR. MINNOCK: You can answer.
THE WITNESS: Exterior walls are one of the
first ones youframe,so that was the beginning of the
project.
Q (BY MR. BADARUDDIN) Okay. Did his
interference ever stop?
A I don't know.
MR. DAVENPORT: Same objection.
Q (BY MR. BADARUDDIN) And then the last
sentence of the second paragraph, "If it wasn't wanting
something done out of sequence, it was putting other
subs and/or material in the way so the framers could not
do their job."
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Can you tell me what you meant by that
sentence?
A I know of one instance. This was after that,
I went down ~
MR. DAVENPORT: Excuse me, after what?
THE WITNESS: It was before the completion of
the building. It was during the framing of the roof. I
had to go down and give - I sent some other guys down
on the job, and I - they needed a paycheck from me on
work that they'd done for me, so I took a paycheck down
to them, and they had stacked sheetrock in the way
inside the cultural hall/chapel area of the building.
And that's what I meant by putting material in the way
so that they couldn't complete the project.
Q (BY MR. BADARUDDIN) Was there any other thing
you might have been referring to?
A That's the only thing I have personal
knowledge of.
Q Okay.
(Off-the-record discussion)
MR. BADARUDDIN: Let me ask you about some
other exhibits we've already marked. Let me ask you to
look at Exhibit 29. That's the daily from August 4,
1999.
MR. DAVENPORT: What is it?
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for a more accurate cut."
j
MR. DAVENPORT: Objection. You're asking him
to comment on someone else's entry, which he has never
previously seen and which he did not make himself.
Q (BY MR. BADARUDDIN) I'm asking you what, if
anything, does that mean to you?
MR. DAVENPORT: Same objection.
MR.MINNOCK: You can answer.
THE WITNESS: It's an entry on the sheer walls
like we've discussed previously.
Q (BY MR. BADARUDDIN) Do you remember any issue
with the sheer wall and leaving the studs long?
A We've already talked about it.
j
Q Exactly. Okay. Would that be consistent with
your earlier testimony about the rake and the stud walls
being long and that sort of thing?
j
A Yes.
1
Q Did you tell Ken Egbert he shouldn't do it
that way because of the extra labor cost?
A We discussed extra labor costs on it, extra
p
material costs. I told him that I had done it on other
projects and it worked out well.
Q Told who?
A Told Ken.
Q Okay.

l
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1
MR. BADARUDDIN: The daily from August 4,
2 1999.
3
MR. DAVENPORT: What exhibit do you refer to
4 it as?
5
MR.MINNOCK: 29.
6
Q (BY MR. BADARUDDIN) And let me ask you this.
7 Do you know what Exhibit 29 is?
8
A Yes.
9
Q What is Exhibit 29?
0
A It's a daily report.
1
Q Did you ever have an occasion to review daily
2 reports for the Highland 4 and 20 project?
3
A No.
4
Q I guess basically there's three entries. Let
5 me ask you about the bottom one that starts "Ken
6 Egbert." If you could review that. Read it, is what I
7 mean.
8
MR.MINNOCK: Do you want him to read it into
9 the record or read it himself?
0
Q (BY MR. BADARUDDIN) Just read it to yourself.
1
A Okay.
2
Q Can you tell me what that entry means to you?
3 For example, "Ken Egbert, framer, is concerned with the
4 manner in which we want the building framed, leaving
5 sheer wall studs long, to be cut after trusses are up
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A And I think I called the superintendent and
discussed it with him, and he said this is the way the
architect wants it. So I told Ken he had to do it this
way.
j
Q It says "Ken and I," but I'm wondering, did
you to go a church with a similar ~
A I didn't go.
Q And you don't know whether they went, "they"
being Ken and whoever "I" is?
A I don't know.
Q And ultimately, did you tell Ken to do it one
way or another? There's an indication that Ken was
going to do it as we have requested until final decision
from Brent Reynolds is given. Did you give any final
decision to Ken Egbert?
A I told him that he had to do what the
superintendent wanted on the job.
Q Okay. Let me ask you a b o u t MR.MINNOCK: You asked him about 29. What
you've just referenced was from 30,1 believe.
MR. BADARUDDIN: That's what I was confused
about.
Q (BY MR. BADARUDDIN) Let me ask you to look at
Exhibit 30.
I think all of my questions that I thought
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Q Could you understand the logic behind building
it the way they did, even though you may have felt that
another way would have been cheaper in cost?
A Yes.
Q Now, I think you explained before this
sentence where it says, "From the very beginning, your
superintendent interfered with the framing process," and
I believe you indicated that that was referring to this
initial wall that was one inch too high; correct?
A Yes.
Q Would you agree that there was nothing
inappropriate with the superintendent asking Ken Egbert
to comply with the plans and build it an inch lower as
specified by the plans?
A Correct.
Q Now, as I understand it, the references
relating to this interference relate to those two
issues, namely, number one, building the wall as
specified by the plans, one inch lower than it had been
built, and the other issue was relating to the sheer
wall with the studs sticking out the top; correct?
A Are you saying that's the only issues?
Q Those were the two you were referring to as
far as interference; right? That you had knowledge of?
A No. There was another issue that I know of,
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name BRC or Brent Reynolds Construction on it, I found
in the file many invoices, for example,fromlumber and
whatnot, that were invoiced to you. For example, I
believe one wasfrom,if I'm not mistaken, Burton Lumber
and whatnot.
Do you remember seeing those types of
documents?
A Yes.
Q Do those documents relate to your procurement
of the materials?
A Yes.
Q Now, I also noted in thefilechecks written
out by Hales & Warner to you and sometimes with the
lumber or other suppliers' name on it also. But as I
understand it,fromreviewing thefile,you are the one
securing the materials and Hales & Warner would pay you
as it relates to the procurement of those materials;
correct?
A Yes.
Q And as it relates to the time periods over
which these materials were secured, I have invoices that
start, at the least, on July 29, 1999,fromBurton
Lumber, another onefromConstruction Specialties, Inc.
for July 30, 1999, and they go through, at the very
least, October 26, 1999. I have a statementfromBurton
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that I knew of.
Q Okay, what was that?
A When they put sheetrock in the chapel and the
cultural area so they couldn't frame some door pockets.
Q Other than those three, any other ones you
were personally aware of?
A No.
Q So as I understand it, you have no personal
knowledge of Hales & Warner ever instructing a framing
subcontractor or a framing subcontractor's employees as
to the method in which they should raise a wall from the
ground to an upright position; is that correct?
A That's correct.
Q And you have no personal knowledge whether or
not Hales & Warner ever gave any instructions as to any
framing subcontractor or its employee as to how to hold
a wall that has not yet been tied into place after it's
been raised; is that correct?
A Correct.
Q And you have no personal knowledge as to
whether Hales & Warner ever gave any framing
subcontractor instructions as to how to put a wall onto
the bolts after it's been raised; is that correct?
A That's correct.
Q Now, as I've reviewed documents containing the
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Lumber that has your name on it.
Does that sound accurate?
A Yes.
Q I'm going to show you the subcontract
agreement, have you thumb through it, and I'm going to
ask you after you have an opportunity to review it
whether or not this is the subcontract you were
referring to previously and whether or not that's your
signature.
(Off-the-record discussion)
Q (BY MR. DAVENPORT) Is this a copy of the
subcontract agreement entered into between Hales &
Warner Construction, Inc. and BRC, Inc.?
A It looks like it, yes.
Q And that's dated May 10, 1999?
A Yes.
Q Is that your signature found on page 8?
A Yes.
Q You signed it as president of BRC?
A Yes. BRC, Inc.
Q Now, let me ask you a couple of quick general
questions. As we've gone through all of these
documents, it appears to me that the manner in which
this matter proceeded was that Hales & Warner would
still deal directly with you as their subcontractor and
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April 3, 2000

Hales & Warner Construction Inc.
1460 North Main, Unit 1
Spanish Fork, Utah 84660
Attn: Clifford Warner
Re: Highland 4 & 20 Wards
Dear Clifford,
Before the framing on the project was started, I called you and told you I was having difficulty and could
not frame your project. I told you that another framer was available and could frame the building. I told
you that he had never done a chapel and would get it done far you but the time frame could not be met.
You looked for other framers to do the work but could not find any, I told you that I would help him when
I could and try to get it done for you. You said that you would work with us in getting the job done and we
would all try to make the best of a bad situation. I told you I would get the material there and he would get
started on the scheduled date. You told me to wait until after the first of the month because of billing
purposes, but I said that it would not be a problem and sent material and men to do the job. I even got
myself in hot water on another job in order to send some of my men there to supplement the work force
there and try to get your project framed
From the very beginning, your superintendent interfered with the framing process, telling them that they
couldn't do it the way they were used to framing and caused the framer many problems, costing extra time
and material. This interference continued through out the framing of the building. If it wasn't wanting
something done out of sequence, it was putting other subs and/or material in the way so the framers could
not do their job.
I do not feel that the 4 XA weeks you want to charge me time on is fair considering all of the situations
involved in the project. Even if you do charge for time, the $570.00 per day that you are charging is
excessive, your own contract says $350.00 per day.
There is no way that I feel that I owe you anywhere near that amount of money.
Sincerely
Brent Reynolds Construction

Brent L. Reynolds
Pres.
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Q From what?
A From written notice to proceed.
Q And when did you receive the written notice to
proceed?
A I don't know the date.
Q Well, what would you have to look at to
determine that?
A They send me out a formal notice to proceed;
I'd have to find that.
Q Well, that's a document that pertains to the
Highland project, setting time limits; isn't that
correct?
A Yes.
Q You received it at least prior to the May 17
issuing of the permit as shown in Exhibit 22; isn't that
correct?
A I don't know that, sir.
Q You don't? Well, who sets the time schedules
for a project on behalf of Hales & Warner?
A I generally write the schedule.
Q Where is the schedule for the Highland
project?
A I'm assuming it's in my office somewhere.
Q When you prepare this schedule, do you break
it down as to various parts of the project, sir?
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Q Where is the schedule that was prepared for
Exhibit 14, if you know?
A I don't know where it is.
Q In the normal course of business, there would
have been a schedule A Yes.
Q - for Exhibit 14; correct?
A Yes.
I
Q And you would have prepared it; correct?
A Most likely.
Q And you would have prepared it for the reasons
setforthin your testimony afewmoments ago; correct? 1
A Yes.
Q And that's so that BRC would know before they
signed the subcontract, what your anticipated schedule
was; isn't that correct?
A They have a basic idea of when they'll be
there, but the schedule, yes, it does.
Q And if they had problems, for example, if they
made arrangements, and you, Hales & Warner, had said
okay to BRC, that you were going to send them a
subcontract agreement, they would have had timely notice
as to when they were expected to be on the job; correct?
A Yes.
Q And if there had been problems, you would have
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A Yes.
Q Tell me what parts of the project you would
set time limits on, and using as an example this
Highland project.
A I would set a time limit on forming and
pouring footings, a time limit to excavate for the
footings, a time limit to form and pour the foundation,
time to prepare the slab, a time limit to pour the slab.
Basically, every portion of that work has a time affixed
to it.
Q Why?
A It's a matter of coordination between subs.
Q Why is that important?
A It keeps everyone informed. They know what to
expect up front. It makes jobs go smoother.
Q When you say it lets everyone know what to
expect up front, what do you mean?
A It means that we send out a schedule, either
with their contract or shortly after. They can review
it and plan for those time schedules.
Q For example, Exhibit 14, what is that?
A It's a subcontract from Hales & Warner
Construction to BRC, Incorporated.
Q Is the schedule attached to it?
A No, sir.
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anticipated that they would have told you of those
problems before you signed the contract; correct?
A Yes.
Q And the reason being is, if they weren't
available, you would have got someone else in the
framing business as a subcontractor; correct?
A Yes.
Q Somebody that you had worked with before;
correct?
A Preferably.
Q And if for any reason you couldn't get someone
that you had worked with before, whoever you got, you
would have checked out their qualifications before
signing the contract; correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q And the reason for that is so that you would
have a good workmanlike job done on the site; correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q Because you were responsible for their work as I
it pertained to delivering a goodfinishedproduct to
your customer, the LDS Church; correct?
A Yes.
Q And you prided yourself in doing it that way,
did you not?
A Yes.
I
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not going to be there, Hales & Warner can take proper
steps to get a qualified replacement, if necessary;
isn't that correct?
A It's generally a last resort.
Q I understand. But that's part of the reason
why you have a two-week lead time; isn't that correct?
A In that two-week lead time, if he would have
said, I absolutely cannot be there, will not fulfill the
contract, then, yes, we are forced into other
alternatives.
Q Yes, but you have some time to do that.
A Yes.
Q So that you can get a qualified sub to come in
and replace him; correct?
A Yes.
Q So then what happened when BRC was supposed to
be on the j ob, this time period after they were
originally set to be on the job?
Do you understand what I mean?
A No.
Q Let's say day one was the day required by the
schedule for BRC to be on the job; correct?
A Okay.
Q They weren't there on that day, were they?
A No.

Q And as far as you know, no one from Hales &
Warner knew who Ken Egbert Construction was; isn't that
correct?
A That's correct.
Q No one from Hales & Warner knew anything at
all about Ken Egbert Construction when they showed up on
the job on this hypothetical day two; isn't that
correct?
A I believe that's correct.
Q How many men did Ken Egbert Construction bring
with them on this hypothetical day two?
A I don't know.
Q It was not the number of men required by the
contract; isn't that correct?
A We didn't have a requirement on the number of
men in the contract.
Q Okay.
A It's not uncommon to start with three or four
men, get your feet under you, get layout going, get some
things going, so that you can bring in more men.
Q Yes. Yes, exactly.
And Ken Egbert Construction just had their
reduced crew for the purpose of, using your words,
getting their feet under them, as far as you know; isn't
that correct? If you know, if you don't, that's okay,
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Q Then there was some time, a delay, that they
told you that they couldn't be there, but they then
promised to be on the job during this delay period that
you're not sure exactly what it was; correct?
A Yes.
Q Let's call that day two.
A Okay.
Q Now, on day two, did BRC show up?
A Personally?
Q Yes.
A No.
Q What explanation, if any, did they, BRC, give
Hales & Warner for not showing up after this delay? For
not showing up on day two?
A I don't recall all the circumstances that took
place at that time, but I believe that BRC was trying to
buy themselves some time to get a start on the job, and
then be able to supplement that job with their own men.
Q So what did they do?
A You mean to start?
Q Yes. On day two.
A They made an arrangement with Ken Egbert to
start that job.
Q Who was Ken Egbert?
A I don't know the man, or didn't know the man.
1

_

_

_

_
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too.
A I don't know what his intentions were. I
don't know what his thinking was. It's just my
experience.
Q But there were daily logs for this project
prepared by Maurice Egbert; correct?
A Yes.
Q Did you review those daily logs at any time?
A Yes.
Q When was the last time you saw those daily
logs?
A It's been a while.
Q Yes. When was the last time, sir?
A I'm guessing.
Q Please tell me.
MR. DAVENPORT: Let him finish his answer.
Go ahead.
THE WITNESS: Probably 18 months ago.
Q (BY MR. MORIARITY) What was the purpose of
the daily logs?
A Refresh my memory.
Q There were other purposes, other than just
refreshing your memory; isn't that correct?
A Such as?
Q Well, were there any other purposes for the

, - ' » ; ' • '
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A No, sir.
MR. MORIARITY: Should we take a short break?
(Recess)
Q (BY MR. MORIARITY) Getting back to this
hypothetical day two, when Egbert Construction showed up
in place of BRC, how did youfindout about that?
A I don't recall.
Q What did you do when you found that out?
A I didn't do anything.
Q Why?
A I didn't feel I needed to do anything.
Q Why?
A As far as I knew, BRC was attempting to
fulfill his contract.
Q As far as you knew, BRC was attempting to
fulfill the contract; is that correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q How were they doing that?
A He had made an arrangement with Egbert. The
extent of that arrangement, I didn't know the full
extent.
Q And as the general contractor, Hales & Warner,
did anyone make any inquiry as to what was going on as
it related to the framing?
A I'm sure there were discussions back and
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Q Let me ask you, what were the first
impressions that you made of Ken Egbert?
A That he was hard working and honest.
Q Describe Ken Egbert.
A Physically?
Q Yes.
A Probably about my height.
Q How high is that?
A Five eight. A little stockier.
Q Any other description?
A No.
Q Age?
A I would guess in his 30s.
Q Anything else?
A Not that comes to mind.
Q Okay. Now, this discussion that you had with
Ken Egbert, tell me about it.
A It was kind of a mini preconstruction meeting.
It was just reiterating plans and specs, encouraging him
to get into the plans and review them.
Q Had he been into the plans and reviewed them
before you encouraged him to do so?
A I don't remember.
Q Was it your observation that he didn't seem
very educated about the plans, about those specific
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forth. I don't remember exactly what took place.
Q Discussions between whom?
A Like I said, I'm sure there were discussions.
It would have had to have been between BRC and Hales &
Warner.
Q Yes. And what information about these
discussions was given to you, Joel Warner?
A I don't remember the exact content.
Q It was a problem, was it not?
A It was.
Q And you were one of the problem solvers;
correct?
A That's correct.
Q What, if anything, did you do to solve this
problem?
A I did meet with Ken Egbert on site, either the
first or second day, spoke with him.
Q Thefirstor second day that he was on the
project, on the site?
A That's true.
Q Right?
A That's correct.
Q Describe Ken Egbert.
A He seemed like a hard working, honest
individual when I met with him. First impression.

.
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plans?
A Not - 1 didn't get that assumption.
Q Why did you encourage him to get into the
plans and review them?
A These particular plans have a lot of details.
It's just - it's nothing new to him. He had done
custom homes, apartment complexes. Everything I was
telling him wasn't new to him.
Q How do you know that?
A Just a general feeling I had.
Q How many commercial projects had Ken Egbert
worked on prior to the Highland project?
A I don't know.
Q Did you ask him?
A I asked him about some of his prior projects.
Q Yes. And he told you that he'd worked on some
custom homes and some apartments; correct?
A I believe that's what he told me.
Q My question is, do you know if he had worked
on any commercial projects?
A I don't know.
Q Did you ask him anything about his crew?
A I'm sure that was a topic of discussion.
Q What did he tell you?
A I don't remember.
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Q Did you ask him the number of framers he
intended to have on the project?
A Like I said, I'm sure that was a topic of
discussion. I have these meetings all the time with
subcontractors, and that's the topic. I don't remember
the exact content of it.
Q Let me ask you, how many men have been killed
on projects that you have been involved in?
A Just this one.
Q So would you agree that this project, the
Highland project, was a little bit different than any
other project that you had been involved with since
1978, because of the fact that a young man had been
killed?
MR. DAVENPORT: I'll have to object to the
vagueness of the question. I don't understand it.
You can go ahead and answer it if you can.
THE WITNESS: Of course it was unique in that
regard.
Q (BY MR. MORIARITY) Because of it being
unique, do you have any better recollection of your
conversations with the subcontractor for whom this young
man that got killed had been employed?
A No, sir.
Q No reason to, in your mind; is that correct?

A I didn't ask him.
Q Was Ken Egbert Construction approved by the
LDS Church, your client, to be a subcontractor on the
Highland project?
A In saying "approved," you're assuming that
there was a list out there of approved subcontractors?
Q My question is very simple. Was Ken Egbert
approved to be aframeron the Highland project by the
LDS Church, your client?
A He was neither approved nor disapproved.
Q Well, did the LDS Church, your client, know
that Ken Egbert was doing theframingon the Highland
project as distinguished from BRC doing the framing?
A I don't know when they knew. It wasn't
something that we tried to hide. I'm sure the architect
was privy to it, who is a representative of the owner.
Q Well, Hales & Warner was a representative of
the owner in reference to the subcontractors, weren't
they?
MR. DAVENPORT: I object to the extent you're
asking for a legal conclusion.
You can go ahead and answer to the extent you
can. Go ahead.
THE WITNESS: I didn't understand your
question.

_ _ _ _ _ _
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1
Q (BY MR. MORIARITY) Yes. Hales & Warner was a
2 representative of their client, the LDS Church, in
3 relation to dealing with the subcontractors; isn't that
4 correct?

A This is a first for me, sir. I had nothing to
hide at the time. Of course, it was a tragedy, but I
didn't take any other precautions.
Q Thank you.
Now, did you ask Ken Egbert if he had a
contract with BRC?
A No, sir.
Q You were informed that he was a separate
construction company than BRC; isn't that correct?
A I knew that.
Q Yes, you knew that. How did you know that?
A I'm not sure.
Q You knew he had never worked on any LDS
churches before; correct?
A I think that's correct.
Q And yet you have no recollection of having
asked Ken Egbert if he had a contract with BRC; isn't
that true?
A Say that again.
Q And yet you have no recollection of having
asked Ken Egbert if his construction company had a
separate contract with BRC; isn't that true?
A That's correct.
Q Did you ask him if he had even seen
Exhibit 14, the subcontract with BRC?
,
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A No, sir.
Q You were not?
A (Witness indicating in the negative.)
MR. MORIARITY: Please mark the record.
Q (BY MR. MORIARITY) Now, you say that the
architect was aware that Ken Egbert Construction, rather
than BRC, was doing the framing; correct?
A I said Tm sure they were privy to it. It's
nothing that we tried to hide. As far as we were
concerned, BRC retained the contract, and, in fact,
supplied material for the framing for that job.
Q My question was, your testimony is that the
architect knew that Ken Egbert Construction was doing
the framing instead of BRC; is that true?
A I believe I've answered it.
Q Would you please answer it.
A I said that he was privy to it. I did not
personally go to him and tell him. I don't know how it
come about.
Q Is there a reason why you're hollering at me?
A No, I'm--
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MR. DAVENPORT: Let me let the record reflect
that my client is not hollering.
THE WITNESS: I'm just telling you I think
I've answered the question.
Q (BY MR. MORIARITY) Did you ever have any
discussions of any nature whatsoever about the role of
Ken Egbert Construction on the Highland project?
A No, not that I remember.
Q Who was the architect?
A Butler & Evans.
Q Yes, but who was the actual person?
A Paul Evans.
Q How often would you meet with him?
A I wasn't on site. He met with Maurice on a
weekly basis.
Q How do you know that the architect was privy
to the fact that Ken Egbert was doing the framing?
A Just from the mere fact that Paul Evans was on
site on a weekly basis. I'm sure he would have looked
at theframing,would have talked to Ken.
Q You're just assuming all of those things;
correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q You did not observe the architect talking to
Ken, did you?

Q Yes. Now, who actually ordered the lumber
from the lumber supplier; do you know?
A All I know is, it was in BRC's name.
j
Q How do you know that?
A Because that's who we wrote the joint checks
to.
Q You know that the method of payment to the
lumber supplier was by a joint check, payable and to be
endorsed by BRC and Hales & Warner Construction;
correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q But you don't know who ordered the lumber, do
you?
A No, sir.
Q Did you see the bill?
A No, sir.
Q Did you check to find out who had actually
ordered the lumber?
A No, sir.
Q Did you check the grade of the lumber?
A Personally?
Q Hales & Warner, did they check the grade of
the lumber?
A I can't answer for Maurice. He would have
been the one to check it.
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A No, sir.
Q You did not have conversations that you recall
with the architect about the role of Ken Egbert
Construction, did you?
A No.
Q What materials did BRC furnish to Ken Egbert
Construction, if you know?
A He didn't supply them to Ken Egbert. He
supplied them to the Highland project, as per his
contract.
Q What materials did he supply prior to the
death of Jason Smith, "he" being BRC Construction?
A Lumber package.
Q How do you know that?
A Because we joint checked.
Q Joint checked what?
A With BRC and the lumber supplier.
Q In other words, your name and his was on the
check? Is that what you're saying?
A Say that again.
Q What do you mean by "joint checked"?
A We write out a check to BRC Construction and
the lumber supplier. I don't recall the lumber
supplier. It goes to BRC Construction, he endorses it,
sends it to the lumber supplier.

Q Now, the first wall that Ken Egbert
1
Construction built was too tall, wasn't it?
A Yes.
Q How did you know that?
A How did I personally know?
Q Yes.
A Maurice called me.
Q Where did he call you at?
A On my cell phone.
Q What did he say?
A He told me the problem.
Q This is another problem that the problem
solver would take care of; correct?
A Jointly, yes.
I
Q Jointly with whom?
A Maurice.
MR. DAVENPORT: Canwegoofftherecordfora
minute.
(Off-the-record discussion)
Q (BY MR. MORIARITY) Was Maurice Egbert an
officer of Hales & Warner's partnership?
A It's a corporation and, no, he was not.
Q Was he a director?
A No.
Q He was an employee; correct?
[
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MR. DAVENPORT: Let me let the record reflect
that my client is not hollering.
THE WITNESS: I'm just telling you I think
I've answered the question.
Q (BY MR. MORIARITY) Did you ever have any
discussions of any nature whatsoever about the role of
Ken Egbert Construction on the Highland project?
A No, not that I remember.
Q Who was the architect?
A Butler & Evans.
Q Yes, but who was the actual person?
A Paul Evans.
Q How often would you meet with him?
A I wasn't on site. He met with Maurice on a
weekly basis.
Q How do you know that the architect was privy
to the fact that Ken Egbert was doing the framing?
A Just from the mere fact that Paul Evans was on
site on a weekly basis. I'm sure he would have looked
at the framing, would have talked to Ken.
Q You're just assuming all of those things;
correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q You did not observe the architect talking to
Ken, did you?

Q Yes. Now, who actually ordered the lumber
from the lumber supplier; do you know?
A All I know is, it was in BRC's name.
Q How do you know that?
A Because that's who we wrote the joint checks
to.
Q You know that the method of payment to the
lumber supplier was by a joint check, payable and to be
endorsed by BRC and Hales & Warner Construction;
correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q But you don't know who ordered the lumber, do
you?
A No, sir.
Q Did you see the bill?
A No, sir.
Q Did you check to find out who had actually
ordered the lumber?
A No, sir.
Q Did you check the grade of the lumber?
A Personally?
I
Q Hales & Warner, did they check the grade of
the lumber?
A I can't answer for Maurice. He would have
been the one to check it.
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A No, sir.
Q You did not have conversations that you recall
with the architect about the role of Ken Egbert
Construction, did you?
A No.
Q What materials did BRC furnish to Ken Egbert
Construction, if you know?
A He didn't supply them to Ken Egbert. He
supplied them to the Highland project, as per his
contract.
Q What materials did he supply prior to the
death of Jason Smith, "he" being BRC Construction?
A Lumber package.
Q How do you know that?
A Because we joint checked.
Q Joint checked what?
A With BRC and the lumber supplier.
Q In other words, your name and his was on the
check? Is that what you're saying?
A Say that again.
Q What do you mean by "joint checked"?
A We write out a check to BRC Construction and
the lumber supplier. I don't recall the lumber
supplier. It goes to BRC Construction, he endorses it,
sends it to the lumber supplier.
—
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Q Now, the first wall that Ken Egbert
Construction built was too tall, wasn't it?
A Yes.
Q How did you know that?
A How did I personally know?
Q Yes.
A Maurice called me.
Q Where did he call you at?
A On my cell phone.
Q Whatdidhesay?
A He told me the problem.
Q This is another problem that the problem
solver would take care of; correct?
A Jointly, yes.
Q Jointly with whom?
A Maurice.
MR. DAVENPORT: Canwegoofftherecordfora
minute.
(Off-the-record discussion)
Q (BY MR. MORIARITY) Was Maurice Egbert an
officer of Hales & Warner's partnership?
A It's a corporation and, no, he was not.
Q Was he a director?
A No.
Q He was an employee; correct?

-J
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A Yes.
Q Now, when he called you on your cell phone and
told you that Egbert Construction had constructed a wall
that was too tall, what, if anything, did you do about
solving that problem?
A First of all, I asked him why, what their
thinking was. Oftentimes, subcontractors come up with
what they think is a better idea.
Q And what was Maurice's information that he
gave you in response to your inquiry?
A It was so that they could use precut studs.
Q So what did you then do?
A I remember telling Maurice I'd get back to
him. I mulled it over in my own mind, called him back,
and told him to have them do it the way - according to
plans and specs.
Q This was the first wall that Egbert
Construction had constructed; correct?
A I believe so.
Q And isn't it true that Maurice told you that
when he had asked Ken Egbert why he was doing it that
way, that Mr. Ken Egbert told Mr. Maurice Egbert that
the reason was because BRC, specifically Mr. Reynolds,
had told him to do it that way; is that correct?
A That was my understanding.

1
Q Such as?
2
A Those walls are designed as a sheer wall with
3 sheeting from bottom plate to top plate.
4
Q And who installed the sheeting?
5
A I don't believe it was installed at that time.
6
Q No, sir, but whose job was it to install the
7 sheeting?
8
A Theframers'.
9
Q What do you mean by it was designed to be a
10 sheer wall?
11
A It's a structural wall.
12
Q Yes.

Q Yes. And, the reason was twofold. They could
use precut studs and it was faster; correct?
A It would have been faster.
Q Why did you mull it over in your mind?
A Because I wanted to see what, if any, ill
effects that it would have on the project.
Q The fact is, if it would have been faster and
didn't have any ill effects on the project, you probably
would have approved it; correct?
A On my own volition, probably not. I would
have conferred with the architect.
Q Did you confer with the architect on that
problem?
A No, sir.
Q Because you recognized that no matter how much
faster it may have been, having a wall an inch higher
than what the plans called for would affect the whole
project; correct?
A I don't know to what extent, but it would have
affected the proj ect.
Q Yes. You can't have walls that are planned to
be "X" number of feet be an inch taller and everything
else in the project fit in; correct?
A It wouldn't have been that big of a calamity,
but there were some different ramifications.
:
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A That prevents itfrommoving horizontally,
diagonally.
Q Now, how long after Ken Egbert Construction
had been on the Highland project was it that this
problem with the wall being one inch higher took place? 1
(Off-the-record discussion)
Q (BYMR.MORIARITY) I'm sorry, go ahead and 1
answer.
A I don't know the exact time frame. It would
have been shortly after he started.
Q Yes. What reaction, if any, did you have to
the fact that Ken Egbert Construction, now doing the
framing on the Highland project, disregarded the plans
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and specs and was building at least the first wall, not
to specs, but rather to precut stud specifications?
A It was as per BRC Construction, so I didn't
have any negativity towards Egbert, nor BRC.
Q Did you call and talk to anyone at BRC and ask 1
them why they were telling Egbert to do something
different than was in the plans?
A Brent called me.
h
Q What did he say?
A He pled his case, why he wanted to use them.
Q So Brent Reynolds from BRC called you and
tried to make a case for using the precut studs.
A Yes, sir.
Q And part of his case, a big part of his case,
was that it was going to be faster; isn't that correct?
A No. The biggest part of his case is that he
said he had done it on previous church jobs.
Q Had he done it with approval on the previous
church jobs?
A I don't know.
Q Well, did you ask him?
A I don't know if he asked for approval. That's
what I gathered, because he didn't ask us for approval.
Q Okay. So Ken Egbert didn't ask for approval
to build the wall one inch higher, did he?
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1 to the site?
A No.
2
Q Where was Mr. Hales?
3
A He was off that day.
4
Q You called him from the office and told him
5
6 about it; correct?
A I don't know. He was involved in a wedding.
7
8 I don't know when I told him.
Q You made a deliberate decision in your own
9
10 mind that it wasn't necessary for you to go to the site;
11 correct?
A Yes.
12
Q Did you speak with any of the investigating
13
14 officers?
15
A No, I did not.
Q Did you speak with anyone from OSHA?
16
A I did not.
17
Q There wasn't anything that would have
18
19 prevented you from going to the site, was there?
A No, sir.
20
21
Q Did you call the Church, your client, and tell
22 them that there had been a fatality on the site?
A I don't know when that took place.
23
24
Q Well, did you talk to them about it?
A I did not.
25
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them to provide proper supervision if that had not been
a problem?
A We didn't want just bodies. When you increase
crew size, you expect a certain amount of them to be
experienced.
Q Yes. Providing bodies may, in fact, lead to
dead bodies; correct?
A Well, I don't know.
Q It did, in fact, didn't it?
MR. DAVENPORT: Objection. You're asking him
to make ~
THE WITNESS: Yes. You're asking m e Q (BY MR. MORIARITY) You don't know?
A You're asking me to state that that's the
cause, and I don't know that.
Q Based upon Exhibit 16, what Hales & Warner
wanted were experienced framers on the job to get the
job done in a timely manner; correct?
A Yes, I think we said supervision, adequate
supervision.
Q Yes. And you wanted experienced framers;
correct?
A Yes.
Q Now, there were three individuals involved in
the raising of the wall that fell and killed Jason
1
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Q Do you know if anyone did from Hales & Warner?
A I don't know.
Q Now, Exhibit 16, refers to a seven-week
framing schedule.
A Yes.
Q Correct?
A Yes.
Q From what we know, theframershad been on the
job for approximately two weeks; correct?
A Yes.
Q And we know that they were late getting there
by approximately a week or sometime in that general
area; correct?
A Yes.
Q And it says here, You need to immediately
increase the number of framers and provide proper
supervision.
What does "proper supervision" mean?
A Experienced men.
Q Had there been a problem with there not being
proper supervision that led, at least in part, to the
writing of Exhibit 16 on August 11, 1999?
A I don't remember any discussions that they
were improperly supervised.
Q Well, why would Hales & Warner write and tell
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Smith. Are you aware of that?
A Just through these proceedings.
Q "These proceedings" being the depositions here
Friday and today?
A Yeah. That's when I've known for sure that
there were three men.
Q Prior to that, did you have any knowledge as
to how many men were being involved in the attempted
raising of the wall that killed Jason Smith?
MR. DAVENPORT: I'm just going to instruct you
not to speculate. You can testify on your personal
knowledge, but if this is just something that someone
has told you MR. MORIARITY: I would really be interested
in the Hornbook citation to the objection you just made
as it being a legal objection. Is there one?
MR. DAVENPORT: I'm not here to answer your
questions. I just want him to understand that he's
supposed to testify on his personal knowledge, not to
speculate.
MR. MORIARITY: Please read the question.
(Record read)
THE WITNESS: Yes, I knew.

|

r

Q (BY MR. MORIARITY) You knew there were three;
correct?
1
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A Yes.
Q Did you know what their qualifications or
experience was?
A No.
Q Now, let me ask you a question. As a general
contractor, do you check the permits of the
subcontractors, does Hales & Warner check the permits of
the subcontractors?
A Permits? I'm confused.
Q The license, the permits.
A Contractor's license?
Q Yes.
A We ask for a number.
Q That's all?
A That's all.
Q And the number would permit you to call up the
Department of Commerce and get a copy of their permit,
their license, if you so desired; correct?
A Yes.
Q Now, when you buy supplies, you issue checks
with the subcontractor's signature and Hales & Warner's
signature being required for it to be cashed; correct?
A When we buy supplies?
Q Supplies for the job. Materials.
A We don't buy supplies through our subs. I

A Yes.
Q Do you check or does anyone on behalf of
Hales & Warner check green cards?
A For subcontractors?
Q Yes.
A No, sir.
j
Q You know what a green card is?
A I have an idea.
Q What?
A It's a documentation that says people are in
this country legally.
1
Q Yes. What steps, if any, are taken to check
to find out if the people working on the site are, in
fact, in this country legally?
A I don't know.
Q Now, we were talking about criteria regarding
the raising of walls. Do you remember that?
A Yes.
Q What criteria, if any, is there regarding
having unobstructed paths for the raising of the wall?
A When we have preconstruction meetings with our
subcontractors, we emphasize the need for a clean site.
Q Okay. And why is the clean site so important?
A One, you would say that's the overall
appearance of the site.
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don't know ~ I'm confused on that matter.
Q Well, let's take, for example, what we talked
about earlier, the materials for the framing.
A Correct.
Q When you were paying the supplier, you pay it
with a check signed by the subcontractor and by Hales &
Warner; correct?
A No. The check is made out to the
subcontractor and the materials supplier.
Q So it requires signature by the material
supplier.
A Well, we send it to the person we have a
contract with. He, then - I'm not sure, I'm assuming
he endorses it and sends it on.
Q How about your payroll? How is that handled?
A The payroll?
Q Do you do a similar situation?
A It's a direct check to our employees.
Q Well, how about the payroll of, for example,
BRC? What safeguards, if any, do you take to make sure
that you're not going to have a labor lien?
A We don't take any safeguards, per se.
Q The reason that you issue the check to the
supplier in the manner you just described is to prevent
any material men's liens; isn't that correct?

___________—___—________—___—__________—,—,—___________—.,.,.,—____._

|
Q Is that the only reason, appearance?
A Safety issues.
Q Yes. How is a clean site a safety issue?
A From many standpoints. We don't want - spent 1
boards with nails in it could cause injury. We don't
want a lot of clutter on the site.
Q Why not?
A You can twist an ankle, you can trip.
Q Why don't you want to trip?
A I guess you could hurt yourself.
Q Yes. Getting back to the criteria to safely
raise a wall, should the individuals who are raising the I
wall have a clean path for raising the wall?
A Yes.
Q Why?
A To prevent tripping.
Q Now, as I understand it, Hales & Warner
emphasizes at these preconstruction meetings with the
subs how important a clean site is; correct?
A We emphasize we want a clean site.
Q Yes. Was he, Brent Reynolds, at the
preconstruction meeting?
A He was at the initial preconstruction meeting.
Q Well, was that the prebidding or was that the
preconstruction?
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1

A

Not to my knowledge.

2

Q

Prior to the time that the Smith boy was

3

killed, was the framing on schedule?

4

A

No.

5

Q

How far was it behind schedule?

6

A

Probably a couple of weeks, maybe three weeks.

7

Q

Why was it behind schedule?

8

A

That would be based on the work of Egbert

9

Construction.

10
11

Q

Yes, but why was it behind schedule, if you

A

I would say because of their not having done

know?

12
13

churches before.

14

corrected in their framing, such as heights of walls.

15

We had to tear apart one whole side, back section of a

16

wall, that they had made an inch too tall, and we had to

17

tear that apart and rebuild it.

18

Construction not being able to watch what was going on,

19

I guess.

20
21
22

I had found problems that had to be

Just Egbert

Q

Why weren't they able to watch what was going

A

Actually, with that situation, with the wall,

on?

23

BRC had actually instructed them to build it that way to

24

save time in cutting studs.

And the plan had called for
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the shorter wall, and we had requested that they follow

57

1

the plans.

2

Q

Who is BRC?

3

A

Brent Reynolds Construction.

4

Q

What role did they play in this project?

5

A

They were the contracted framers.

6

Q

Wait a minute.

7

Construction was doing the framing.

8
9

I thought you said Egbert

A

Brent Reynolds Construction had verbally

agreed with Egbert Construction to come in and take over

10

the project, because Brent Reynolds was unable to man

11

the project at the time.

12

Q

How did you find that out?

13

A

In speaking with Ken Egbert.

14

Q

How did you first meet Ken Egbert?

15

A

The day he came on the job site.

16

Q

What day was that?

17

A

That would be the first day that framing

18

began.

19

not sure exactly what date that was.

20
21
22

He was waiting for and unloading materials.

Q

Ifm

I want to make sure Ifm understanding.
Had you had previous work at all of any nature

whatsoever with BRC?
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

23
24
25

A

I had called him on the phone to let him know

where the project was on schedule.
Q

Galled who?
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1

if you heard the —

2

heard.

3

base your testimony on what you

TEE WITNESS:

I -talked to Ken Egbert.

Ken

4

Egbert told me that he was told by somebody in Brent

5

Reynolds1 company to make the wall that high.

6
7

Q

10
11
12
13
14
15

And the height, was it

higher or shorter?

8
9

(BY MR. MORIARITY)

A

One inch higher than what the plans called

Q

The reason it was one inch higher was to save

for.

studs and not have to cut them; correct?
A

Yes.

The height that they would make them

would be a standard height of a stud.
Q

And so they could then just buy standard

studs, put them in, get the job done faster; correct?

16

A

That would be my assumption.

17

Q

How did you find out that the walls were one

18

inch higher?

19

A

I measured them.

20

Q

And when you measured them and found that out,

21

what, if anything, did you do?

22

A

23

. Q

I talked to Ken.
And what did Ken tell you?
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A

I don't recall if he went back to Brent and

talked to him or not, but the next day the wall was

66

1

fixed.

2

Q

But was it during the course of that

3

conversation or conversations with Ken that he told you

4

that the reason the walls were as high as they were is

5

because someone from BRC had told them to do it that

6

way?

7

A

I would assume it would be in that

8

conversation.

9

Q

And did you show him the plans?

10

A

Yes.

11

Q

And point out the fact that no matter what BRC

12

or anybody else said, the walls were to be this height,

13

and it had to be torn down and made that height, which

14

was one inch shorter; correct?

15
16

A

It is in their contract to follow the plans

and specs of the job.

17

Q

In whose contract?

18

A

Brent Reynolds1.

19

Q

And what did Mr. Egbert say to you when you

20

told him that?

21

.A

He was hesitant, and I think he went and
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called Brent, because he came back to me and we visited

23

again over the problem.

24
25

Q

And what was said during that second visit, or

that visit, whatever number it was.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

69

1

A

They corrected the problem.

2

Q

Yes, sir, I understand, but I'm talking about

3

at the time when you made the conclusion in your mind

4

that Ken Egbert was frustrated.

5

A

No.

6

Q

Okay.

7

Did Ken Egbert ask you to speak to

Brent Reynolds or anyone at that company?

8

A

No.

9

Q

Did he ask that the architect be called in so

10

he could show him the work?

11

A

No.

12

Q

But the bottom line is that Egbert

13

Construction had constructed a wall and they had to redo

14

the entire wall and make it one inch shorter; correct?

15

A

That is correct.

16

Q

And that was based upon your direction;

17

correct?

18

A

Yes.

19

Q

How long did it take for them to dismantle

20

that wall; do you know?

21

A

I believe they had it finished the next day.

22

Q

But they, "they" being Egbert Construction,

23

were- approximately two weeks behind the schedule;
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correct?
A

Not a t t h a t

time.
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1

Q

Sometime shortly thereafter, were they?

2

A

Sometime into the framing.

3

Q

Yes.

4
5
6
7
8

How long into the framing were they two

weeks behind schedule?
A

I'd say approximately the time of the death.

That's as close as I could say.
Q

What was causing them to be two weeks behind

schedule?

9

MR. DAVENPORT:

Again, if you know, you can

10

tell them, but if you don't, I don't want you

11

speculating.

12
13

THE WITNESS:
Q

I don't know.

(BY MR. MORIARITY)

Based on your

14

observations, what was causing them to be two weeks

15

behind schedule?

16
17

A

There were several other items that they had

to redo.

18

Q

Such as?

19

A

I don't recall what they are.

20

Q

But items that you told them they had to redo?

21

A

But items that I had showed them on the plan

22
23

that we needed to rectify.
. Q

Such as?
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A

I don't recall.

25

Q

But there were several items that you made

71

1

them redo?

2

A

There were several items.

3

Q

Anything else?

4

A

Not enough manpower.

5

Q

Yes.

6

A

Egbert Construction is a small company, and

Tell me about that.

7

hires on, as we do, as needed, new employees, and he was

8

building his crew, but it wasn't coming very fast.

9

MR. DAVENPORT:

If you know this personally,

10

that's fine, but if you're speculating on someone else's

11

statement to you, you need to tell him it's based on

12

someone else's statement.

13
14
15

THE WITNESS:
Q

I had discussed this with Ken.

(BY MR. MORIARITY)

Yes.

And this was the

explanation given to you by Ken Egbert; correct?

16

A

Yes.

17

Q

Did he, Ken Egbert, tell you whether or not

18
19
20
21

his framers were experienced?
A

I did not go into the qualifications of his

employees.
Q

Well, isn't it one of your roles as the
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superintendent to make sure that the work is done in a

23

workmanlike manner?

24

A

Could you repeat that, please?

25

Q

Yes.

Isnft it one of your roles as the

72

1

project superintendent to make sure that the work of the

2

subcontractors is done in a workmanlike manner?

3

A

4

manner.

5

Q

I am to see that the work is done in a quality
Is that what you're asking?
No, Ifm asking in a workmanlike manner.

6

Workmanlike manner is a term of art in the construction

7

trade, is it not?

8

A

9

. Q

Workman?
Yes.

Workmanlike manner.

10

A

Never heard that presented to me.

11

Q

Never did, okay.

12

So do you know if it was your job to make sure

13

that the work done by the subcontractor and their

14

employees was done in a workmanlike manner?

15

that?

16

MR. DAVENPORT:

Do you know

I'm going to object to the

17

extent that you're asking for some kind of a legal

18

conclusion.

19

. Q

You can word it as you understand it.

(BY MR. MORIARITY)

Just answer my question as
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21
22

I asked it.
A

I don't understand what you mean by

"workmanlike manner."

23

Q

You don't?

24

A

Are you talking quality of work?

25

Are you

talking craftsmanship?

73

1
2

Q

Has anyone ever talked to you, anyone from

Hales & Warner, as to what workmanlike manner means?

3

A

No.

4

Q

Never heard it before today; correct?

5

A

Never heard of the term.

6

Q

Never seen it in writing before today?

7

A

Never seen it in writing.

8

Q

Never seen it in that big, thick book that you

9

have at home?

10

A

Never seen it in that big book.

11

Q

Never seen it in the three construction books

12

that you've read?

13

A

No.

14

Q

Okay.

Then what did you see your role as the

15

project superintendent to be in reference to make sure

16

that the subs were doing quality construction?

17

.. A

I look over the plans and see to it that they
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18

are following the plans.

19

of the specs in the spec book and see to it that they

20

are following the spec book.

21

and using the correct lumber, correct nailing, the

22

quality of workmanship will be there.

23

Q

I read through their section

If they are doing that,

Well, if a subcontractor came in with three or

24

four 13-year-old boys that were doing all of the things

25

that you just said, would you permit that as the project
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1

superintendent?

2

A

If I knew their age, I would not permit it.

3

Q

Why not?

4

A

They're underage for working.

5

Q

I see.

6

Now, you had been a framer.

You

testified to that earlier here today, had you not?

7

A

I've had some experience in framing, yes.

8

Q

And you said to be an experienced framer, you

9
10
11
12
13

should have at least a year's experience, or words to
that effect, did you not?
A

Yes.

One year's experience is what I felt was

minimum.
Q

How many of the framers that Egbert

14

Construction was using on the Highland project had a

15

year or more experience, if you know, as framers?
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16

A

I do not know.

17

Q

What you did know is that Egbert Construction

18

was falling behind the required time schedule; correct?

19

A

Yes.

20

Q

And you were discussing this with Mr. Egbert;

21

correct?

22

A

Yes.

23

Q

Did you discuss it with anyone else?

24

A

I discussed it with Joel and Cliff.

25

Q

And when did you discuss it with Mr. Hales and

75

1
2

Mr. Warner?
A

Exact time, I do not know, but when I felt

3

that they were falling behind, I approached Joel or

4

Cliff.

5

Q

And what did you do?

6

A

And told them we needed to get a letter to

7

Brent Reynolds or to Ken Egbert and see if we couldn't

8

rectify that problem.

9

Q

Did you make the decision as to who the letter

10

should go to?

11

A

No.

12

Q

Did you have just one conversation with

13

Mr. -Hales and Mr. Warner or did you have a series of
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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14

conversations on the subject matter of Egbert

15

Construction falling behind?

16

A

I would say more than one.

17

Q

Yes.

18

A

I do not know.

19

Q

Approximately?

20

A

It would probably be a conversation —

21

How many more than one?

a topic

of conversation almost every time we talked.

22

Q

For what period of time?

23

A

Probably -- probably throughout the job.

24

Q

Yes.

25

How would you, as project

superintendent, communicate with your bosses, Mr. Hales

16

1

and Mr. Warner?

2

A

I would talk to them on the phone.

3

Q

It was all verbal?

4

A

Or —

5

yes -- or if Joel would come to the

site, I would talk to him there in person.

6

Q

But all of the communication was verbal.

7

A

Correct.

8

Q

And from the very first when Egbert

9
10
11

That is correct.

Construction came on site, you had some problems or
reservations about them, didn't you?
MR. DAVENPORT:

Ifm going to object.

That
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12
13

mischaracterizes the prior testimony.
Q

(BY MR. MORIARITY)

14

MR. DAVENPORT:

15

THE WITNESS:

Go ahead and answer.

You can go ahead and answer.
From the very start of when they

16

came on the job site, I had —

I did not have

17

reservations.

18

Q

(BY MR. MORIARITY)

19

A

When Ken and I first talked, I felt like it

Okay.

20

was a new company.

21

You know, proceed as you would any other new

22

subcontractor, watching their work.

23

Q

I had never worked with them before.

And when they1re new, do you watch them a

24

little bit closer than you watch somebody that you had

25

worked with year after year?
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1

A

Yes.

2

Q

Did Mr. Ken Egbert tell you, Mr. Maurice

3

Egbert, that he had had previous experience working on

4

LDS churches?

5

A

No.

6

Q

Did he tell you that he hadnft?

7

A

I don't recall.

8

Q

Did you know how much experience, if any,

9

Egbert Construction had working previously on LDS
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10
11
12

churches?
A

On LDS churches, I do not know how much

experience he had.

13

Q

Okay.

When was it that you first had a

14

communication, verbal communication, with either of your

15

supervisors as it related to Egbert Construction and the

16

framing?

17

first have that communication?

18
19

A

How soon after Egbert came on the job did you

It would probably be when they built the wall

wrong.

20

Q

Their first wall?

21

A

Their first wall.

22

Q

And time-wise, how soon was that prior to the

23

time that the young Smith boy was killed?

24

A

25

a half.

1
2

There again, it ! s probably a month, month and
I can't remember the exact dates when they

arrived on site.
Q

And during this month, month and a half, did

3

you say that in almost every conversation you had with

4

Mr. Hales and Mr. Warner, either when they were on site

5 . or by phone, that Egbert Construction was one of the
6
7

subject matters of the communication?
. A

I!m sorry, repeat that.
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8
9

Q

Yes.

Did you testify a few moments ago that

in all of your communications, after you first started

10

seeing these problems with Egbert Construction, that

11

they were the subject matter, at least in part, of all

12

of your communications with Mr. Hales and Mr. Warner?

13

A

Ifd say thatTs a fair —

14

Q

And did Mr. Hales or Mr. Warner ever come down

15

yes.

to the job site there at Highland and discuss these

16 . problems that you were discussing with them about Egbert
17

Construction?

18

A

Did they come and discuss it with me?

19

Q

Personally, yes, sir.

20

A

Yes.

21

Q

How often?

22

A

I don't recall.

23

Q

Several occasions?

24

A

I'm sure.

25

Q

And was it both Mr. Hales and Mr. Warner or

79

1

was it just Mr. Hales or Mr. Warner that came on site

2

and discussed these problems with you?

3
4
5

A

More than likely it would be Joel most of the

time.
-> Q

And Joel's last name?
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6

A

Joel Warner.

7

Q

Thank you very much.

8
9
10
11
12

And did Joel Warner give you some advice as to
how to deal with Egbert Construction and the problems
that you were discussing with him?
A

He told me to keep watching, check their work,

like we do on every job.

13

Q

Anything else?

14

A

I do not recall.

15

Q

Did you trust Egbert Construction?

16

MR. DAVENPORT:

Object to the vagueness of

17

the question, but if you can understand how to answer

18

it, go ahead.

19

THE WITNESS:

I felt with my overseeing of

20

the -- following the plans and specs, that I could trust

21

them, because they did correct all the problems that I

22

found.

23
24
25

Q

(BY MR. MORIARITY)

But corrected it after

exhibiting some frustration; correct?
A

On the first one, yes.
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1
2

MR. DAVENPORT:

Well, that's not personal

knowledge, but your knowledge is through Ken.

3

THE WITNESS:

4

Okay, what Ken told me.

Q

(BY MR. MORIARITY)

6

A

Shortly after the accident.

7

Q

Tell me the circumstances of that

8

conversation.

9

A

I don't recall.

10

Q

Well, you're having a conversation with the

5

And when did he tell you

that?

All I know is we had --

11

guy who was the boss of Egbert Construction, or at least

12

who the construction company was named after; isn't that

13

true?

14

A

Yes, I was talking to Ken Egbert.

15

Q

And he advised you that this kid who had been

16

killed, who was 18 years of age, that was only his

17

second day on the job; isn't that true?

18
19
20
21

MR. DAVENPORT:

Are you testifying that he was

18 years of age?
Q

(BY MR. MORIARITY)

Let me ask you, do you

know how old he was?

22

A

23

-. Q

I did not know.

I knew he was young.

Well, remember when we were talking about a
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24

bunch of 13-year-olds coming on, that you'd inquire.

25

Did you make any inquiry as to how old this kid was when

104

1

he came on your project to work?

2

A

I did not inquire as to his age.

3

Q

Did you at any time learn of his age?

4

A

I believe in the conversation with Ken -- in

5

fact, I know in the conversation with Ken, his age was

6

discussed.

7

Q

And how old was he?

8

A

I do not recall, but I know he was preparing

9
10
11
12
13
14

for a mission, so he was under 19, because he wasn't old
enough at the time.
Q

And what else do you recall about that

conversation with Ken Egbert?
A

Just that Ken had been told that he was

preparing for a mission.

15

Q

Anything else?

16

A

I don't recall anything else.

17

Q

It was a tragedy, wasn't it?

18

A

Yes, it was.

19

Q

Terrible waste of a human life; correct?

20
21

Is that correct, sir?
- A

Are you asking for my religious views?
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22

Q

No, that's not a religious view.

23

A

Yes, it is.

24

Q

Well, what is your answer in response to my

25

question?

105

1

A

2
3

A religious view.
MR. DAVENPORT:

it is.

4

You can go ahead and say what

I don't care.
THE WITNESS:

God has given him a mission.

5

Whether it be served here on earth or in heaven, it is

6

being served, and, yes, I believe that to be true.

7
8

Q

So you believe that this

was destined to happen, no matter what?

9
10

(BY MR. MORIARITY)

MR. DAVENPORT:

I object.

You're

mischaracterizing his testimony.

11

MR. MORIARITY:

12

THE WITNESS:

I'm asking.
I believe God has a purpose.

13

Whether there is a time, I will not testify to, but God

14

has a purpose for every individual on this earth.

15

Q

(BY MR. MORIARITY)

As a result of the tragic

16

death of Jason Smith, are you going to be a better

17

project supervisor?

18
19

A

Every experience that I have, whether it's on

the.job, through education, through life, makes me a
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20

better man, a better employee, a better superintendent.

21
22
23

Q

And can you answer the question that I asked

A

This is an experience of my life.

you?

24

never be erased.

25

without a camera.

It will

These pictures I have seen before
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MR. MARIGER: Application process to the
LDS Church?
MR. BADARUDDIN: Sure.
THE WITNESS: No.
Q (BY MR. BADARUDDIN) Did you have to provide
them any referrals or something of that nature?
A No.
Q How did they come to choose you the very first
time, if you know? When I say "y°u>M I mean your firm.
MR. MARIGER: So now are we talking about
before 1997?
Q (BY MR. BADARUDDIN) Well, when was the first
time you did anything for the LDS Church?
A My partner has worked for them since 1971.
Q Okay. So are you aware of the circumstances
under which your partner was able to start working with
theLDSChurch?
A No.
Q When were you born?
A 1969.
Q Okay. He didn'tfillyou in, I guess.
Well, let's talk about the Highland 4 and 20
project. How did you come to be the project -- is it
project architect?
A Yes.
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project?
A That could be a long list of things. Would
you like them all?
Q If you can list them, yes.
MR. MARIGER: Do you have the contract?
MR BADARUDDIN: I do, but I got this this
morning, and I haven't been able to go through this
thoroughly.
MR MARIGER It seems to me that me contract
would be the best evidence of that. You're asking him
all of his duties? Is that what I understand the
question to be?
MR BADARUDDIN: Well, I'm not asking him his 1
legal duties. Let me rephrase that.
Q (BY MR. BADARUDDIN) What did you doforthe
LDS Church on the Highland 4 and 20 project? Let me
start you off.
Did you have to design or draft the plans for
the structure?
1
A No.
Q Where did they come from?
A The church has a standard set of plans that
they use for their buildings.
Q What's the name of the building? Is it a
chapel, a sanctuary?

I
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Q How did you come to be the project architect
on the Highland 4 and 20 project?
A Our firm had projects in a geographical area
that spread from Idaho to Nephi, and within our
organization of the office, we, my partner and I,
decided that it didn't make sense for us to be crossing
paths all the time, so I tried to take the majority of
the projects in the south area.
Q Okay. Did Mr. Schick call y'all and say y'all is a word that we use where I'm from — did
Mr. Schick call your firm and say, Well, we've got a
project that we'd like your help with?
A I think he called my partner and said that.
Q And you didn't bid it or anything, they just
chose you?
A Correct.
Q And were you paid a retainer? Was there a
contract or did you just send them bills and they paid
them? What was the payment arrangement?
A We have a contract.
Q Did you? Okay. And the contract, was that
for a set rate or an hourly, or how did that work?
A A fixed fee.
Q Well, what were your duties and obligations to
the LDS Church with regard to the Highland 4 and 20
,

,

,

,

,

.

.V

..

:

-

. , :

:.

• - .

•-•

••

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

A They refer to it as the Heritage plan.
Q So they sent you drawings, drafts?
A They sent us CAD files in a hard copy. This
project - there are five styles that the local church
leaders choosefrom,and this was called the New England
Style.
Q Okay
A So they sent those plans to us as hard copy,
and also on CAD.
Q Okay. And CAD is a software of some sort?
A Yes.
Q And all you had to do was put your stamp on
them?
A No.
Q What did you have to do to these plans to make
it so they could build the thing?
A The site had to be designed and the drawings
created for the site grading and utilities. Then the
standard plans, we review those to determine, in our
minds, if code has been met.
Q Code being?
A Uniform Building Code at the time.
Q The State of Utah imposes certain restrictions
or requirements on buildings.
A Correct.
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go back to y'all.
Q (BY MR. BADARUDDIN) Is there a circumstance
where you and the LDS representative jointly decide to
instruct the general contractor not to use a particular
subcontractor?
A Yes.
Q Okay. And under those circumstances, does the
general contractor accept your instruction or reject it?
A In past cases, they've accepted it.
Q Have you ever told a general contractor in an
LDS project, Use this subcontractor, for whatever
purpose?
A No.
Q And has the LDS Church, to your knowledge,
ever provided you with a list of, let's say, approved or
preferred subcontractors?
A No.
Q Do you have an idea in your headfromworking
with the LDS Church as to what subcontractors they
prefer or approve?
A I think that everybody that works on LDS
projects, whether they're architects or general
contractors or the project managers, know that some
contractors perform better than others.
Q And that'sfromyour experience in the

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22

their foreman might be, a number of different things.
MR. WALLACE: I heard you say "schedule," and I
I couldn't hear after that.
MR.MARIGER: Who their foreman might be.
Q (BY MR. BADARUDDIN) So it's not like the
representativefromthe LDS Church ever said to you,
Paul, here are a couple of people I like, here are a
couple of people I don't?
A No.
Q It's just your prior experience in various
construction projects?
A Yes.
Q All right. Well, let me get back to the
Highland 4 and 20 project.
There were the master plans and the - was it
the New England style of ~ what was the name of the
structure?
1
A New England Style Heritage.
Q Who decided how big it was going to be? If we
were to go out and measure the perimeter, who decided
those measurements?
I
A I don't know.
i

23
24
25

Q Was it your firm?
A No.
Q What about, let's say, for example, the width
Page 36
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construction field or from your experience with the
LDS Church?
A Can you rephrase that?
Q Well, you've done quite a bit of construction;
correct?
A Yes.
Q And you've had some good subcontractors and
some bad ones.
A Yes.
Q And while maybe you can't list them off the
top of your head, the good ones and the bad ones, if you
were looking at a list of subcontractors for a
particular project, you would recall whether or not any
of the really bad ones were on that list; is that fair
to say?
A If I had an association or past experience
with a bad subcontractor, I would typically remember,
but there may be one that's bad that I have had no
experience with that would not be apparent to me.
Q So your criteria for judging a subcontractor
as, let's say, bad or substandard or unacceptable would
basically be your prior experience with that
subcontractor was not very good?
A Correct. And that could be based on more than
just quality. It could have to do with schedule, who

1

1
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of the doorways and the height of the doorways. Some
churches, especially in Rome — in fact, in this
building, the doors go way up. Other times, like in
your house, they're going to be a good bit shorter. Who
determined the size of the doorways?
A I don't know.
Q That wasn't your firm?
A No.
Q And what about the size of the walls and the
ceiling height, who determined all of that?
A I don't know.
Q It wasn't your firm?
A No.
Q Now, what exactly did yourfirmdo?
MR. MARIGER: I'm going to object. He gave a
very long list of what they did with the Church's
standard designs and drawings. If you want him to
repeat all of that...
Q (BY MR. BADARUDDIN) I don't want you to
repeat it. If I understand correctly, and I wanted to
make sure I did, the church basically designed the
New England Style Heritage.
A Correct.
Q You just make sure their design conforms with
the requirements of law, and I guess physics, because we
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A Correct.
Q And there's no 34, is there?
A Not that I'm aware of.
Q 33 would be your last weekly report for the
Highland 4 and 20 project?
A I believe so.
Q Did I say 34? I meant 33. I don't know what
I said, but the last numbered report is 33. And that
would be your last weekly report for the Highland 4 and
20 project; correct?
A When you say "your," you're speaking of
Butler & Evans?
Q Yes.
A Correct.
Q And of course, report number one would be your
first report for the Highland 4 and 20 project.
A Weekly construction field report.
Q Okay. Who designed this form that you used
for the weekly reports?
A Someone within my office.
Q The purpose of this form is, I guess, to have
a form to give all the information to your client in an
easy, readable manner? Well, let me ask you this.
What is the purpose of the form?
A To give the project manager a list of what is

1
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current status of the project. What sort of information
would you put in that category?
A What is currently occurring at the project,
where they are in the progress of construction.
Q And then in resolved items, what sort of
information would you put there?
A Those items that came from-if there is an
item that needs attention, whether it be a question or a
discrepancy in the plans or noncompliance with the
construction documents, it is listed under new items.
When those new items are corrected, they move to
resolved items. If they are not corrected the first
week, they move to unresolved items until they become a
resolved item.
Q So new items would only be new items once on
one weekly report; is that correct?
A Typically.
Q And then they would move to either resolved or
unresolved.
A Yes.
Q It appears also that you use codes of some
sort, like for example, you've got 1-1 under new items,
a sewer manhole.
Do you see where I'm reading from?
A Yes.
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occurring at the project, what the progress of the
project is.
Q The project manager in this case being Dean
Schick?
A Correct.
Q Okay. What sort of information do you put
into the report?
A What the progress is of different components
of the project, items that do not comply with the
construction documents, questions that may be raised.
(Off-the-record discussion)
Q (BY MR. BADARUDDIN) Well, for example,
there's some information regarding the project manager,
the architect, the contractor. That's just
identification information?
A Yes.
Q I mean, that's not really going to help
anybody determine how the project is coming along.
A No.
Q But I guess the first big item there is
current status of the project.
A Yes.
Q I'm looking at report No. 1. It's the same on
every report. You can look at whatever report you want.
Let's talk about report 1, Exhibit 27, the
—
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Q What does that mean, 1-1?
A Item 1 of report 1.
Q And so if we were to turn to any report, this
item would be numbered 1 -1 ?
A No.
Q Well, if we go to report No. 16, Exhibit 27.
A Oh, I misunderstood your question.
Q Okay.
A It always stays as one - an item, once it's
listed, so it always stays at 1-1. I thought you were
inferring that on all reports the first new item is
always 1.1, and it's not. It's the report number, dash
one.
Q All right. And that way you can follow along
with its progress, know how long it's been a problem; is
that fair to say?
A Correct.
Q So thefirstnumber would be the report
number. The second number would just be numbering it in
that report.
A Correct.
Q Now, how often would you visit the Highland 4
and 20 project?
A Weekly.
Q Just once a week?
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A Unless requested to come more often.
Q And did you, in fact, visit more often than
once a week on the Highland 4 and 20 project?
A Possibly.
Q In the Highland 4 and 20 project, was there a
schedule for completing the various items that are
required to build the building?
A Yes.
Q Who designed that schedule?
A Contractor.
Q Did you have any input as to the timing?
A No. We establish the overall total days of
the contract.
Q Okay. And this in case, I think it was
approximately 300 days?
A Possibly. That sounds appropriate.
Q Well, that number would have been established
by your firm?
A It's established by the LDS Church.
Q And then as to what element of the project is
completed the first week, the second week, that would be
up to the general contractor?
A Correct.
Q And what, if any, input would you have into
that?
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A Yes.
1
Q And do you know whether or not they indicated
the height and width of the walls?
A The plans?
Q Yes.
A Yes, they do.
Q Do you know what height was prescribed by the
plans?
A It's different in different places.
Q Well, on the Highland 4 and 20 project.
A They're different walls of different heights.
Q Okay. But you could look to the plans, is it,
and determine what, if any -- what height any given wall
should be?
A Yes.
Q And is there a name for the plans
specifically, where I could go and look at these
documents and see what the height is supposed to be, the 1
walls?
A A specific sheet?
Q Well, if I wanted to know how tall the wall
should be in a particular place at the Highland 4 and 20
project, what document would I look at?
A The Highland 4 and 20,1 don't know what
they're labeled, but it's the project name building
1
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1
A None.
2
Q I wanted to ask you about report No. 7 of
3 Exhibit 27.
4
Under "current status of the project," you
5 indicate that theframingshould start on Friday. It's
6 the last sentence of the only paragraph in "current
7 status of the project."
8
A Yes.
9
Q And why did you note that?
10
A I was told by the superintendent when the
11 framing would start.
12
Q Why is it important when theframingis going
13 to start?
14
A Just a mark in time.
15
Q And what is framing? What does that mean?
16
A That is putting together the dimensional
17 lumber, that's the bearing and non-bearing walls, the
18 roof system. Can be a floor system in some instances.
19
Q Okay. Well, who would determine how wide and
10 how tall to make these walls?
\\
A Whoever designed the standard plans.
\2
Q And who designed the standard plans on the
3 Highland 4 and 20 project?
14
A I don't know.
15
Q But you reviewed those plans.
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plans.
fc
Q Okay. Well, let me ask you about report No. 8
of Exhibit 27. Under "current status," you make some
description of the framing progress. It says, "The
framers have started the exterior walls. They stood the
north wall along the east side and the east wall along
the north side, and everything appears to be in
conformance with the construction documents, except as 1
noted below."
fe
Is that what it says?
A Yes.
Q And the date of this observation was August 5,
1999; is that correct?
A Yes.
I
Q What is noted below? It says, "Everything
appears to be in conformance except as noted below."
What is not in conformance?
A 8.1.
I
Q And I can read 8.1, but tell me what it means.
A I don't recall specifically which two beams
are being discussed. It was an item that was discussed
between the superintendent and the structural engineer.
Q Okay. What is a beam?
A A beam is a horizontal member that holds
something above it.
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Q (BY MR. BADARUDDIN) The superintendent's name
being?
A Maurice Egbert.
Q What did he tell you happened?
A That three workers were standing a wall, and
that one of them wentfromone side of the wall to the
other side, and tripped and fell, and that the wall fell
at the same time and landed on his head.
Q Okay. Do you have any experience with
framing?
A Define "experience."
Q Have you ever built a wall?
A Yes.
Q Have you ever lifted a wall into place?
A Yes.
Q And how did you manage to lift the wall you
lifted into place?
A Tip it.
Q Tip it? What does that mean?
A It means you lay the base plate adjacent to
its final spot, you build the wall laying on the ground,
and then you tip it or raise it into the spot.
Q How do you raise it into the spot?
A It can be done a couple of ways.
Q Tell me the ways that you're familiar with
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A
Q
A
Q

No.
It had nothing to do or you don't know?
It had nothing to do.
I had some questions about some reports.
Do you know whether or not Hales & Warner kept
a daily report of events at the Highland 4 and 20
project?
A Yes.
Q Did you ever review those reports?
A Yes.
Q In what capacity would you review them?
A They were submitted to us biweekly, so they
would give us a copy of them.
Q Okay. And what purpose did you have in mind
when you reviewed those reports?
A General progress of the project and if there
were problems.
Q So not only would you visit every week, but
you would review these daily reports just to see how
things are going; correct?
A Correct.
Q And then you could make a report to
Mr. Schick, or whoever might be in his position, as to
the progress on, in this case, the Highland 4 and 20
project.

raising a wall into the spot it goes in.
A You can use a crane and pick it up. You can
pull it with a rope. You can push it with a board from
one side. You can have — depending on the size, there
are different ways, but small walls can be lifted just
with a man, a couple of men, five men.
Q This wall that fell on this individual, was
that a small wall, a medium-sized wall, a large wall?
A Relatively speaking, small wall for the
project.
Q Do you think three men were adequate to lift
it?
A Yes.
Q You don't think they needed a crane or a
forklift or anything of that nature?
A No.
Q Do you know how much experience these
individuals had?
A No.
Q Do you know how much experience one should
have in order to lift a wall of that size?
A No.
Q Do you know whether this wall that fell on
this individual had anything to do with item 8.1? When
I say 8.1, it's really 8-1, but the beam issue.
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1

1
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A Yes.
(Exhibit No. 29 is marked for identification.)
Q (BY MR. BADARUDDIN) If you could review
Exhibit 29.
My question is, is that the daily report for
August 5, 1999?
A No. It's August 4.
Q Right. August 4, 1999.
Do you know whether you reviewed that while
you were working on the Highland 4 and 20 project?
A I don't recall.
Q Well, let me ask you about the last
handwritten entry. It starts, "At Joel's request."
A Yes.
Q Can you read that paragraph.
A Sure. "At Joel's request, I have told the
framers we want all sheer walls and end walls to be" and I can't read that word, "with studs long, no top
plate, then to cut them when the trusses and TGIs are
available for exact heights. This is how we had done it
on our other jobs. In early discussions about the
framers" - "about this, the framers did" - "didn't
want to do it. They are proceeding as we have
requested."
Q Can you tell me what that means, if you know.
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A On the east wall of the building, it's a tall
gable wall, very tall, very long. And in order to get
the slope of that wall to match the trusses, he's asking
them to let the studs extend vertically until the
trusses are in place and then mark the slope of that
wall, based on what the slope of the set trusses and
TGIs are.
Q Do you know how the framers wanted to do it?
A No.
Q But however they wanted to do it, the general
contractor gave them some instruction as to how they
must do it?
MR. DAVENPORT: Objection to the extent you're
asking him to speculate. If he was present and heard
these instructions, that's one thing to testify to his
personal knowledge. It's another thing to speculate as
it relates to reading someone else's writing as to what
occurred.
I'm going to object to your question because
it calls for speculation and lacks foundation.
MR. MARIGER: I'll join the objection.
Q (BYMR.BADARUDDIN) Subject to that
objection, do you know whether or not the general
contractor gave some instruction to the framers as to
how they were to proceed with this thing that's

they're talking about in the report.
MR. MARIGER: In the contractor's report.
THE WITNESS: In the contractor's report.
Q (BY MR. BADARUDDIN) And that would be
Exhibit 29.
A Yes.
Q So the description of your current status of
project in field report No. 8 indicates that the framing
is proceeding as indicated in Exhibit 29?
A I don't understand the question.
MR. MARIGER: That's ambiguous.
MR. DAVENPORT: Join.
Q (BY MR. BADARUDDIN) There's some framing
described in Exhibit 29; correct?
A Yes.
MR. MARIGER: There's a framing and a method
for framing in Exhibit 29, and you need to differentiate
between those two.
1
MR. BADARUDDIN: I'm getting there.
Q (BY MR. BADARUDDIN There'sframingdescribed
in Exhibit 29; correct?
A Yes.
Q And there's one method described by the author
of Exhibit 29.
A Yes.
1
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described on Exhibit 29?
MR. DAVENPORT: Are you asking for his
personal knowledge?
MR. BADARUDDIN: I'm always asking for his
personal knowledge.
MR. MARIGER: He has no personal knowledge of
this. His knowledge is based just upon the document you
just gave him.
MR. DAVENPORT: You're asking him to read
something and then you're asking him questions.
MR. MARIGER: Do you know for a fact that this
occurred?
THE WITNESS: No.
Q (BY MR. BADARUDDIN) Let me ask you about your
weekly report that would coincide with this date, which
I believe would be No. 8.
A Yes.
Q Does report No. 8 or possibly 9 reflect
anything relevant to what's going on on Exhibit 29 with
regard to the framing?
A Well, it is an exterior wall, so potentially
the first sentence refers to it.
Q Okay.
A The north wall along the east side is
consistent with what they're - with the wall that
—
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Q And there's an indication that the author of
Exhibit 29 wants the framing done according to the
manner described in Exhibit 29; is that fair to say?
A Yes.
Q Now, in your report No. 8 MR. DAVENPORT: Let me make sure I'm clear.
Which is Exhibit 29?
MR. BADARUDDIN: The daily report.
MR. DAVENPORT: I'm just going to indicate
that, again, I object to lack of foundation. He doesn't
know, have any personal knowledge as to Exhibit 29. He
did not prepare it, and he's already testified that he
doesn't know. He hasn't any personal knowledge as to
its content.
MR BADARUDDIN: Okay.
Q (BY MR. BADARUDDIN) Field report No. 8, does
that indicate that the framing is proceeding on the
Highland 4 and 20 project in the manner described in
Exhibit 29?
A No.
Q What does it indicate?
A It indicates that the walls are in the right
location.
Q Okay. Does it indicate anything more?
A No.
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Q All right.
(Exhibit No. 30 is marked for identification.)
MR. BADARUDDIN: It's August 5.
I don't know, Erik, if you have all of these
documents, it's the daily log for August 5.
MR. DAVENPORT: I've got it. I'll refer to
them.
Q (BY MR. BADARUDDIN) Exhibit 30 is another
daily report; correct?
A Yes.
Q For August 5,1999.
A Yes.
Q And in your work on this Highland 4 and 20
project, would you have reviewed this daily report?
A I should have.
Q And do you have any reason to suspect you did
not?
A No.
Q And I want you to, if you can, read the last
handwritten entry. It's the most lengthy one, starting
with "Ken Egbert."
A "Ken Egbert, framer, is concerned with the
manner in which we want the buildingframed,leaving
sheer wall studs long to be cut after trusses are up for
a more accurate cut.
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MR. DAVENPORT: - comments that are not based I
upon his personal knowledge.
MR. BADARUDDIN: I'm asking him to interpret
the document. I'm asking him for what information it
conveys to him.
Q (BY MR. BADARUDDIN) But anyway, are there
different ways that aframercouldframethe walls as
described in yourfieldreport No. 8 consistent with the
plans?
A Yes.
Q And in Exhibit 30, how many different ways are
described?
A One.
Q Isn't there some dispute as to at least two
ways? Theframerwants to do it one way and whoever
wants to do it another way?
MR. DAVENPORT: You're talking about the
particular wall at issue here, referring to this sheer
wall?
MR. BADARUDDIN: I'm asking about Exhibit 30.
Whatever wall is described there.
MR. MARIGER: Objection; foundation.
Q (BY MR. BADARUDDIN) Let me ask you this.
Does Exhibit 30 describe a particular wall?
A Describe "particular."
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"Brent Reynolds, with whom our contract is
with (framing), told Ken he shouldn't do it because of
extra labor costs. At my request, Ken and Brady,
(anotherframerwho always does his churchframingthis
way), met to discuss this method offraming.Ken and I
also went up to a church with the same floor plan
directly north of us to see theframingof it. Ken is
proceeding as we have requested untilfinaldecision
from Brent Reynolds is given."
Q Can you tell me what is being discussed there?
A It refers back to the same wall and the same
method of erecting the east wall as in the previous
daily report. It sounds as though twoframersare
discussing whether they should proceed in the manner in
which they've been asked to by the superintendent. It
sounds like they're consulting with anotherframer,and
it appears that they went to a similar project to review
how that wasframed.And it ends with the fact that
they're proceeding as asked until a final decision is
given by the framer.
Q Okay.
MR. DAVENPORT: I'm going to object You're
asking him to speculate or comment on what someone else
has written ~
MR. BADARUDDIN: I'm asking him -•••—.:• • ••' mm wmm.
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Q Does it refer to a particular wall, meaning -MR. MARIGER: In the writing itself?
Q (BY MR. BADARUDDIN) The writing itself,
Exhibit 30, is it referencing a particular wall?
MR. DAVENPORT: I'm going to object to the
extent the writing speaks for itself. It says "sheer
walls." We all can read what it says.
Q (BY MR. BADARUDDIN) Exhibit 30 doesn't
reference a particular wall, does it?
A No.
Q It talks about how toframethe building.
MR. DAVENPORT: Objection. Exhibit 30 speaks
for itself.
THE WITNESS: Am I to answer?
MR. MARIGER: Yes.
THE WITNESS: Can you repeat the question?
Q (BY MR. BADARUDDIN) Sure. Exhibit 30 refers
to no particular wall; correct?
A No.
Q No, it does refer to a particular wall?
A Sorry, it does not refer to a particular wall.
Q All right. And your report No. 8 would be the
relevant report for August 5, 1999, and before; correct?
MR. MARIGER: Relevant report for what?
Q (BY MR. BADARUDDIN) Well, suppose Exhibit 30 I
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Hales & Warner Construction Inc.
1460 North Main,, Unit 1, Spanish Fork, Utah 84660

(801) 798-7318 • FAX 798-7320

August .11, 1999

BRC, Inc.
328 South 725 East
Layton,UT 84037
RE: Highland 4 & 20 Wards
Brent;
You have now been framing on the Highland 4 & 20 Wards building for 2 weeks.
You promised to have 12 men on the job. This has not happened. If you continue with
the same number of framers, you will not meet the 7 week framing schedule. We feel
you need to immediately increase the number of framers and provide proper supervision
so as to meet the 7 week framing schedule.
Please provide us a written framing schedule outlining manpower and target dates
such as wall framing, roof framing, completion, etc.
If you have any questions, please call.
Sincerely.
Hales & Warner Construction, Inc.

Clifford Hales
President

CH/jd

v
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Hales & Warner Construction Inc.
1460 North Main, Unit 1, Spanish Fork, Utah 84660

(601) 798-7316 » FAX 798-7320

August 25, 1999
BRCInc.
328 South 725 East
Layton,UT 84041
RE; Highland 4 & 20 Wards
Gentlemen:
This is a follow up to the letter dated August 11, 1999. You still have not had 12 men
on the job as promised, and the job is getting further behind. Therefore, you are hereby
notified that you are in breech of paragraph 2 of said construction subcontract.
Specifically, you have failed to employ sufficient competent help to complete the work in
a reasonable time. You are hereby given 48 hours written notice in accordance with said
paragraph to employ help to complete the work. If you fail to employ and have at the job
site within 48 hours after this written notice sufficient competent help to complete the
work, we, as general contractors, will engage additional help to complete the work and
charge the same to your account, and charge you any penalties due to your failure to
complete the work as contracted.
You should be advised that if costs of completing said work exceeds the contract
price, you have agreed to reimburse the contractor for any sums over and above the
contract price. If the cost of completing the work does not exceed the contract price, an\
excess will be paid to you. If the contractor is assessed liquidated damages by the owner
for failure to complete the work on time, and if delay has been caused by you, which wc
maintain has been the case, you will be required to pay us the portion of the liquidated
damages caused by or attributed to your failure to complete your work on time and in
accordance with the working schedule.
Please comply with the above stipulations and have sufficient men on the job site (12
or more men) by August 27, 1999, and continue to have sufficient men on the job each
day thereafter, If you are not on the job with a sufficient crew by August 27, 1999, you
will not be notified again. Hales & Warner Construction will simply have, another
suhcor.:ractor at the job site on August 30. 1999.
Sincerely,
Hales & Warner Construction, Inc.

(/J#U
Clifford Hales
President
pc: Ken Egbert Construction

sr
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LEXSEE 979 P2D 322
Trevor Thompson, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Connie Jess, aka Connie Stroup, dba
Motel 9/Rio Damian Motel, and Does 1 through 10, Defendants and Appellee.
No. 980127
SUPREME COURT OF UTAH
1999 UT22; 979 P.2d 322; 364 Utah Adv. Rep. 64; 1999 Utah LEXIS 25
March 12,1999, Filed

SUBSEQUENT HISTORY: [***1]
As Corrected November 1, 1999. Released for
Publication June 24, 1999.
PRIOR HISTORY: Eighth District, Duchesne County.
The Honorable John R. Anderson.
DISPOSITION: Affirmed.
CASE SUMMARY:

PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Appellant workman, an
employee of an independent contractor, sought review of
an order of the Eighth District, Duchesne County (Utah),
granting summary judgment to appellee motel owner in
appellant's action for damages sustained while appellant
worked on the property.
OVERVIEW: Appellee motel owner asked that a pipe
be delivered to her motel property. When appellant
workman, an employee of an independent contractor,
arrived, appellee asked him to install the pipe. Appellant
said that he did not have the preferred tools, but agreed
to attempt installation. The pipe fell during installation
and caused appellant's leg to be amputated. Appellant
sued, claming that appellee was negligent in her control
of the situation and in failing to take special precautions.
The trial court granted appellee's motion for summary
judgment. On appeal, the court affirmed. Appellee had
no duty under the "retained control" doctrine because she
did not actively participate in the performance of the
work; she did not impose means or methods of achieving
the work, but merely stated her desired result: the pipe's
installation. The "peculiar risk" and "inherently

dangerous work" doctrines did not provide theories of
relief for appellant, as they only applied to innocent third
parties injured as a result of the independent contractor's
negligence.
OUTCOME: The court affirmed the grant of summary
judgment; appellee was not liable under the "retained
control" doctrine because she did not actively participate
in the work, and the "peculiar risk" and "inherently
dangerous work" doctrines were inapplicable to
appellant, as he was an employee of the independent
contractor.
CORE TERMS: pipe, contractor, independent
contractor, retained control, precautions, install, workers'
compensation, physical harm, inherently dangerous, duty
of care, plywood, backhoe, stub, contracted, peculiar
risk, subject to liability, subcontractor, hired, owed, duty,
motel, performing, summary judgment, third parties,
installed, chain, general contractor, beams, hires,
agreeing
LexisNexis (TM) HEADNOTES - Core Concepts:

Civil Procedure > Summary Judgment > Summary
Judgment Standard
[HN1] Summary judgment is proper only when there is
no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
Civil Procedure > Appeals > Standards of Review > De
Novo Review
[HN2] The appellate court reviews the district court's
grant of summary judgment for correctness, according no
deference to the court's legal conclusions.
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Labor & Employment Law > Employer Liability > Tort
Liability > Independent Contractors
[HN3] Utah adheres to the general common law rule that
the employer of an independent contractor is not liable
for physical harm caused to another by an act or
omission of the contractor or his servants. This general
rule recognizes that one who hires an independent
contractor and does not participate in or control the
manner in which the contractor's work is performed owes
no duty of care concerning the safety of the manner or
method of performance implemented. The most
commonly accepted reason for this rule is that, where the
principal employer does not control the means of
accomplishing the contracted work, the contractor is the
proper party to be charged with the responsibility for
preventing the risk arising out of the work, and
administering and distributing it.
Labor & Employment Law > Employer Liability > Tort
Liability > Independent Contractors
[HN4] The retained control doctrine is a narrow theory
of liability applicable in the unique circumstance where
an employer of an independent contractor exercises
enough control over the contracted work to give rise to a
limited duty of care, but not enough to become an
employer or a master of those over whom the control is
asserted. The duty in such situations is one of reasonable
care under the circumstances and is confined in scope to
the control asserted.
Labor & Employment Law > Employer Liability > Tort
Liability > Independent Contractors
[HN5] Under the retained control doctrine, one who
entrusts work to an independent contractor, but who
retains the control of any part of the work, is subject to
liability for physical harm to others for whose safety the
employer owes a duty to exercise reasonable care, which
is caused by his failure to exercise his control with
reasonable care.
Labor & Employment Law > Employer Liability > Tort
Liability > Independent Contractors
[HN6] A principal employer is not subject to liability for
injuries arising out of its contractor's work unless the
employer actively participates in the performance of the
work.
Labor & Employment Law > Employer Liability > Tort
Liability > Independent Contractors
[HN7] Under the "active participation" standard, a
principal employer is subject to liability for injuries
arising out of its independent contractor's work if the
employer is actively involved in, or asserts control over,
the manner of performance of the contracted work. Such

an assertion of control occurs, for example, when the
principal employer directs that the contracted work be
done by use of a certain mode or otherwise interferes
with the means and methods by which the work is to be
accomplished. It is not enough that he has merely a
general right to order the work stopped or resumed, to
inspect its progress or to receive reports, to make
suggestions or recommendations which need not
necessarily be followed, or to prescribe alterations and
deviations. Such a general right is usually reserved to
employers, but it does not mean that the contractor is
controlled as to his methods of work, or as to operative
detail.
Labor & Employment Law > Employer Liability > Tort
Liability > Independent Contractors
[HN8] To have "actively participated" in the contracted
work, a principal employer must have exercised
affirmative control over the method or operative detail of
that work. The degree of control necessary for the
creation of a legal duty must involve either the direct
management of the means and methods of the
independent contractor's activities or the provision of the
specific equipment that caused the injury. Although the
requisite level of control over the contractor's manner or
method of work does not rise to the level of creating a
master-servant relationship, the principal employer must
exert such control over the means utilized that the
contractor cannot carry out the injury-causing aspect of
the work in his or her own way. A typical instance in
which such an exertion of control might occur is when a
principal contractor entrusts a part of the work to
subcontractors, but himself or through a foreman
superintends the entire job.
Labor & Employment Law > Employer Liability > Tort
Liability > Independent Contractors
[HN9] Under Restatement (Second) of Torts § 413
(1965), one who employs an independent contractor to
do work which the employer should recognize as likely
to create, during its progress, a peculiar unreasonable
risk of physical harm to others unless special precautions
are taken, is subject to liability for physical harm caused
to them by the absence of such precautions if the
employer fails to provide in the contract that the
contractor shall take such precautions, or fails to exercise
reasonable care to provide in some other manner for the
taking of such precautions.
Labor & Employment Law > Employer Liability > Tort
Liability > Independent Contractors
[HN10] Under Restatement (Second) of Torts § 416
(1965), one who employs an independent contractor to
do work which the employer should recognize as likely
to create during its progress a peculiar risk of physical
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harm to others unless special precautions are taken, is
subject to liability for physical harm caused to them by
the failure of the contractor to exercise reasonable care to
take such precautions, even though the employer has
provided for such precautions in the contract or
otherwise.
Labor & Employment Law > Employer Liability > Tort
Liability > Independent Contractors
[HN11] Under Restatement (Second) of Torts § 427
(1965), one who employs an independent contractor to
do work involving a special danger to others which the
employer knows or has reason to know to be inherent in
or normal to the work, or which he contemplates or has
reason to contemplate when making the contract, is
subject to liability for physical harm caused to such
others by the contractor's failure to take reasonable
precautions against such danger.
Labor & Employment Law > Employer Liability > Tort
Liability > Independent Contractors
[HN12] The purpose of the "peculiar risk" doctrine and
the "inherently dangerous work" doctrine, under
Restatement (Second) of Torts § § 413, 416, and 427
(1965), is to ensure that innocent third parties injured by
the negligence of an independent contractor hired by a
landowner to do inherently dangerous work on the land
would not have to depend on the contractor's solvency in
order to receive compensation for the injuries. This
purpose is not advanced when these exceptions are
applied in favor of a contractor's employees who are
covered by workers' compensation. Thus, the doctrines
have no application when the injured person is an
employee of the independent contractor undertaking the
allegedly dangerous work.
COUNSEL: John Paul Kennedy, Salt Lake City, and
David J. Bennion, San Jose, Cal., for plaintiff.
Stephen G. Morgan, Joseph E. Minnock, Salt Lake City,
for defendant.
JUDGES: RUSSON, Justice. Chief Justice Howe,
Associate Chief Justice Durham, Justice Stewart, and
Justice Zimmerman concur in Justice Russon's opinion.
OPINIONBY: RUSSON
OPINION: [**323] RUSSON, Justice:
[*P1] Trevor Thompson appeals from the district
court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Connie
Jess, owner of four motels in Duchesne, Utah. The
district court ruled, as a matter of law, that Thompson
could not recover from Jess for injuries sustained while

erecting a steel pipe for use as a sign post at one of Jess's
motels. We affirm.

BACKGROUND
[*P2] On or about March 9, 1995, Jess phoned
AmeriKan Sanitation to arrange for the purchase and
delivery of a used steel pipe. Jess requested a hollow
pipe approximately 20 feet in length with an 8-inch
diameter, one that would fit vertically over an [**324]
existing pipe stub secured to the ground in front of one of
her motels, [***2] which stub would support the larger
pipe for use as a sign post. After agreeing upon a price,
Jess requested that the pipe be delivered to her motel.
Two employees of AmeriKan Sanitation, Dennis Jensen
and Trevor Thompson, delivered the pipe. When Jensen
inquired where to place the pipe, Jess told him she
wanted it installed over the existing pipe stub. Jensen
responded that he had been instructed only to deliver the
pipe and that he was not equipped to erect it in the best
manner. Jess then asked Jensen if he would install the
pipe, and he agreed to do so, believing he could
improvise by hoisting the pipe with the winch truck and
tools he had with him.
[*P4] At that point, Jess's involvement in erecting
the pipe ceased, and she went inside the motel. Jensen,
who had hoisted similar pipes more than a hundred times
before, determined on his own the manner and method of
lifting and installing the pipe. For leverage, Jensen set up
stabilizing poles in an A-frame formation. He then
attached to the pipe a "system-seven" chain and a hook
using a "trucker's hitch" or "logger's hitch"-a method of
fastening pipe, which Jensen had used many times prior,
whereby the weight of the pipe [***3] pulls the chain
tight. Jensen connected the chain to a winch cable that
was strung over the A-frame and proceeded to hoist the
pipe with the winch attached to his truck. Thompson
stood near the back of the truck and attempted to guide
the elevated pipe onto the pipe stub protruding from the
ground.
[*P5] After lifting the pipe as high as this method
would allow, Jensen and Thompson discovered they
were approximately two inches short of being able to
raise the pipe over the top of the pipe stub. They decided
to lower the pipe to the ground and obtain different
equipment that would lift the pipe the requisite height. In
the process of lowering the pipe, however, slack
developed in the chain, and the pipe slipped out,
bouncing on the ground and striking Thompson in the
leg. As a result of the injuries sustained from this
incident, Thompson's leg was amputated below the knee,
nl
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nl Shortly after the accident, Thompson
applied for and began receiving workers'
compensation benefits through his employer,
Amerikan Sanitation.
r***4i

[*P6] The day following the accident, Jensen
returned to the site with a backhoe and erected the pipe
without problem using the same chain-hitch method.
Both Jensen and Thompson, as well as their employer,
AmeriKan Sanitation, testified after the accident that had
they known in advance they would be asked to raise and
install the pipe, they would have arrived prepared with a
backhoe or crane in the first instance. However, after
agreeing to install the pipe for Jess, neither Jensen nor
Thompson informed her that a backhoe or crane was
necessary to do the job. Rather, as reflected by the
record, Jensen simply told Jess that although he lacked
the best equipment, he would nonetheless erect the pipe.
Jensen devised his own technique for the task, and
Thompson helped him in the attempt.
[*P7] In April 1997, Thompson filed suit against
Jess, alleging that she was negligent in the control she
exercised over installation of the pipe and in failing to
take or require special precautions in the performance of
the job. After the parties conducted discovery, Jess
moved for summary judgment, arguing that (1) she did
not direct or otherwise control the manner or method of
installing the pipe, and therefore [***5] owed no duty of
care to Thompson or Jensen to insure they raised the pipe
safely, and (2) she cannot be held vicariously liable for
the negligent acts of the independent contractor she
hired, regardless of whether the work involved peculiar
risks or was inherently dangerous, because the injuries
were suffered by an employee of that independent
contractor. The district court granted Jess's motion for
summary judgment, ruling that under Dayton v. Free, 46
Utah 277, 284-85, 148 P. 408, 411 (1914), Jess owed
Thompson no duty of protection or warning concerning
performance of the task because she did not exercise
control over the manner or method utilized to install the
pipe.
[*P8] On appeal, Thompson contends that the
district court erred in granting summary judgment.
Thompson argues that by requesting [**325] that he
and Jensen erect the pipe when they were not obligated
to do so, and by directing them to install the pipe over
the existing pipe stub, Jess asserted control over the work
and thereby assumed a duty of care to him under the
"retained control" doctrine set forth in section 414 of the
Restatement. n2 Thompson also submits that, under
section 413 of the Restatement, the work Jess [***6]
requested posed "a peculiar unreasonable risk of physical
harm to others" and that, consequently, Jess had a duty to

take appropriate safety precautions. By not taking
measures to ensure the safety of the work, asserts
Thompson, Jess breached her duties of care under these
provisions. Thompson argues that Jess knew or should
have known from erecting sign posts at her other motels
that a crane or backhoe was required to install the pole
safely.

n2 All Restatement references herein are to
Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965).
[*P9]
As an alternative theory of liability,
Thompson posits that even if Jess was not directly
negligent herself, she nonetheless should be held
vicariously liable for the contractor's negligence—in this
case, the negligence of Thompson's co-worker, Jensenbecause Jess knew the work she requested involved a
peculiar risk of physical harm to others. On this point,
Thompson urges this court to adopt and apply in his
favor sections 416 and 427 of the Restatement. Section
416 imposes vicarious [***7] liability on the principal
employer for the contractor's negligence if the employer
knows or should know that the work involves "a peculiar
risk of physical harm to others." Section 427 imposes the
same liability for work involving "a special danger to
others . .. inherent in or normal to the work."
[*P10] In response, Jess counters that the trial
court did not err in granting summary judgment because
(1) she did not control the manner or method in which
Thompson and Jensen attempted to lift and install the
pole, and therefore owed them no duty of care under the
"retained control" doctrine; and (2) sections 413, 416,
and 427 of the Restatement provide causes of action to
"others"-meaning innocent third parties-not to
employees of the independent contractor hired to
perform the allegedly dangerous work.
[*P11] Thus, the principal issues before us are (1)
whether Jess owed Thompson a duty of care under the
"retained control" doctrine, and (2) whether the "peculiar
risk" and "inherently dangerous work" doctrines under
sections 413, 426, and 427 of the Restatement provide
causes of action in favor of employees of the contractor
hired to perform the work at issue.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
[*P12]
[HN1] [***8] Summary judgment is
proper only when "there is no genuine issue of material
fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law." Doit, Inc. v. Touche, Ross & Co., 926
P.2d 835, 841 (Utah 1996). [HN2] We review the
district court's grant of summary judgment for
correctness, according no deference to the court's legal
conclusions. See id.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Page 5
1999 UT 22, *; 979 P.2d 322, **;
364 Utah Adv. Rep. 64; 1999 Utah LEXIS 25, ***
ANALYSIS
[HN3] [*P13] Utah adheres to the general
common law rule that "the employer of an independent
contractor is not liable for physical harm caused to
another by an act or omission of the contractor or his
servants." Restatement § 409; see Gleason v. Salt Lake
City, 94 Utah 1, 16, 74 P.2d 1225, 1232 (1937) (noting
applicability of said general rule and certain exceptions
to it). This general rule recognizes that one who hires an
independent contractor and does not participate in or
control the manner in which the contractor's work is
performed owes no duty of care concerning the safety of
the manner or method of performance implemented. See
W. Prosser & W. Keaton, The Law of Torts 509 (5th ed.
1984). The most commonly accepted reason for this rule
is that, where the principal employer does not control the
means of accomplishing [***9] the contracted work, the
contractor "is the proper party to be charged with the
responsibility for preventing the risk [arising out of the
work], and administering and distributing it." Id.
[*P14] In the case at bar, Thompson does not
contend that by agreeing to install the pipe over the
existing pipe stub, he and Jensen [**326] became Jess's
employees. Rather, Thompson relies entirely on certain
exceptions to the general rule of nonliability of an
employer of an independent contractor: namely, the
"retained control" doctrine, and the "peculiar risk" or
"inherently dangerous work" doctrine. We address each
in turn.
A. "Retained Control" Doctrine
[*P15] Thompson charges that Jess should be
subject to liability because, by requesting that the pipe be
erected and instructing that it be installed over the
existing pipe stub, she controlled and directed the work
that caused his injuries. [HN4] In so arguing, Thompson
relies on the retained control doctrine, which, as set forth
more fully below, is a narrow theory of liability
applicable in the unique circumstance where an employer
of an independent contractor exercises enough control
over the contracted work to give rise to a limited duty of
care, [***10] but not enough to become an employer or
a master of those over whom the control is asserted. The
duty in such situations is one of reasonable care under
the circumstances and is confined in scope to the control
asserted.
[*P16]
In 1965, the American Law Institute promulgated
the retained control doctrine as section 414 of the
Restatement, which states:
§ 414. Negligence in Exercising Control Retained by
Employer

[HN5]
One who entrusts work to an independent contractor, but
who retains the control of any part of the work, is subject
to liability for physical harm to others for whose safety
the employer owes a duty to exercise reasonable care,
which is caused by his failure to exercise his control with
reasonable care.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 414 (1965). This
doctrine has not been adopted formally in Utah, although
similar principles were discussed in this court's early
decision of Dayton v. Free, 46 Utah 277, 148 P. 408,
411-12 (Utah 1914).
[*P17] In Dayton, this court addressed whether a
company that employed an independent contractor was
liable for injuries sustained by an employee of that
contractor during the blasting of an underground tunnel.
See [***11] 148 P. at 411-12. Citing a number of
authorities from other states, the injured employee
claimed that because the company, by contract, reserved
to itself certain rights pertaining to overall management
of the contract work, "the relation between the company
and the contractors was not that of independent, but
nonindependent, contractors." 148 P. at 411. As a result,
argued the injured employee, he should be allowed to
recover against the company. The court disagreed,
stating:
[The cited authorities] relate to instances and cases
where the proprietor or employer reserved or exercised
the right to superintend, direct or control the work, not
only with respect to results, but also with reference to
methods of procedure or means by which the result was
to be accomplished, where the will and discretion of the
contractor as to the time and manner of doing the work
or the means and methods of accomplishing the results
were subordinate and subject to that of the owner or
proprietor. We do not find anything in the contract or the
evidence [identified by the plaintiff] which brings this
case within such a rule.
Id. The court concluded that the injury had been caused
by the manner [***12]
in which the work was
performed rather than by the nature of the work itself.
See 148 P. at 412. Because the company exercised no
control over the contractor's manner of work, it owed the
plaintiff no duty to warn or guard him "against dangers
incident to or created by the prosecution of the work, and
certainly not to guard or protect him against the
negligence of those who had employed him or with
whom he labored." Id.
[*P18] This court has not had opportunity to
determine the precedential value of Dayton with respect
to the retained control doctrine. Several federal courts
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applying Utah law, however, have been called upon to do
so. [HN6] Those courts uniformly have determined that
under Dayton, a principal employer is not subject to
liability for injuries arising out of its contractor's work
unless the employer "actively participates" in the
performance of the work. For instance, in Simon v. Deery
Oil, 699 F. Supp. 257, 258 [**327] (D. Utah 1988), the
court cited Dayton for the proposition that a principal
employer "retaining an independent contractor to render
services has no duty to warn or train employees of the
contractor, nor must the principal protect the contractor's
[***13]
employees from the contractor's own
negligence, unless the principal has 'actively participated'
in the project." See also Sewell v. Phillips Petroleum Co.,
606 F2d 274, 276 (10th Cir. 1979), cert, denied, 444
U.S. 1080, 62 L. Ed. 2d 763, 100 S Ct. 1031 (1980);
Texaco, Inc. v. Pruitt, 396 F.2d 237, 240 (10th Cir.
1968); Erwin v. Kern River Gas Transmission Co., 1997
Tex. App. LEXIS 6685, *8 (addressing Utah law on
issue). We believe the standard relied upon in these cases
is correct, and we formally adopt the same. Elaboration
on the contours of the standard is needed, however.
[HN7] [*P19] Under the "active participation"
standard, a principal employer is subject to liability for
injuries arising out of its independent contractor's work if
the employer is actively involved in, or asserts control
over, the manner of performance of the contracted work.
See Conklin v. Cohen, 287 So. 2d 56, 60 (Fla. 1973)
(holding that under "active participation" standard,
principal employer must directly influence manner in
which work is performed; no duty arises from "passive
nonparticipation"). Such an assertion of control occurs,
for example, when the principal employer directs that
[***14] the contracted work be done by use of a certain
mode or otherwise interferes with the means and
methods by which the work is to be accomplished. See,
e.g., Lewis v. N.J. Riebe Enterprises, Inc., 170 Ariz. 384,
825 P.2d 5, 7-8 (Ariz. 1992) (imposing liability where
subcontractor's employee was injured as result of new,
less safe method of work required by general contractor);
Redinger v. Living, Inc., 689 S.W.2d 415, 418 (Tex.
1985) (imposing liability where subcontractor was
ordered to operate backhoe dangerously close to
plaintiff).
[*P20] The comments to section 414 of the
Restatement provide guidance as to the "active
participation" requirement:
In order for the rule stated in this Section to apply, the
employer must have retained at least some degree of
control over the manner in which the work is done. It is
not enough that he has merely a general right to order the
work stopped or resumed, to inspect its progress or to
receive reports, to make suggestions or recommendations

which need not necessarily be followed, or to prescribe
alterations and deviations. Such a general right is usually
reserved to employers, but it does not mean that the
contractor is controlled [***15] as to his methods of
work, or as to operative detail.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 414 cmt. c. (1965)
(emphasis added). [HN8] In other words, to have
"actively participated" in the contracted work, a principal
employer must have exercised affirmative control over
the method or operative detail of that work. See Grahn v.
Tosco Corp., 58 Cal. App. 4th 1373, 1997 Cal. App.
LEXIS 897, *37-38, rev. denied, 1998 Cal LEXIS 494.
"The degree of control necessary for the creation of a
legal duty must involve either the direct management of
the means and methods of the independent contractor's
activities or the provision of the specific equipment that
caused the injury." Id.
[*P21] Although the requisite level of control over
the contractor's manner or method of work does not rise
to the level of creating a master-servant relationship, cf.
Restatement § 414 cmt. a, the principal employer must
exert such control over the means utilized that the
contractor cannot carry out the injury-causing aspect of
the work in his or her own way. Cf. id. cmt. c. A typical
instance in which such an exertion of control might occur
is "when a principal contractor entrusts a part of the
[***16] work to subcontractors, but himself or through a
foreman superintends the entire job." Id. cmt. b.
[*P22] The requisite level of control over the
contractor's work is well illustrated in Lewis, 825 P. 2d at
7-8. There, the general contractor, Riebe, hired the
subcontractor, Garges, to install a pitched roof
constructed of beams and sheets of plywood nailed to the
beams. After Garges had already put the plywood in
place, Riebe's on-site superintendent told Garges the roof
was improperly installed and ordered it redone,
specifying the use of H-clips to secure the plywood.
Pursuant to this [**328] instruction, Garges employees
began removing the nails from each row of plywood,
installing H-clips, and then renailing the plywood to the
beams. Soon thereafter, however, Riebe's superintendent
instructed the Garges employees to use a different, faster
method of dislodging the plywood by banging it from
underneath. Because this method resulted in plywood
being dislodged faster than H-clips could be installed,
numerous sheets of plywood were left lying loose on top
of the beams. A Garges employee stepped on the loose
plywood and fell through the roof, incurring serious
injuries. See id.
[*P23]
[***17] Thus, in Lewis, the general
contractor interfered with the subcontractor's method of
performing the work and instructed that a quicker but
less safe method be implemented. A worker was injured
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as a direct result of the dangerous condition created by
the general contractor's method. The court concluded, on
the basis of these facts, that the general contractor
exercised sufficient control over the means used in
performing the contracted work to subject it to retained
control liability. See 825 P. 2d at 14-15.
[*P24] Applying these standards to the case at
hand, we conclude that Jess did not actively participate
in the manner in which Thompson and Jensen attempted
to lift and install the steel pipe. After agreeing to erect
the pipe, Jensen, not Jess, determined the method for
bringing about the desired result. Jensen decided to
proceed with the equipment he had with him, and by
Jensen's own design, he and Thompson set up the Aframe for use as leverage, fastened the chain to the pipe
using the "trucker's hitch" or "logger's hitch" technique,
and hoisted the pipe with the winch on Jensen's truck.
When this method was unsuccessful, Jensen and
Thompson attempted to lower the pipe to the [***18]
ground and, in the course of doing so, lost control of the
pipe. Thompson's injury was caused by the manner of
performance, implemented by Jensen, over which Jess
exercised no direction, control, or supervision. The only
control Jess exerted was in directing that the pipe be
installed over the pipe stub. This amounted merely to
control over the desired result, which is insufficient to
come within the retained control doctrine.
[*P25] Particularly revealing is the fact that Jensen
returned to the site with a backhoe the day after the
accident and erected the pipe without incident using the
same chain-hitch method. Nothing precluded Jensen
from retrieving the backhoe before attempting to hoist
the pipe in the first instance. The backhoe was stored
only two to three miles away at the time, and nothing
suggests that Jess required Jensen to install the pipe at
the moment of delivery. Jensen alone chose to attempt
installation of the pipe without a backhoe.
[*P26]
Thus, because Jess did not actively
participate in or otherwise exercise affirmative control
over the manner or method of performance utilized by
Jensen and Thompson, she owed Thompson no duty of
care under the retained control doctrine. [***19] n3 The
trial court was correct in so ruling.

n3 We note that the term "retained control"
doctrine is somewhat of a misnomer. Under the
standards announced herein, a duty of care is
imposed if the principal employer asserts
affirmative control over or actually participates
actively in the manner of performing the
contracted work. "Retained," to the extent the
word implies passivity or nonaction, is inapt.

The term "retained control" may have a more
syntactically correct application to sophisticated
parties who, by contract, stipulate which party
will control the manner or method of work or the
safety measures to be taken-such as in contracts
between general contractors and subcontractors
involved in construction projects. See Dayton,
148 P. at 411 (noting that under terms of
contract, principal employer did not reserve right
to direct or control prosecution of work or any of
contractor's workers). The issue, however, of
whether a duty of care may be imposed solely as
a result of a such a contractual reservation is not
before us.
[***20]
B. "Peculiar Risk" or "Inherently Dangerous Work"
Doctrine
[*P27] Thompson also relies on sections 413, 416,
and 427 of the Restatement and urges this court to adopt
those sections in his favor as exceptions to the general
rule that one who employs an independent contractor is
not liable for injuries arising out of the contract work.
These sections are similar in wording and are commonly
referred to as the "peculiar risk" doctrine, see, e.g.,
Privette v. Superior Court, 5 Cat. 4th 689, [**329] 854
P.2d 721, 725 (Cal 1993) (en banc), or the "inherently
dangerous work" exception, see, e.g., Wagner v.
ContinentalCas. Co., 143 Wis. 2d379, 421 N.W.2d835,
840 (Wis. 1988).
[*P28] Section 413 is premised on direct liability
for a principal employer's negligence in failing to insure
that special precautions are taken in the contractor's
work. That section provides:
§ 413. Duty to Provide for Taking of Precautions
Against Dangers Involved in Work Entrusted to
Contractor
[HN9]
One who employs an independent contractor to do work
which the employer should recognize as likely to create,
during its progress, a peculiar unreasonable risk of
physical harm to others unless special [***21]
precautions are taken, is subject to liability for physical
harm caused to them by the absence of such precautions
if the employer
(a) fails to provide in the contract that the contractor
shall take such precautions, or
(b) fails to exercise reasonable care to provide in some
other manner for the taking of such precautions.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 413 (1965).
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[*P29] Sections 416 and 427 impose vicarious
liability on the principal employer for the contractor's
negligence, even if the employer reasonably provides for
precautions in the contract work. Those sections state:
§
416. Work Dangerous in Absence of Special
Precautions
[HN10]
One who employs an independent contractor to do work
which the employer should recognize as likely to create
during its progress a peculiar risk of physical harm to
others unless special precautions are taken, is subject to
liability for physical harm caused to them by the failure
of the contractor to exercise reasonable care to take such
precautions, even though the employer has provided for
such precautions in the contract or otherwise.

§ 427. Negligence as to Danger Inherent in the Work
[HN11]
One who employs [***22] an independent contractor to
do work involving a special danger to others which the
employer knows or has reason to know to be inherent in
or normal to the work, or which he contemplates or has
reason to contemplate when making the contract, is
subject to liability for physical harm caused to such
others by the contractor's failure to take reasonable
precautions against such danger.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § § 416, 427 (1965).
[HN12] The purpose of these sections is "to ensure that
innocent third parties injured by the negligence of an
independent contractor hired by a landowner to do
inherently dangerous work on the land would not have to
depend on the contractor's solvency in order to receive
compensation for the injuries." Privette, 854 P.2d at 725.
Privette held that this purpose is not advanced when
these exceptions are applied in favor of a contractor's
employees who are covered by workers' compensation.
See id. at 726-30; see also Wagner, 421 N W.2d at 84044 (detailing reasons for not adopting sections 413, 416,
and 427 in favor of employees of independent
contractors).
[*P30] We agree with Privette and Wagner and
decline to apply section 413, 416, [***23] or 427 of the
Restatement in the manner Thompson proposes. Whether
based on direct negligence under section 413 or vicarious
liability under sections 416 and 427, these provisions
have no application when the injured person is an
employee of the independent contractor undertaking the
allegedly dangerous work. The majority of jurisdictions
that have examined this issue have decided likewise. n4

n4 See Morris v. City ofSoldotna, 553 P. 2d
474, 481-82 (Alaska 1976); Welker v. Kennecott
Copper Co., 1 Ariz. App. 395, 403 P.2d 330, 33739 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1965); Jackson v. Petit Jean
Elec. Coop., 270 Ark. 506, 606 S.W.2d 66, 69
(Ark. 1980); Privette, 854 P.2d at 726-31; Ray v.
Schneider, 16 Conn. App. 660, 548A.2d461, 466
(Conn. App. Ct. 1988); Peone v. Regulus Stud
Mills, 113 Idaho 374, 744 P.2d 102, 105-06
(Idaho 1987); Johns v. New York Blower Co.,
442 N.E.2d 382, 386-88 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982);
Dillardv. Strecker, 255 Kan. 704, 877 P.2d 371,
385 (Kan. 1994); King v. Shelby Rural Elec.
Coop. Corp., 502SW.2d659, 661-63 (Ky. 1973);
Parker v. Neighborhood Theatres, 76 Md. App.
590, 547 A.2d 1080, 1082-83 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
1988); Vertentes v. Barletta Co., 392 Mass. 165,
466 N.E.2d 500, 502-03 (Mass. 1984); Zueck v.
Oppenheimer Gateway Properties, 809 S.W.2d
384, 390 (Mo. 1991) (en banc); Sierra Pacific
Power Co. v. Rinehart, 99 Nev. 557, 665 P.2d
270, 273-74 (Nev. 1983); Donch v. Delta
Inspection Services, Inc., 165 N.J. Super. 567,
398 A.2d 925, 927-29 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1979); New Mexico Electric Serv. Co. v.
Montanez, 89 KM. 278, 551 P.2d 634, 637-38
(N.M. 1976); Whitaker v. Norman, 75 NY.2d
779, 551 NE.2d579, 580, 552 N.Y.S.2d86 (N.Y.
1989); Fleck v. ANG Coal Gasification Co., 522
NW.2d 445, 449-54 (N.D. 1994); Curless v.
Lathrop Co., 65 Ohio App. 3d 377, 583 NE2d
1367, 1376-78 (Ohio Ct. App. 1989); Cooper v.
Metropolitan Government of Nashville, Davidson
County, 628 S.W.2d 30, 32-33 (Tenn. Ct. App.
1981); Humphreys v. Texas Power & Light Co.,
427 S.W.2d 324, 330-31 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968);
Tauscher v. Puget Sound Power & Light Co., 96
Wash. 2d 274, 635 P.2d 426, 428-31 (Wash.
1981) (en banc); Wagner, 421 N W.2d at 839-44;
Stockwell v. Parker Drilling Co., 733 P.2d 1029,
1031-33 (Wyo. 1987).
[***24]
[**330] P31 Along with Privette and Wagner,
Zueck v. Oppenheimer Gateway Properties, 809 S.W.2d
384 (Mo. 1991) (en banc), is representative of those
decisions. As expounded in Zueck, if employees of an
independent contractor are allowed to avail themselves
of the peculiar risk doctrine or inherently dangerous
work exception, the principal employer is placed in an
untenable position: he or she must anticipate activities
that are "inherently dangerous" to the contractor's
employees and, if the dangers inhere to the manner in
which the work is done, protect against such dangers
despite the fact that the employees are best able to
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identify and address whatever hazards are involved in
their own method of performance. Oftentimes, both the
risks involved and the protections necessary to avoid the
risks are beyond the principal employer's knowledge or
capacity. Thus, to avoid the liability imposed by the
peculiar risk doctrine or inherently dangerous work
exception, the principal employer has an incentive to
direct his or her own employees to do the work despite
their lack of expertise. Such a choice would limit the
principal employer's exposure to that under the Workers'
Compensation [***25] Act but, at the same time,
increase the risk of injury to the principal's employees
and innocent third parties. Placing principal employers in
such a position distorts the objectives of tort law, and for
that reason, the peculiar risk doctrine or inherently
dangerous work exception should not apply in favor of
employees of the independent contractor performing the
work. See Zueck, 809 S. W.2d at 387-88.
[*P32] In addition, sections 413,416, and 427 each
speak of liability for injury "to others," which implies
third parties rather than employees of the independent
contractor carrying out the contracted work. An early
draft of the Restatement included a special note which,
though ultimately not adopted, provided guidance on this
point:
Special Note. The rules stated in this Chapter are, in
general, not applicable to make the defendant who hires
an independent contractor liable to two classes of
persons.
One consists of the employees, or servants, of the
defendant himself....
The other class of plaintiffs not included in this Chapter
consists of employees of the independent contractor. . . .
One reason why such responsibility has not developed
has been that the [***26] workman's recovery is now,
with relatively few exceptions, regulated by workmen's
compensation acts. . . . While workmen's compensation
acts do not infrequently provide for third-party liability,
it has not been regarded as necessary to impose such
liability upon one who hires the contractor, since it is
expected that the cost of the workmen's compensation
insurance will be included by the contractor in his
contract price for the work, and so will in any case
ultimately be borne by the defendant who hires him.
Restatement (Second) of Torts (Tent. Draft No. 7, Apr.
16, 1962) ch. 15, special note at 17-18. The American
Law Institute omitted this note due to lack of uniformity
of the effect of the various state workers' compensation
acts but indicated nonetheless that "certainly the
prevailing point of view is that there is no liability on the
part of the employer of the independent contractor." 39

A.L.I. Proc. 244, 247 (1962); see also Monk v. Virgin
Islands Water & Power Auth, 53 F.3d 1381, 1390-91
(3d Cir.), cert, denied, 516 U.S. 914, 116 S Ct. 302, 133
L. Ed. 2d 207 (1995) (referring to same language of
tentative draft of Restatement).
[*P33] The rationale set forth in the special note
quoted above is [***27] persuasive and provides
[**331] additional support for our holding that sections
413,416, and 427 of the Restatement have no application
to employees of independent contractors performing the
work at issue. The phrase "to others" in these sections
does not encompass such employees, but rather, innocent
third parties. This is consistent with the analysis in
Dayton and with Tenth Circuit case law applying Dayton
to this issue. See Eutsler v. United States, 376 F.2d 634,
636 (10th Cir. 1967) (concluding that phrase "to others"
as contained in Restatement § 413 does not include
employees of independent contractors); see also United
States v. Page, 350 F.2d 28 (10th Cir. 1965), cert,
denied, 382 U.S. 979, 86 S Ct. 552, 15 L. Ed. 2d 470
(1966) (acknowledging that general law on subject
reaches same conclusion as to Restatement § 427).
[*P34] Holding otherwise would create unfair and
anomalous results under Utah's workers' compensation
system:
Courts and legal commentators have expressed concern
that to allow an independent contractor's employees who
incur work-related injuries compensable under the
workers' compensation system to also seek damages
under the doctrine of peculiar risk from the person who
[***28]
hired the contractor would give those
employees an unwarranted windfall. As these authorities
point out, to permit such recovery would give these
employees something that is denied to other workers: the
right to recover tort damages for industrial injuries
caused by their employer's failure to provide a safe
working environment. This, in effect, would exempt a
single class of employees, those who work for
independent contractors, from the statutorily mandated
limits of workers' compensation.
Privette, 854 P. 2d at 729. Furthermore, given that the
exclusive remedy provision of the workers'
compensation scheme limits the liability of independent
contractors to coverage premiums, permitting an
employee of the contractor to recover tort damages
against the nonnegligent landowner who employed the
contractor would allow for the inequitable result that a
nonnegligent person's liability for an injury is greater
than that of the person whose negligence actually caused
the injury. n5
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n5 We note that in Utah, this unfairness is
exacerbated by the fact that an employee who
recovers against a third party is obligated to
reimburse the workers' compensation insurer for
any amounts paid to or on behalf of the
employee. See Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-106(5)
(1997). Thus, if Thompson recovered from Jess
for any negligence of Jensen in raising the pipe,
he would be required to reimburse AmeriKan
Sanitation's insurer for benefits received. Such a
reallocation would result in Jess's being
exclusively liable for Thompson's injuries.

We have no reason to question the determination
(already made as a prerequisite to Thompson's qualifying
for such benefits) that Thompson was acting within the
course of his employment when injured. See Allen v.
Industrial Comm'n, 729 P.2d 15, 18 (Utah 1986) (noting
that to qualify for workers' compensation benefits, injury
must be "by accident" and must arise "in the course of
employment"). Accordingly, the trial court correctly
determined as a matter of law that Thompson's sole
recourse is workers' compensation benefits.
CONCLUSION
[*P36] In view of the foregoing analysis, summary
judgment in favor of Jess was proper.

j***29]
[*P35] In the present case, there is no question that
Thompson was an employee of the independent
contractor, AmeriKan Sanitation, at the time of his
injury. He was involved in attempting to install the pipe
and, indeed, has been receiving workers' compensation
benefits through AmeriKan Sanitation since the accident.

Affirmed.
[*P38] Chief Justice Howe, Associate Chief Justice
Durham, Justice Stewart, and Justice Zimmerman concur
in Justice Russon's opinion.
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Defendant "Hales & Warner Construction, Inc.'s Motion for Summary Judgment against
Plaintiffs" and the "Motion for Summary Judgment of the Defendant Corporation of the
Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints" came before this Court
on August 20,2003. Shandor Badaruddin, Jeffrey D. Gooch and Justin T. Ashworth appeared
on behalf of Plaintiffs; and the Plaintiffs also appeared at the hearing. Eric K. Davenport
appeared on behalf of Hales & Warner Cof1S^^!!PAr?n^(H^remafter "Hales & Warner");
Clifford T. Hales of Hales & Warner was alsopFesent^Rofeert R: Wallace appeared on behalf
of the Corporation of the Presiding Bishop offelw-Gfiwef^efitestfs Christ of Latter-Day Saints
(hereinafter the "CPB"). Steven G. Morgan appeared on behalf of BRC, Inc., aka BrentReynolds Construction, inc., (hereinafter'BRC"). Oral argument was received on August 20,
2003 from counsel for the parties.
The Court will note that afterthe initial memoranda in "support and opposition to these
motions had been filed, the Court held a hearing on November 19,2002, and signed an order
on January 31,2003, which order provided that the parties "shall have until February 28,2003
to conduct and complete additional fact discovery;" the order also referred to the filing of
supplemental memoranda by the parties after the additional discovery referred to was
completed. After additional discovery was conducted, Plaintiffs, Hales &Warnerand the CPB
filed supplemental memoranda pertaining to the motions for summaryjudgment. Thereafter,
supplemental oral argument on the motions for summaryjudgment was scheduled for August
20, 2003, as referenced above.
The Court, having reviewed the motions and memoranda submitted in support and in
opposition to the motions, and having heard oral argument on the motions, hereby enters the
?
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following order for good cause shown:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that "Hales & Warner
Construction, Inc.'s Motion for Summary Judgment against Plaintiffs" and the "Motion for
Summary Judgment ofthe Defendant Corporation ofthe Presiding Bishop ofthe Church of
Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints" are hereby granted.
The Court finds that there are no material d i ^ ^ f ^ ^ ^ W f i t c l i preclude summary
judgment in favor of Hales & Warner or the CPB. T^^^HMS'fes-that Plaintiffs' counsel
agreed during oral argument that there was no dispute-a-s^^tfee-material facts.
On or about May 7,1999, the CPB entered an agreement with Hales & Warner for the
construction of a church house for the Highland 4th and 20th Wards. On or about May 10,
1999, Hales & Warner entered into a subcontract agreement with BRC, under which
subcontract agreement BRC was to perform: "All of the Section 06100 Rough Carpentry
complete, including all labor and materials, all material handling and crane time, except wood
trusses to be supplied by others but installed by BRC, Inc." BRC entered into an oral contract
with "Egbert Construction, Inc.," (hereinafter "Egbert Construction"), wherein B R C was to
provide the materials, and Egbert. Construction was to provide all labor, as to the section
06100 rough carpentry.
Egbert Construction hired and trained Jason Smith, Michael Lewis, and Jose Louis.
On August 13, 1999, an Egbert Construction supervisor instructed Jason Smith, Michael
Lewis, and Jose Louis to "put up" a wooden framed wall Egbert Construction had built. On
August 13, 1999, Jason Smith, Michael Lewis, and Jose Louis raised the wooden framed
wall, and were in the process of putting the wall onto bolt studs when the wall started to fall and
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fell on Jason Smith, causing Jason Smith's death (hereinafter the "Accident").
The Court finds that it is undisputed that it was Egbert Construction who hired, trained
and educated Jason Smith, Michael Lewis, and Jose Louis as it relates to the work being
performed at the time of the Accident. Hales & Warner and the CPB did not hire, train or
educate Jason Smith, Michael Lewis, or Jose Louis as to the work they were performing at
the time of the Accident.

rzzzzi""^:

\

The Court finds that it is undisputed that P l l l ^ ^ a s S n : Smith was an employee of
Egbert Construction prior to and at the time of the-Asc-i4e-nti=-Michael Lewis and JQse Louis
were also employees of Egbert Construction prior to and at the time of the Accident.
The Court finds that Jason Smith, Michael Lewis, and Jose Louis were under the
direction, supervision, instruction and control of Egbert Construction at the time of the
Accident.

-

~

The Court finds that Jason Smith, Michael Lewis and Jose Louis were not under the
direction, supervision, instruction or control of Hales & Warner orthe CPB priorto and atthe
time of the Accident. The Court finds that there is no evidence that Jason Smith, Michael
Lewis and Jose Louis were ever under the direction, supervision, instruction, or control of
Hales & Warner or the CPB.
The Court finds that there is no evidence that Hales & Warner or the CPB instructed
Egbert Construction or its employees (or BRC or its employees) to do the work being
performed at the time of the Accident in a different manner or by way of a different method.
The Court finds that there is no evidence that Hales & Warner or the CPB exerted •
control over the means utilized by Jason Smith, Michael Lewis, or Jose Louis, in doing the
4
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work Jason Smith, Michael Lewis and Jose Louis were performing at the time of the Accident,
or that Hales & Warner or the CPB interfered with that work.
The Court finds that the employee of Hales & Warner on the site at the time of the
Accident was in the construction trailer and had no involvement as to the work being
performed, and the wail being put into place, by Jason Smith, Michael Lewis, and Jose Louis
at the time of the Accident.

*TZT~TI^7~~~

I

The Court also finds that there was no erTp^i^arreprdsentative of the CPB on the
site at the time of the Accident, and no emplo^^i^presBntative of the C P B had any
involvement in the work being performed by Jason Smith, Michael Lewis, and Jose Louis at
the time of the Accident.
The Court finds that the evidence indicates that it was Egbert Construction who was
controlling the means utilized and the manner of performance "of the work being performed by
Jason Smith, Michael Lewis, and Jose Louis at the time of the Accident.
The Utah Supreme Court decision Thompson v. Jeffs, 1999 Utah 22, 972 2d. 322, is
applicable, authoritative, and supports the Court's granting of the motions for summary
judgment as to both Hales & Warner and the CPB. In its analysis section, the Utah Supreme
Court in Thompson first sets forth the general rule, stating:
Utah adheres to the general common lawrule that "the employer of an
independent contractor is not liable for physical harm caused to another by an
act or omission of the contractor or his servants." . . . This general rule
recognizes that one who hires an independent contractor and does not
participate in or control the manner in which the contractor's work is performed
owes no duty of care concerning the safety of the manner or method of
performance implemented.
id. at ft 13 (citations omitted). The Thompson Court went on to discuss therein "certain
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exceptions to the general rule of nonliability of an employer of an independent contractor,"
including the "retained control" doctrine exception.
The Court notes that Plaintiffs'counsel stipulated on the record in oral argument that
if the standard for the "retained control" exception (to the general rule) set forth in Thompson
relates to the "injury-causing aspect of the work/' that Plaintiffs cannot meet the "retained
control7' exception, and that Defendants HalesWWamefs and the CPB's motions for
summary judgment should be granted.

" ,r

[

The Court finds that Plaintiffs have not metpSffiii^n^otmeet, the "retained control"
exception to the general rule, pursuant to the contours of thatstandard outlined in Thompson.
In discussing the contours of the "retained control" exception and the "active participation"
requirement pertaining thereto, the Thompson Court states, among other things:
•

In-other words,to have "actively participated" in the contracted work", a principal
employer must have exercised affirmative control over the method or operative
detail of that work. "The degree of control necessary for the creation of a legal
duty must involve either the direct management of the means and method of the
independent contractor's activities or the provision of the specific equipment
that caused the injury."

Thompson, 1999 UT22, ^20 (citations omitted). The Thompson Court also points outthat
there must be exertion "of such control over the means utilized that the contractor cannot carry
out the injury-causing aspect of the work in his or her own way." ]d. at ft 21.
Hales & Warner and the CPj^. did not exert affirmative control over the method or
operative detail of the work and did not directly manage the means and methods of Egbert
Construction's work nor provide the specific equipment used by Egbert Construction as to the
work Jason Smith was performing at the time of the Accident.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

As referenced in the above quote, the standard set forth in Thompson also indicates
that the exertion of control over the means utilized must relate to the "injury-causing aspect of
the work." Id, (underlining added). Hales & Warner and the CPB did not exert control over
the means utilized as to the "injury-causing aspect of the work" of Jason Smith, (even
assuming the means utilized caused his death); rather, Egbert Construction controlled the
means utilized as to the work Jason Smith was peffpffW^atihe

time of the Accident. The

activities of Hales & Warner and the CPB to which Plaintiffs refer did not relate to, and were
not an exertion of control over, the work Jason-Sm#Hves-fierforming at the time of the
accident, and did not cause the accident and death of Jason Smith.
The Court also finds thatHales & Warner and its employees were not employees'of
the CPB; the Court finds that Hales & Warner was an independent contractor of the CPB.
Further, the contracts and fheirprovisions do not preclude'summary judgment in favor ofHales"
& Warner and the CPB.
DATED this 7 H ^ day otSeptemteer, 2003.
BY THE COURT:

^ if w*6/,.
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LEXSEE 699 F.SUPP 257
TED SIMON, Plaintiff, v. DEERY OIL, a Washington corporation, and
KENNECOTT CORPORATION, a Delaware corporation, Defendants
Civil No. 87-C-0653A
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH,
CENTRAL DIVISION
699 F. Supp. 257; 1988 U.S. Dist LEXIS 13026
November 16,1988, Decided

CORE TERMS: contractor, ponds, independent
contractor, general rule, summary judgment, evaporation,
construction project, matter of law, unsafe, train, actively
participated, active participation, tank truck, construct,
asphaltic, sealant, laborer, sealer, rubber, duty,
vicariously liable, non-performance, intrinsically,
superintended, owed, actively participate, right to
control, failure to warn, work done, temporary
COUNSEL:
[**1] John L. Black, Esq., Salt Lake City, Utah, for
Plaintiff.

On June 24, 1987, plaintiff Ted Simon filed a
complaint for personal injuries arising from a work
accident occurring during the construction of evaporation
ponds by Deery Oil for defendant Kennecott
Corporation. Plaintiff was accidentally burned while
filling a portable tank truck with hot asphaltic sealer.
Plaintiffs complaint alleges three separate claims against
defendant Kennecott: (1) failure to warn; (2) allowing an
unsafe operation to be performed [*258] with unsafe
equipment; and (3) failing to require proper training of
personnel working on defendant's property, nl

H. James Clegg, Esq., Salt Lake City, Utah, for
Defendant.

nl The original complaint contained a cause
of action against Deery Oil for negligence in
maintaining the equipment and failure to properly
train the plaintiff. Deery moved for summary
judgment on the grounds that it was the statutory
employer of the plaintiff under the Utah Worker's
Compensation Act, entitling it to judgment as a
matter of law. Plaintiff did not oppose Deery's
motion, and it was subsequently granted by this
court.

JUDGES:
Aldon J. Anderson, United States District Senior
Judge.
OPINIONBY:
ANDERSON
[**2]
OPINION:
[*257]
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT
KENNECOTT CORPORATION'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
ALDON J. ANDERSON,
STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
INTRODUCTION

SENIOR

UNITED

Defendant Kennecott has moved for summary
judgment on the basis that it is not liable for injuries
occurring to employees of independent contractors when
it does not actively participate in the construction project.
Kennecott asserts that plaintiff worked for Deery Oil, an
independent contractor, and that Kennecott had no duty
to conduct safety inspecticns of Deery's equipment, nor
to train or warn Deery's employees with respect to such
equipment. Plaintiff, on the other hand, argues that
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summary judgment should not be granted because
Kennecott had the right to control, and, in fact, did
control Deery's construction of the evaporation ponds.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
In April of 1987, Deery Oil and Kennecott entered
into a contract wherein Deery agreed to line certain
evaporation ponds for the Kennecott corporation. The
contract recognized Deery as an independent contractor
and called for it to supply the labor, equipment, and
materials necessary to construct a rubber and asphalt
lining for the evaporation ponds. The contract was a
performance contract where Deery was to construct a
lining in accordance with its own specifications as long
as it would be able to contain copper leachate [**3]
solution with a minimal amount of leakage. Therefore,
Kennecott exercised no control over the construction and
design of the ponds.
The construction project required a large amount of
unskilled labor to apply the rubber matting and sealant
that constituted the liner, and Deery contracted with SOS
Temporary Services to supply this labor. The plaintiff
was employed by Deery through SOS Temporary
Services as a temporary laborer. Deery supervised all the
work done by plaintiff and the other laborers.
On May 6, 1987 plaintiff was burned while filling a
Deery-owned portable tank truck with hot asphaltic
sealer. The nozzle being operated by plaintiff was
connected to the tank truck by means of a flexible rubber
hose. Plaintiff was injured when a clamp connecting the
hose to the nozzle loosened, spraying him with the
sealer.
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff claims that Kennecott is liable for the
injuries resulting from the accident because it had the
right to control, and, in fact, did control the construction
project. Plaintiff asserts that Kennecott's failure to warn
plaintiff of the inherent danger of the work and to
properly train him on the equipment in question, as well
as permitting an unsafe [**4] operation to be performed
with unsafe equipment on its property, was the cause of
plaintiffs injuries. Defendant contends that it is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law because principals are not
liable for injuries to employees of independent
contractors unless they actively participate in the project.
In Utah, it is clear that a company retaining an
independent contractor to render services has no duty to
warn or train employees of the contractor, nor must the
principal protect the contractor's employees from the
contractor's own negligence, unless the principal has
"actively participated" in the project. Dayton v. Free, 46
Utah 277, 148 P. 408 (1914); United States v. Page, 350
F2d 28, 31 (10th Cir. 1965); Sewell v. Phillips

Petroleum Co., 606 F.2d 274 (10th Cir. 1979) cert. den.
444 U.S. 1080, 62 L. Ed. 2d 763, 100 S. Ct. 1031 (1980).
In Dayton v. Free, the Utah Supreme Court adopted
the common law rule that principals are not liable to
third parties for work done by independent contractors
where there is no evidence "to show that the company in
fact directed, controlled, or superintended the
prosecution of the work, or hired or discharged
employees, or directed,
[*259]
controlled, or
superintended [**5] them in or about the work . . . ."
148 P. at 411. See also Dowsett v. Dowsett, 116 Utah 12,
207 P.2d 809, 811 (1949).
The rule of Dayton has also been used by federal
courts applying Utah law. In the case of Sewell v.
Phillips Petroleum Co., 606 F.2d 274, the plaintiff was
employed by a contractor to install underground gasoline
tanks for Phillips Petroleum Company. Plaintiff was
injured while working in an excavated hole. The Court of
Appeals vacated a plaintiffs jury verdict and affirmed a
judgment for defendant on the grounds that the jury was
not instructed concerning the "active participation"
requirement needed to impose liability on principals
under Utah law:
Plaintiffs principal theory at trial was that
defendant "retained and exercised control"
over the contractor's work and was
therefore liable for plaintiffs injuries. The
relevant jury instruction failed to explain
the necessity for "active participation" by
the defendant as required by Utah law.. . .
The record clearly shows a lack of
evidence supporting the "retained control"
theory. . . . Appellants contention has no
merit because the record provides the
evidence necessary for determining that
defendant [**6] was not liable as a
matter of law.
Id. at275-76.
This is not to say that a principal can never be liable
for injuries sustained by an employee of an independent
contractor. The three recognized exceptions to this rule
in Utah are: (1) where the injury was the direct result of
the stipulated work; (2) where the work was intrinsically
dangerous, and the injury was the consequence of the
failure of the contractor to take appropriate precautions;
and (3) where the injury was caused by the nonperformance of a absolute (non-delegable) duty owed by
the principal to the plaintiff, individually or to the class
of person to which he belongs. Dayton v. Free, 148 P. at
411 (citing 1 Labatt's Mast. & Serv. § 41). These
exceptions, in one form or another, are recognized in
most jurisdictions. See e.g. Wilson v. Good Humor

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Page 3
699 F. Supp. 257, *; 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13026, **

Corp., 244 U.S. App. B.C. 298, 757 F.2d 1293, 1303
(D.C.Cir. 1985) (exception to general rule that
employers are not vicariously liable for torts of their
independent contractors exists when employer engages
independent contractor to perform inherently dangerous
work); Vagle v. Pickands Mather & Co., 611 F.2d 1212,
1217 (8th Cir. 1979) cert. den. 444 U.S. 1033, 62 L. Ed.
2d 669, 100 S. Ct. 704 (1980) (Under "nondelegable
[**7] duties" exception to general rule that employers
are not vicariously liable for torts of their independent
contractors, a principal may be liable if the work to be
performed is likely to create a peculiar unreasonable risk
of physical harm or if a special danger is inherent or
normal to the work).
In the instant case, plaintiff argues that the fact
Kennecott required a list of general safety rules to be
incorporated into the contract shows that Kennecott
retained tight control and, presumably, actively
participated in the construction project. This
requirement, however, does not rise to the level of active
participation by Kennecott. Deery clearly had the right to
construct the ponds as it saw fit, the only requirement
being that the ponds retain the copper solution with
minimal leakage. Deery supplied all the labor, equipment
and materials for the project. In addition, Deery
supervised and trained all of the temporary laborers.
With this in mind, it cannot be seriously contended that
Kennecott actively participated in the construction of the
ponds.
Moreover, there is no indication that plaintiff falls
within any of the exceptions to the general rule of nonliability. First, plaintiff [**8] was injured as a result of
the manner the work was to be performed, by
transferring asphaltic sealant from the truck to the ponds.
Thus, the injury was not caused from the act of

performance, but from the manner of performance, over
which Deery had control.
Second, transferring sealant from a truck is not an
ultrahazardous or intrinsically dangerous activity. If the
transfer is done in the proper manner with proper
equipment, then the workers are in no danger of being
injured.
Third, the injury was not caused by the nonperformance of a duty that Kennecott [*260] owed the
plaintiff. Plaintiff has made no showing that Kennecott
failed to perform a duty that it owed to the plaintiff. In
fact, the contract specifically places on Deery all
responsibility for the supervision and construction of the
ponds.
In sum, plaintiff does not fit within any of the
recognized exceptions to the general rule that principals
are not liable for injuries to the employees of
independent contractors.
CONCLUSION
Utah law provides that companies are not liable for
injuries to employees of independent contractors unless
the company actively participates or controls the project
to be done by the independent contractor. [**9] It has
been clearly shown that Kennecott retained no control
over the project to construct the evaporation ponds.
Moreover, plaintiff does not fit within any of the
recognized exceptions to this general rule of nonliability. Therefore, this court holds that defendant
Kennecott corporation is not liable as a matter of law and
grants summary judgment in its favor.
DATED this 16 day of November, 1988.
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Appeal From The United States District Court For The
District Of Utah Central Division (D.C. #C 74-40)

of evidence supporting the "retained control" theory; and
(3) the alternative business invitee theory had no merit
because the danger, which arose from the work
performed, was readily apparent and the landowner had
no duty to guard against such an obvious danger.

CASE SUMMARY:
OUTCOME: The court affirmed the judgment in favor
of the landowner.
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Appellant independent
contractor filed an action against appellee landowner
seeking damages for injuries sustained while working on
the landowner's premises. The United States District
Court for the District Of Utah Central Division entered a
verdict in favor of the independent contractor, which the
court reversed and remanded. On remand, judgment was
entered in favor of the landowner. The independent
contractor appealed.
OVERVIEW: The independent contractor claimed that
the landowner, who had contracted with the independent
contractor's employer regarding the installation of
gasoline tanks, was liable for the independent
contractor's injuries because the landowner retained and
exercised control over the work. The court reversed and
remanded the initial verdict in favor of the independent
contractor because the "retained control" jury instruction
that was given at trial failed to explain the necessity for
active participation by the landowner as required by Utah
law and the evidence failed to support the independent
contractor's alternative theories. On remand, the parties
agreed to submit the liability issue to the trial judge on
the basis of the trial record. The court held that (1) the
independent contractor's arguments, which were raised
previously, were not persuasive because no further
evidence was produced on remand; (2) there was a lack
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contractor, precautions, new trial, excavation, pit,
safeguards, shoring, prior decision, gasoline, tank, prior
appeal, misstatements, ordinance, earlier decision,
excavated, punitive damages, cause of action, matter of
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[HN1] A landowner is under no duty to guard against an
obvious danger under the business invitee theory of
liability.
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JUDGES:
Before SETH, Chief Judge, and DOYLE and
McKAY, Circuit Judges.
OPINIONBY:
SETH
OPINION:
[*275]
We previously considered this case in Sewell v.
Phillips Petroleum Company, Inc., Nos. 76-1030-31
(10th Cir. March 21, 1977). We held there that the
crucial "retained control" jury instruction for imputing
liability to an owner for injuries caused by a negligent
independent contractor was erroneous, and that the
evidence clearly failed to support plaintiffs alternative
theories for imposing liability on the defendant. We
reversed the general verdict in favor of plaintiff and
remanded for a new trial. The parties stipulated to the
trial judge on remand that no issue remained to be
determined and agreed to submit the liability issue to the
trial judge on the basis of the trial record. They also
agreed that if the trial judge found in favor of plaintiff on
the [**2] liability issue, then the case would proceed to
a jury for a determination of damages. Since there was
no further evidence to be presented, the trial judge
entered judgment for the defendant in light of our
holding.
Appellant complains here that he was entitled to
judgment as a matter of law, and that our previous
holding relied on misstatements of the facts in the
defendant's brief. He also maintains entitlement to
remand on the punitive damages issue which we
considered and denied in our previous holding.
We believe it unnecessary to reiterate the relevant
facts because they are discussed in detail in our previous
holding. The case involved a suit for damages for
injuries sustained by plaintiff while working in an
excavated eleven-foot hole. Plaintiff was employed by
Harvey W. Eckman & Associates which had contracted
with the defendant to install 10,000-gallon gasoline
storage tanks at defendant's gasoline stations. Plaintiffs
principal theory at trial was that defendant "retained and
exercised control" over the contractor's work and was
therefore liable for plaintiffs injuries. [*276] The
relevant jury instruction failed to explain the necessity
for "active participation" [**3] by the defendant as
required by Utah law. United States v. Page, 350 F.2d
28 (10th Cir.); Dayton v. Free, 46 Utah 277, 148 P. 408.
We noted further that no evidence presented at trial

indicated the defendant could be held liable under this
theory or the alternative theories.
Appellant raises here the same issues discussed
previously. No further evidence was produced on
remand. We see no purpose in repeating the basis for
our previous holding. Appellant's arguments are simply
unpersuasive.
We do address, however, the contention that the
previous holding relied on misstatements in the
defendant's brief. The record clearly shows a lack of
evidence supporting the "retained control" theory.
Furthermore, on plaintiffs alternative business invitee
theory, the danger arose from the work performed on the
premises and was readily apparent to the plaintiff.
[HN1] Defendant was under no duty to guard against
such an obvious danger. Texaco, Inc. v. Pruitt, 396 F.2d
237 (10th Cir.). Appellant's contention has no merit
because the record provides the evidence necessary for
determining that defendant was not liable as a matter of
law.
AFFIRMED.
CONCURBY:
McKAY
CONCUR:
McKAY, Circuit Judge, concurring [**4]
result:

in the

Although I believe that the dissenting opinion may
correctly characterize the result which should have been
reached in the prior appeal brought in this case, I believe
the instant appeal is in substance only a much-belated
petition for rehearing. Rightly or wrongly, the issues that
divide the other panel members were decided in the
earlier appeal, and the time for asking this court's
reconsideration of its determination has long since
expired. All purported defects in the earlier disposition
would have been known to appellant during the period in
which filing for rehearing would have been timely. I
therefore agree with the decision to affirm.
Nonetheless, I believe a troubling subsidiary matter
should be addressed. There appears to be a substantial
likelihood that disciplinary proceedings are in order. If
counsel for appellant is correct, counsel for appellee
deliberately misstated material facts to this court in the
brief he filed in the prior appeal. If counsel for appellee
is correct, counsel for appellant has leveled false charges
of serious professional impropriety against a member of
the bar. Both charges are extremely grave. If either is
true, disciplinary [**5] sanctions are in order.
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We have not investigated the charges and
countercharges raised in this case, nor is such an
undertaking the proper responsibility of this court in the
first instance. I am, however, mailing a copy of this
opinion to the Commissioners of the Utah State Bar, of
which both attorneys are members, for their appropriate
disposition. I will also direct the clerk of this court to
supply the Commissioners with copies of the relevant
materials.
In a growing number of cases, adversarial rivalry
has degenerated into accusations of unethical conduct.
This court will not tolerate false charges of this variety.
Neither will it abide the filing of dishonest statements by
practitioners. We expect the highest standard of care by
attorneys in correctly citing facts and cases. If necessary,
when deliberate or grossly negligent miscitations occur,
we will strike the briefs and leave the clients who are
damaged thereby to malpractice remedies. We intend to
apply an equal standard to false accusations of unethical
conduct.
When misstatements of the type discussed here do
occur, opposing counsel should note the errors in a
responsive brief.
Misconduct should not be so
characterized [**6] in the briefs on appeal, lest the
argument shift to focusing on the integrity of
practitioners rather than the substantive issues raised in
the appeal. Where the misstatements suggest the
likelihood of misconduct, opposing counsel should file a
charge with the appropriate bar authorities. We will
ourselves be alert to whether the challenged [*277]
statements suggest the propriety of disciplinary
proceedings and will, as in the instant case, initiate
appropriate action when the opposing attorney has not
already done so.
Having outlined our views in this matter generally,
we repeat that we express no view at this time
concerning which attorney is correct in the instant
dispute. We assume that the matter will be resolved in a
more appropriate forum so that the rights of the litigants
will not be further affected by this controversy.
I am authorized to state that SETH, C. J., concurs in
the views expressed in this opinion on the matter of
professional misconduct on the part of attorneys who
practice before us.
DISSENTBY:
DOYLE
DISSENT:
WILLIAM E. DOYLE, Circuit Judge, dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.

This case was appealed on a previous occasion. It
was reversed and remanded [**7] for a new trial. The
panel, with the exception of Chief Judge Seth, was
different on the prior appeal.
The complaint was originally filed in this case on
February 8, 1974. Plaintiff was injured as a result of the
cave-in of an excavation wall in a pit in which he was
working. This excavation was made on behalf of
Phillips Petroleum Company, the defendant herein. The
depth of this was 11'6 . The sides, however, were
perpendicular and it is said that this is what caused it to
cave.
It is not disputed that both the Uniform Building
Code which was in effect in Salt Lake City and also
OSHA, the United States agency, which was concerned
with employee safety, required sloping and shoring. See
United States v. Dye Construction Company, 510 F.2d
78 (10th Cir. 1975).
In this instance the pit was excavated for the purpose
of installing a gasoline storage tank at a retail service
station. An independent contractor performed the work.
However, he did not apply for a permit. Had he done so
there would have been an inspection together with orders
requiring the sloping in accordance with the city
ordinance and OSHA regulations.
The evidence established that the ^particular
excavation was [**8] one of a large number in Salt Lake
City by Phillips in order to store unleaded gasoline.
Phillips was fully aware of the manner of excavating and
was aware that it was illegal. There was evidence to
show that proceeding without a permit and not sloping or
shoring was the policy of Phillips. The evidence also
showed that Phillips furnished the blueprint or plan for
the excavation and installation of the tank. This called
for a pit with perpendicular walls.
Plaintiff made the mistake of appealing the trial
court's denial of punitive damages. The defendant crossappealed the judgment on the merits. This court rejected
plaintiffs appeal and adopted that of Phillips. The theory
was that Phillips was shielded by the independent
contractor concept.
The source of this disagreement goes back to the
first appeal following the original trial of the case. The
trial had been to a jury in early October 1975. On that
occasion special interrogatories were submitted to the
jury, and as a consequence of the jury's responses a
verdict in the amount of $ 25,000 was returned in favor
of the plaintiff. In answering the interrogatories, the jury
responded that the defendant Phillips Petroleum [**9]
Company was the proximate cause of the injury to the
degree of 100%. Judgment was entered accordingly.
The appeal which is referred to above followed.
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This court reversed in an opinion filed March 21,
1977. It emphasized that Mr. Eckman had been
employed by Phillips under an explicit contract which
provided that he was an independent contractor. He was
to dig an 11'6 pit in which the gasoline tank would be
placed. In general, this court's opinion followed the
proposition that in order to impose liability on the
defendant, considering that Eckman was an independent
contractor, it would have to appear that an exception
existed to nonliability for torts of an independent
contractor. The court went on to find that such exception
was not present.
[*278] The basis on which the verdict was
rendered at the trial was that Phillips, in truth, controlled
the project; that it was hazardous to fail to perform
sloping and shoring in a pit this deep; that such sloping
and shoring was required by the County of Salt Lake and
also by OSHA, a federal agency. It was also brought out
that Phillips was fully aware of the fact that these
precautions which were required by law had not been
[**10] taken. Indeed, Phillips prepared the drawings
and specifications which called for a perpendicular pit
and which did not provide for sloping or shoring. It was
also shown that this particular contractor was regularly
employed, had excavated a large number of these in
accordance with Phillips' plans, and with the full
knowledge of Phillips. These facts resulted in Phillips
having independent responsibility for the injury.
The opinion of this court remanded the case for a
new trial. However, the trial judge concluded that he was
unable to conduct a new trial in view of the decision.
The court proceeded to enter an order of dismissal of the
complaint with prejudice. In that order of dismissal it
was pointed out that the contract provided that the
contractor was to be an independent contractor, who
would provide the necessary materials and labor, get the
necessary licenses and observe all laws in excavating the
premises and installing the tanks. The wording of the
contract also provided that the contractor was to have
complete control over the work.
While plaintiff, the order continued, was working on
the excavation, a cave-in occurred causing his injuries.
"There had been no [**11] sloping of the sides of the
excavation as local law required. The plans for the work
were provided by the defendant and contained no
requirement of sloping." A representative of defendant
had visited the project occasionally and the company,
from past experience, could expect bidders would follow
the plan provided. No Phillips' representative was
present when it happened.
The trial court wrote that it had first granted the
defendant's motion for summary judgment on the basis
that defendant was insulated from responsibility, but

upon reconsideration it became persuaded that it was a
case that presented a jury question considering that the
defendant company had vast experience in excavation
and installation work, had an engineering department
trained in this kind of work, and "in this very community
had previously contracted for many such jobs and been
familiar with the local law requiring sloping,
notwithstanding that the company drew plans leaving out
sloping, an expensive addition, and put it out to bid." The
court said that since the company had gained an
economic benefit from putting out a job for bid with a
drawing for the work without sloping, the issue of
whether this was [**12] negligence should be presented
to the jury on the theory that such may be an exercise of
control that would deprive the company of the protection
of the contract which placed responsibility with the
independent contractor. The court then went on to say:
The case was presented to the jury
and plaintiff was awarded a verdict of $
25,000. Plaintiff appealed the court's
dismissal of the claim of punitive
damages and defendant cross-appealed,
contending there were no issues of fact for
the jury and that, as a matter of law,
judgment should be entered in favor of
defendant no cause of action on plaintiffs
complaint. The case was argued to the
Court of Appeals in November, 1976, and
on March 21, 1977, the Court handed
down its decision reversing the judgment
and remanding the case for a new trial.
Thereafter the trial court met with
counsel for the parties to hold a pretrial in
preparation for a retrial. It was stipulated
that all of the evidence had been presented
at the first trial and that the matter should
be presented to the trial court, based on
the records and brief of counsel, for its
decision.
The court has carefully reviewed the
facts in the record, the [**13] ruling of
the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit, the briefs of counsel and,
deeming itself folly advised, enters the
following as its ruling and verdict in the
matter.
[*279] IT IS HEREBY ORDERED
that defendant be granted a verdict of no
cause of action on plaintiffs complaint.
The court believes that under the
facts and the law provided by the Circuit
this is the only verdict that could be
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entered. On page 3 of the opinion of the
Appellate Court the Court ruled:
There is no question that Eckman was
an independent contractor.
To impose liability on the defendant
there must be shown an exception to the
general rule of non-liability for torts of an
independent contractor either through the
exercise by the defendant of control over
a delegable duty, or by showing a nondelegable duty.
The opinion then proceeds to
demonstrate that neither of the two
alternatives is present in this case. It
follows, therefore, that plaintiff can
establish no basis for liability.
In holding that the defendant retained
no control of the work (over a delegable
duty), the Court said:
There was shown no active
participation [**14] in the work by
defendant's inspections of the job site.
The defendant never exercised control of
the work and Eckman was under a
contractual duty to comply with proper
procedures.
(a)lthough
the
drawings
and
specifications did not specify sloping,
they in themselves did not show control in
the absence of some affirmative act.
The defendant, on this record, did not
retain control of the work. (Emphasis
added.)
Since the parties have no more
evidence to present, this ruling is
determinative in this alternative.
As to the possibility of its being a
situation of a non-delegable duty, the
Appellate Court said:
As for nondelegable duties which are
described as being "inherently dangerous"
. . . this Circuit has expressed "serious
doubts as to whether the doctrine of nondelegable duty as here involved applies to
injuries of employees of the independent
contractor."
In concluding the opinion, the Court added:
In any event, the defendant owed no
duty to Plaintiff. (Emphasis added.)

With the parties stipulating there is
no more evidence to present, under the
opinion of the Circuit there is nothing left
to try.
Judgment, [**15] therefore, should
be, and is, entered for defendant, no cause
of action on plaintiffs complaint.
DATED this 20th day of September,
1977.
I have quoted and shown the trial court's opinion on
remand in detail for the reason that it shows, in my
opinion, that the trial court was somewhat startled to
receive this court's opinion, and I must confess that I had
similar feelings when I first heard the case on the present
appeal. My first exposure to the case was the occasion
of oral arguments on the second appeal.
Being of the opinion that there has been a
miscarriage of justice, it is my conclusion that the
judgment of the district court should be at this time
reinstated in the interest of justice. Such action has been
taken on past occasions.
The reason for my dissent is my conviction that the
concept of independent contractor is capable of
shrouding a great many sins; that it will not succeed
where, as here, a statute or ordinance imposes a duty to
provide specified safeguards or precautions for the safety
of others. This is expressed in the Restatement (Second),
of Torts § 424, which provides:
Precautions Required by Statute or Regulation
One who by statute or [**16] by
administrative regulation is under a duty
to provide specified safeguards or
precautions for the safety of others is
subject to liability to the others for whose
protection the duty is imposed for harm
caused by the failure of a contractor
employed by him to provide such
safeguards or precautions.
[*280] So, under this principle, the owner will not
be heard to say that it was the duty of the contractor to
fulfill the duties imposed by statute. This is because the
duty is on the owner to comply with the law and he
cannot pass the buck. If he could, avoidance would be
quite simple. The owner could avoid the law by entering
an airtight contract with an "independent contractor."
The guiding principles are set forth in somewhat
more detail and clarity in an annotation reported in 41
Am Jur.2d Independent Contractors §37 (1968), at 799800:
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Generally speaking there are many
situations in which a person cannot
absolve himself from liability by
delegating his duties to an independent
contractor.
An employer
has a
nondelegable duty with respect to the
taking of precautions during work which
is dangerous in the absence of such
precautions, which is inherently or
intrinsically [**17] dangerous, or which
from its nature is likely to render the
premises dangerous to invitees, and also
has a nondelegable duty with respect to
the conduct of ultrahazardous work.
Where a person, either by contract or by
law, owes an obligation to another, he
cannot escape liability for negligence in
performance of such obligation by
delegating the duty to an independent
contractor. Thus, if a statute or ordinance
requires a person to take certain
precautions when work is being done, and
such precautions are not taken, it is no
defense that an independent contractor
was employed to do the work and that the
failure to take the precautions was due to
the contractor's negligence. Likewise, one
who, by a specific agreement, undertakes
to do some particular thing, or to do it in a
certain manner, cannot, by employing an
independent
contractor,
avoid
responsibility for an injury resulting from
the nonperformance of any duty or duties
which, under the express terms of the
agreement or by implication of law, are
assumed by the undertaker. An exception
to the general rule of nonliability of an
employer for the negligence of an
independent contractor or the latter's
servants exists where the [**18]
employer has assumed a contractual
obligation to perform the work.
At bar we have an activity which is inherently
hazardous. The hazard is recognized by statute and
ordinance. In addition, we have an owner who provides
plans which do not attempt to adopt safeguards. In fact, it
knowingly encourages the doing of the work without
taking safeguards. Phillips would be liable for the failure
of the contractor to follow its orders. It is certainly liable
where the contractor follows its orders and thereby
creates the risk.
One recent example is that which occurred in Pierce
v. Cook & Co., 518 F.2d 720 (10th Cir. 1975). In Pierce
v. Cook & Co., the action was for wrongful death in an

automobile collision. The truck driver had been hauling
wheat for the defendant-appellee in the case, Cook &
Co., Inc. The trial court entered summary judgment.
This was appealed and affirmed by this court. The
judgment became final in 1971. The accident had
actually happened in 1968. Relief was sought in the
federal court based upon a change of law in the
Oklahoma state court. The Oklahoma Supreme Court
had overruled the prior decision which had strictly
applied the independent contractor rule [**19] and had
concluded that where there is a foreseeable risk of harm
to others unless precautions are taken, one who is
regularly engaged in a commercial enterprise as an
integral part of the business is responsible for failure to
exercise care in selecting a competent carrier. Failure to
do so rendered him liable.
When this change of law was announced, a motion
for relief was filed by the aggrieved party under Rule
60(b). Notwithstanding that this court's prior decision
had become final in 1971, relief was granted following
presentation of the case to this court en banc. The cause
had been removed to federal court, and after the state
court rule was changed, we held in an opinion by Judge
Breitenstein that in this extraordinary condition, the
plaintiff was the victim of an injustice, and although we
did not reverse [*281] the decision of the trial court, we
commended the Rule 60(b) motion to it.
While an appellate court will generally refuse to
reopen a final judgment entered in a prior appeal, it will
do so when substantial justice warrants. See 9 Moore's
Federal Practice P 110.25(2), at 274-75 (2d ed. 1975).
The law of the case doctrine bars a second review of
established [**20] law unless compelling circumstances
warrant the action.
The Supreme Court has long recognized that an
appellate court may review its earlier decision in a case
and reopen that case when circumstances warrant it. See
Messenger v. Anderson, 225 U.S. 436, 32 S. Ct. 739, 56
L. Ed. 1152 (1912).
Bromley v. Crisp, 561 F.2d 1351, 1363 (10th Cir.
1977), Cert, denied, 435 U.S. 908, 98 S Ct. 1458, 55 L.
Ed. 2d 499 (1978), recognized that this court could
depart from its own earlier decision in the identical case
when circumstances warranted such departure.
Other circuits have also recognized that where
circumstances warrant reopening of an earlier appellate
decision in the same case, such procedure may be
pursued.
The Eighth Circuit has said that the earlier judgment
will not be disturbed unless clearly erroneous and
manifestly unjust.
See Wrist-Rocket Mfg. Co. v.
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Saunders Archery Co., 578 F.2d 727, 730-31 (8th Cir.
1978).
The Fifth Circuit has said that a second review is
permissible "if considerations of substantial justice
warrant it." Lehrman v. Gulf Oil Corp., 500 F.2d 659,
663 (5th Cir. 1974), Cert, denied, 420 U.S. 929, 95 S. Ct.
1128, 43 L. Ed. 2d 400 (1975). Clearly a prior decision
[**21] is not to be reopened and reversed except upon
the basis of cogent reasons and to avoid manifest
injustice. See Terrell v. Household Goods Carriers'
Bureau, 494 F.2d 16, 19-20 (5th Cir.), Cert, dismissed,
419 U.S. 987, 95 S. Ct. 246, 42 L. Ed. 2d 260 (1974).
The Sixth Circuit has refused to review a prior
decision unless a new statute or intervening Supreme
Court decision raises questions as to the viability of the
earlier decision. Hawkes v. Internal Revenue Service,
507F.2d481, 482 n.l (6th Cir. 1974).
In one instance the First Circuit refused to reopen a
civil case, but recognized that it could be done in the
case in which the previous error constituted a manifest
injustice. White v. Higgins, 116 F.2d 312, 317 (1st Cir.
1974).
In the present case the mix-up occurred because of
the fact that the contract between Phillips Petroleum
Company and the independent contractor purported to
place all of the responsibility on the independent
contractor, but when the case was tried a far different
condition was revealed. It was shown that Phillips in
actuality had exercised a good deal of control over the

project and that it was the author of the plans which took
the less expensive [**22] way out, that of not taking
steps to prevent cave-ins. Thus, where it had control of
the condition and acted negligently, that is, where it
could reasonably foresee that a workman was going to be
injured from this practice, it should be held responsible
to the workman for its own negligent conduct. That is
what the trial court held and that is the correct approach
to the case. It is an approach that is not at odds with
Utah law.
Here we have an activity that was contrary to law,
both local and federal, which plainly created a hazard
and thus the trial court was plainly correct in the first
case in submitting the case to the jury. The jury's verdict
was well founded both in law and in fact. A plain
injustice occurred as a result of the reversal. The trial
court was unable to carry out the mandate which ordered
a new trial because the law of the case contained in this
court's decision closed the door to a new trial. There was
nothing for the trial court to do except vacate the
judgment based upon the jury verdict and enter judgment
for Phillips, which it did.
In this case the injustice which the litigant has
suffered is clear. There is not and was not any way
which would allow [**23] Phillips to shift responsibility
to the contractor. To allow it to do so constituted grave
error which should be corrected.
The case should be reopened in the interest of
justice.
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LEXSEE 396 F2D 237
TEXACO, INC., Appellant, v. Jimmy N. PRUITT, Appellee
No. 9595
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
396 F.2d237; 1968 U.S. App. LEXIS 6648
June 6,1968

Texaco appeals from a substantial judgment on a jury
verdict. We affirm.

DISPOSITION: [**1]
Affirmed.

nl The basis of this suit is § 35-1-62 of the
Utah Workmen's Compensation Act, which
provides that when an injury to an employee is
caused by the wrongful act or neglect of another
person not in the same employment, the injured
employee may claim workmen's compensation
and may also have an action for damages against
the third person.

CORE TERMS: horsehead, rod, walking beam, pump,
bolt, servicing, bottom, beam, duty, polished, pumping,
clamp, caught, safe place to work, guard, legal duty,
cable, latent, diesel engine, elevator, carrier, derrick,
surface, top, general contractor, contractor, concealed,
insurance carrier, stuffing box, bumping
JUDGES:
Murrah, Chief Judge, Marvin Jones, * Judge Court
of Claims, and Breitenstein, Circuit Judge.

* Sitting by designation.
OPINIONBY:
MURRAH
OPINION:
[*239] MURRAH, Chief Judge.
While Sayer's Well Servicing Company, Inc. was
servicing a pump on a Utah oil well owned by defendantappellant Texaco, Inc., plaintiff-appellee Pruitt, an
employee of Sayer's, was seriously injured when a piece
of the pumping equipment known as a "horsehead" fell
upon him. Having collected workmen's compensation as
an employee of Sayer's, Pruitt brought this action against
Texaco, alleging that Texaco negligently permitted the
horsehead to fall, nl Texaco denied any negligence,
asserting that Sayer's negligence caused the accident, and
in any event, that Pruitt was contributorily negligent.

[**2]
The pumping unit involved in the accident consists
of three main pieces - a horsehead, a walking beam and
a tripod. The "horsehead" is a large metal object shaped
roughly like the head of its namesake. It is attached to
one end of the "walking beam" ~ a long horizontal metal
beam similar to a girder. The center of the walking beam
rests upon and is affixed to the tripod, which acts as its
fulcrum. A pump jack is attached to the other end of the
walking beam and, when actuated, creates a seesaw
motion of the beam.
Two steel cables called "bridles" hang down from
the top of the horsehead. They are attached to a "polished
rod" which extends through a "stuffing box" and is
attached to rods which operate the pump at the bottom of
the well. Propelled by the seesaw movement of the
walking beam, the rods move up and down inside tubing,
through which the oil is pumped to the surface.
The evidence shows that the horsehead is about 13
feet long and weighs approximately 2000 pounds. It has
a groove on its back side which fits over a two-inch "lip"
on the top of the walking beam. Near the bottom of the
beam both the horsehead and beam have a two-inch slot
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through which a bolt is inserted. [**3] An employee of
the manufacturer of the pumping unit testified that this
particular unit calls for a 3/4 inch bolt. He also explained
that the purpose of the bolt is twofold: (1) to keep the
horsehead on the beam in case a rod breaks in the well,
and (2) to hold the horsehead in place after it is centered
with two adjusting screws.

evidence of actionable negligence on its part. But the
sufficiency of the evidence must be adjudged in the light
of the rule of law by which Texaco's legal liability is to
be determined. We are brought, therefore, to a
consideration of the nature of the legal duty owed by
Texaco to Sayer's employees and the situations under
which this duty becomes operative.

Texaco maintained a production foreman and
several employees in the field who made daily visits to
the wells, and had the responsibility of maintaining and
servicing the surface pumping units. Texaco had a
contract with Sayer's and another well servicing
company to service the pump at the bottom of each well.

It is the general rule, applicable in Utah, that an
owner of premises or the general contractor of work
being performed thereon, who has neither reserved nor
exercised direction or control over the particular work
being performed by a contractor or subcontractor, as the
case may be, owes no legal duty to provide an employee
of the contractor or subcontractor "a safe place to work *
* * or to guard him against dangers incident to or created
by the prosecution of the work, and certainly not to guard
or protect him [**6] against the negligence of those who
had employed him or with whom he labored." Dayton v.
Free, 46 Utah 277, 148 P. 408, 412. See also Titan Steel
Corp. v. Walton, 365 F.2d 542. Such an owner or general
contractor is, however, under a legal duty to warn or
guard against concealed or latent conditions of danger on
the premises of which he has or ought to have knowledge
and of which the employee has none. See Gulf Oil Corp.
v. Bivins, 276 F.2d 753; Titan Steel Corp. v. Walton,
supra. And see also United States Steel v. Warner, 378
F.2d 995; Demarest v. T. C. Bateson Const. Co., 370
F.2d281.

Two or three days prior to the date of the accident,
the surface pumping unit on the well in question was
operating but no oil was being produced. The other
servicing company (Falco) was called in to "trip the subsurface pump", n2 but when its efforts proved
unsuccessful, Sayer's was asked to "bump bottom and
space the pump". To perform this operation, Sayer's shut
down the pump and [*240] raised a 65 foot portable
derrick directly over the well. Cables were then run from
a diesel engine beside the derrick up through the top of
the derrick [**4] and down to the polished rod. Three
objects referred to as a block, hook and elevator were
affixed to the end of the cable, and apparently were used
to attach the cable to the polished rod. After the bridles
were disengaged, the rods were lowered several feet
further into the well so as to put pressure on the pump at
the bottom. The purpose of the operation is to "seat" the
pump more firmly at the bottom of the well and dislodge
any foreign material that might be interfering with the
pump's operation. The operator of the diesel engine was
in the process of lifting the rods when the horsehead fell
from the walking beam onto Pruitt, who was working at
the stuffing box immediately under the horsehead.

N2 This operation involves pulling the string
of rods from the well and hanging them on the
derrick, pulling the pump from the bottom of the
well to the surface, checking the pump and then
returning it to the bottom, and replacing all of the
rods.
The trial judge submitted the question of Texaco's
negligence to the [**5] jury, but instructed as a matter of
law that Pruitt was not contributorily negligent. The
jury's verdict in favor of Pruitt was necessarily based
upon a finding that Texaco's negligence caused the
injury.
Texaco's initial contention is that the trial judge
should have directed a verdict in its favor for want of any

Although the pretrial order defining the triable
issues left in dispute Texaco's ownership and control of
the pumping equipment, the case was apparently tried
and submitted to the jury on the assumption that Texaco,
as the owner and operator of the well, contracted to
Sayer's the performance of the work which was being
done at the time of the accident. There is no evidence to
indicate that any Texaco employee was present or had
anything to do with Sayer's servicing operation. In any
event, there is nothing in the [**7] record to indicate
that the issue of control was submitted to the jury. We
think it is clear that Texaco exercised no direction or
control over the particular work being performed, and
therefore, had only the duty of warning or guarding
Sayer's employees against concealed or latent conditions
of danger on the premises. The issue then must be
whether Texaco allowed the horsehead to be insecurely
fastened to the walking beam so as to create a latent
condition of danger, or whether, as Texaco contends, the
horsehead was pulled off the beam by Sayer's servicing

rigThe evidence was conflicting, and mostly
speculative, as to the cause of the accident. An employee
of Falco testified that the horsehead was taken off when
his company serviced the well two or three days prior to
the accident, and he noticed that the bolt removed was
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[*241] a 5/8 inch rather than the prescribed 3/4 inch
bolt. He further testified that even though the bolt was
"smaller than * * * normal", he directed another
employee to put it back in the horsehead because "we
don't change any bolts". Two witnesses for Texaco
testified that a bolt removed from the walking beam the
day after the accident was a 3/4 inch [**8] bolt. A
Saver's employee testified that he recalled "seeing that
the elevator caught the horsehead and raised it up." He
admitted, however, that he was not "hundred per cent
sure". Other witnesses testified that the elevator was
above the horsehead during the "bumping" operation.
The operator of the diesel engine testified that the
engine's weight indicator gauge showed no sudden
increase in weight while the rods were being lifted. He
explained that if something on his cable had caught the
horsehead, a "very fast" weight increase would have
registered on the gauge.
We have repeatedly held "that a verdict may not be
directed unless the evidence points all one way and is
susceptible of no reasonable inferences which sustain the
position of the party against whom the motion is made."
United States Steel v. Warner, supra, at p. 998. See also
Christopherson v. Humphrey, 366 F.2d 323. It is too
clear for argument that the evidence here is not all one
way in favor of Texaco. The case was for the jury under
the applicable rule of legal duty and liability.
Texaco next complains that the trial judge
prescribed an erroneous legal duty of care when he
instructed [**9]
the jury that Texaco had the
"continuous duty * * to use reasonable care and prudence
to furnish the employees of Sayer's * * with a reasonably
safe place within which to perform their work." Texaco
saved its record by specifically objecting to the use of the
phrase "safe place to work" to describe Texaco's duty to
Pruitt. The objection and the argument here is that
although Texaco owed invitee Pruitt the duty to "use
reasonable care", the duty to provide a safe place to work
was owed by Pruitt's employer, Sayer's, not Texaco.
The phrase "safe place to work" has been loosely
used to characterize both the duties of an employer
incident to the prosecution of the work being done, and
the altogether different duty of an owner or contractor
not in control of the work being done to warn or guard
against concealed or latent dangers on the premises. As
we have seen, these duties are separate and distinct, and
confusion results when they are articulated by the same
or similar words. It is accurate to say that an employer or
person in control of the premises and the work being
done must provide a safe place to work, but it is
inaccurate and misleading to say that an owner or general
contractor [**10] not exercising direction over the
particular work being performed is under such an
obligation.

Although Judge Ritter did use the phrase "safe place
within which to perform their work" to describe Texaco's
legal obligation to the employees of Sayer's, he did not
stop there but went on to explain the meaning of his
words: "this duty required [Texaco] to use reasonable
care to inspect the equipment, and particularly the horse's
head and walking beam and other units of the pumping
equipment, to repair the same when necessary, and to
keep the horse's head securely fastened to the walking
beam." We think his explanation sufficiently advised the
jury that Texaco's legal duty was to guard against hidden
dangers inherent in the premises rather than unsafe
conditions incident to or created by the work being done,
and enabled the jury to arrive at an intelligent verdict.
Complaint is also made of the trial judge's refusal to
allow counsel for Texaco to argue to the jury that the
"polished rod clamp" caught on the horsehead and pulled
it from the walking beam. The polished rod clamp is a
"little box contraption" attached to the polished rod. The
superintendent in charge of Sayer's servicing [**11]
operation testified that the clamp had been removed
during the "bumping operation". [*242] Another
witness, the operator of the diesel engine, testified that
the clamp had been "removed in order for me to touch
bottom." Pruitt, when asked what caught on the
horsehead, if anything, replied: "I was presuming in my
mind that the polish rod clamp caught it. * * * But I
didn't see it, and I don't know."
We agree with the trial judge that the evidence was
insufficient to allow Texaco "to take that clamp to the
jury." It appears to be undisputed that the clamp was
removed from the polished rod. Moreover, Texaco was
not prevented from presenting its causal theory of the
accident to the jury. It apparently was given wide latitude
to argue that some other object, such as the block, hook,
elevator or box (a coupling between two sections of rod),
caught on the horsehead and pulled it from the walking
beam.
Texaco next asserts that the trial judge erred in
refusing to submit to the jury the question of contributory
negligence on the part of Pruitt. It is argued that Pruitt
was negligent in that: (1) he walked out on the walking
beam and should have seen whether or not the horsehead
was [**12] properly attached, and (2) he placed himself
under the horsehead when the servicing unit was lifting
the rods.
We agree with Judge Ritter that there was no
evidence of contributory negligence. The walking beam
was two to three feet in depth, and the slot for the bolt
was located near the bottom of the beam. Certainly a
man on top of the beam would be in no position to
observe that a bolt underneath was not of the proper size.
Nor was Pruitt negligent in placing himself under the
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horsehead when the rods were being lifted. He was not at
a place he should not have been; instead, he was
stationed at his post of duty next to the stuffing box.
Moreover, it was customary to leave the horsehead on
the walking beam while performing this "bumping" type
operation. The horsehead was not in motion, but had
been stopped on the downstroke and a brake applied. In
our opinion there was nothing to indicate that any danger
would be involved in working beneath it.
Finally, Texaco contends that the trial judge
erroneously refused to reduce the amount of the
judgment awarded Pruitt by $18,000-the amount of
workmen's compensation benefits paid to Pruitt. The
argument is that the trial judge should have [**13] held
Sayer's negligent as a matter of law, or in any event,
submitted that issue to the jury; and that because of its
negligence, Sayer's and its insurance carrier, standing in
its shoes, are precluded from recovering the amount of
compensation benefits paid to Pruitt.
Section 35-1-62 of the Utah Workmen's
Compensation Act, which authorizes an injured and
compensated employee to bring an action against a third
party wrongdoer, also provides that "if any recovery is
obtained against such third person * * * the person liable
for compensation payments shall be reimbursed in full
for all payments made." It does not by its terms preclude
a negligent employer or its insurance carrier from
recovering the amount paid to the injured employee.
There is, however, respectable authority denying
reimbursement to such employer or carrier on the
principle that "[one should not] profit from its own
wrong." Witty. Jackson, 57 CaUd57, 17 CalRptr. 369,
366 P.2d 641, 650 (1961). See also Liberty Mutual
Insurance Co. v. Adams, 91 Idaho 151, 417 P.2d 417
(1966). Although admitting that the majority of
jurisdictions have held that a third party tortfeasor cannot
assert [**14] the concurrent negligence of the employer
as a defense, whether the employer, the employer's
carrier, or the employee has brought the action against

him, n3 Texaco argues [*243] that Witt and and Adams,
being California and Idaho decisions, would be highly
persuasive on the Utah courts, which have not faced the
problem.

n3 Baker v. Traders & General Ins. Co., 199
F.2d 289; Cyr v. F. S. Payne Co., 112 F. Supp.
526; Williams Bros. Lumber Co. v. Meisel, 85
GaApp. 72, 68 S.E.2d 384; Fidelity & Casualty
Co. v. Cedar Valley Electric Co., 187 Iowa 1014,
174N.W. 709; City ofShreveportv. Southwestern
Gas & Electric Co., 145 La. 680, 82 So. 785;
General Box Co. v. Missouri Utilities Co., 331
Mo. 845, 55 SW.2d 442; Utley v. Taylor &
Gaskin, 305Mich. 561, 9N.W.2d842; Graham v.
City of Lincoln, 106 Neb. 305, 183 N.W. 569;
Royal Indemnity Co. v. Southern California
Petroleum Corp., 67N.M. 137, 353P.2d358.
[**15]
Judge Ritter refused to consider or submit the issue
of Sayer's negligence to the jury, holding that it had no
bearing on the carrier's right to reimbursement. He
reasoned that "the legislature legislated in this area with
some particularity * * *. They mention that the carrier is
entitled to be reimbursed, and that is unqualified. If they
had meant to impute the negligence of the employer to
the insurance carrier, they very easily could have said so
* * *." Where the state supreme court has not ruled upon
the precise question before us, we will accept the Federal
trial judge's interpretation of his state law unless
convinced that he is clearly wrong. See Rooney v.
Mason, 394 F.2d 250 (10 CA May 13, 1968); Adams v.
Erickson, 394 F2d 171 (10 CA May 10, 1968); Smith v.
Greyhound Lines, Inc., 10 Cir., 382 F.2d 190. In this
case we certainly cannot so say.
Affirmed.
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LEXSEE 1997 TEX. APP. LEXIS 6685
SHANE ERWIN and ANGELA ERWIN, Appellants v. KERN RIVER GAS
TRANSMISSION COMPANY, KERN RIVER CORPORATION, and WILLIAMS
WESTERN PIPELINE COMPANY, Appellees
NO. 01-96-00204-CV
COURT OF APPEALS OF TEXAS, FIRST DISTRICT, HOUSTON
1997 Tex. App. LEXIS 6685
December 18,1997, Opinion Issued

NOTICE: [*1]
PURSUANT TO THE TEXAS
RULES
OF
APPELLATE
PROCEDURE,
UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS SHALL NOT BE CITED
AS AUTHORITY BY COUNSEL OR BY A COURT.
PRIOR HISTORY: On Appeal from the 165th District
Court. Harris County, Texas. Trial Court Cause No. 9223124.
DISPOSITION: Affirmed.
CASE SUMMARY:

PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Appellants, contractors
employee and his wife, sought review of a judgment
from the 165th District Court, Harris County (Texas)
entered on a directed verdict for appellee principal
employer in appellants' claims for negligence and loss of
consortium.
OVERVIEW: Appellee principal employer was
building a 900-mile pipeline. In Utah, appellant
employee of appellee's contractor was severely injured
when equipment failed and the contractor's foreman
negligently decided to back a crane down a hill.
Appellant sued appellee for negligence, and his wife
sued for loss of consortium. Applying Utah substantive
law and Texas procedural law, the trial court directed a
verdict for appellee. On appeal, the court affirmed.
Appellee was not liable because it did not actively
participate in its contractor's work, it did not have a
nondelegable duty or an assumed duty of care to
appellant employee, and appellant wife could not
maintain her spousal consortium claim under Utah law.

Appellee did not direct, control, or superintend its
contractor's work as contemplated by the Dayton line of
cases. The court held Utah would not recognize an
employer's liability to its independent contractor's
employee injured during the course of inherently
dangerous work.
OUTCOME: The judgment for appellee in appellants'
loss of consortium and negligence claims was affirmed.
Utah law did not recognize loss of consortium for the
spouse of a person injured by a third party, and appellee
did not actively participate in its contractor's work, have
a nondelegable duty of care, or an assumed duty of care
to appellant employee.
CORE TERMS: contractor, right-of-way, crane,
inherently dangerous, pin, pipeline, duty, sideboom,
accelerated, precautions, directed verdict, reserved,
independent contractor, superintend, unsafe, active
participation, work schedule, consortium, spread, boom,
actively participated, inspector, overrule, hill, general
rule, spousal, repair, dicta, vice president, rights-of-way
LexisNexis (TM) HEADNOTES - Core Concepts:

Civil Procedure > Trials > Judgment as Matter of Law
[HN1] A motion for directed verdict is proper when: (1)
a defect in the opponent's pleading makes it insufficient
to support a judgment, (2) the evidence conclusively
proves facts establishing the movant's right to judgment,
or negates the nonmovant's right to judgment, as a matter
of law, or (3) the evidence is legally insufficient to raise
a fact issue on a proposition necessary to entitle the
nonmovant to judgment.
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Civil Procedure > Trials > Judgment as Matter of Law
[HN2] In reviewing a directed verdict, the court must
determine whether there is any evidence of probative
force to raise fact issues on the material questions
presented. The court considers all the evidence in the
light most favorable to the party against whom the
verdict was instructed and disregard all contrary
evidence and inferences, giving the losing party the
benefit of all inferences raised by the evidence. If there is
any conflicting evidence of probative value on any
theory of recovery, the instructed verdict was improper,
and the court must reverse and remand for a jury
determination of that issue. The court must affirm a
directed verdict, even if the trial court's rationale for
granting it was erroneous, if it can be supported on
another basis.
Torts > Damages > Consortium Damages
[HN3] See Utah Code Ann. § 30-2-4 (1995).

its contractor until the project's completion has been held
to not justify a finding that the principal company
reserved the right to direct, control, or superintend the
contractor's work.
Torts > Negligence > Duty > Control of Third Parties
[HN7] Requiring a contractor to fire any of its workers
whom the principal employer, in its sole discretion,
deems to be unsafe, unqualified, or the like has been
held, when considered in the context of the entire
contract, not to be a reservation of the right to direct,
control, or superintend the independent contractor's
work.
Torts > Negligence > Duty > Control of Third Parties
[HN8] A clause requiring a contractor to remedy any
imperfect or insufficient work, when pointed out by the
principal employer's engineers, does not reserve the right
to direct, control, or superintend the contractor's work.

Torts > Negligence > Duty > Control of Third Parties
Labor & Employment Law > Employer Liability > Tort [HN9] A clause allowing the principal employer to
Liability > Independent ContractorsLabor &
terminate a contract at will if the contractor fails or
Employment Law > Employer Liability > Contract
refuses to do the amount of work agreed upon, does not
Liability > Third Party Liability
reserve the right to direct, control, or superintend the
contractor's work.
[HN4] As a general rule under Utah law, a principal
employer is not liable for injuries caused by its
contractor's negligence, unless the principal actively
Torts > Negligence > Duty > Control of Third Parties
participates in the work's performance. Utah law
[HN10] Utah law recognizes a principal will be liable for
recognizes three exceptions to this rule: (1) the injury is
injury caused to others by its contractor when the work it
the direct result of the stipulated work; (2) the work to be
hires the contractor to perform is inherently dangerous
performed is inherently dangerous, and the injury is the
and appropriate precautions are not taken. Whether the
consequence of the contractor's failure to take
principal is liable to its contractor's employees under this
appropriate precautions; or (3) the injury was caused by
inherently dangerous exception is another matter.
the non-performance of an absolute, nondelegable, duty
Jurisdictions split on whether a contractor's employees
the principal employer owed the injured party,
fall within the protected class under this doctrine.
individually or to the class of persons to which he
belongs.
Torts > Negligence > Duty > Duty GenerallyBusiness &
Corporate Entities > Agency > Agents Distinguished >
Torts > Negligence > Duty > Control of Third Parties Independent Contractors, Masters & Servants
[HN11] When a person employs a contractor to do work
[HN5] To determine whether a principal employer
lawful in itself and involving no injurious consequences
actively participates in work's performance, the court
to others, and damage arises to another through the
examines whether the principal employer reserved the
negligence of a contractor or his servants, the contractor,
right to direct, control, or superintend the work. The
and not the employer, is liable.
court also examines whether the principal employer in
fact directed or controlled the time and manner of doing
the work, or the means and methods by which the results
Evidence > Procedural Considerations > Rulings on
were to be accomplished. The injury must be caused by
Evidence
the act of performance, not merely the manner of
[HN12] The exclusion of evidence is committed to the
performance over which the principal employer
trial court's sound discretion. For the exclusion of
exercised neither direction, control, nor supervision.
evidence to constitute reversible error, an appellant must
show: (1) the trial court committed error and (2) the error
Torts > Negligence > Duty > Control of Third Parties was reasonably calculated to cause, and probably did
[HN6] A contractual clause giving a principal employer
cause, rendition of an improper judgment. This standard
the right to retain 10 percent of any amounts invoiced by
usually requires the complaining party to show that the
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judgment turns on the particular evidence excluded.
Accordingly, the exclusion of cumulative evidence is not
reversible error. The court reviews the entire record.
JUDGES: Michael H. Schneider, Chief Justice. Justices
Taft and Bass nlO also sitting.

nlO The Honorable Sam H. Bass, retired
Justice, Court of Appeals, First District of Texas
at Houston, sitting by assignment.
OPINIONBY: Michael H. Schneider
OPINION: OPINION
This lawsuit arises from an injury that occurred
during the construction of the Kern River Pipeline (the
pipeline). The trial court granted appellees's motion for
directed verdict after appellants (together, the Erwins)
rested. We affirm.
Standard of Review
[HN1] A motion for directed verdict is proper when
(1) a defect in the opponent's pleading makes it
insufficient to support a judgment, (2) the evidence
conclusively proves facts establishing the movant's right
to judgment, or negates the nonmovant's right to
judgment, as a matter of law, or (3) the evidence is
legally insufficient to raise a fact issue on a proposition
necessary to entitle the nonmovant to judgment. [*2]
Neller v. Kirschke, 922 S.W.2d 182, 187 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist] 1995, writ denied).
[HN2] We must determine whether there is any
evidence of probative force to raise fact issues on the
material questions presented. Szczepanik v. First S. Trust
Co., 883 S. W.2d 648, 649 (Tex. 1994); Jordan v. Jordan,
938 S.W.2d 177, 178 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist]
1997, no writ). We consider all the evidence in the light
most favorable to the party against whom the verdict was
instructed and disregard all contrary evidence and
inferences, giving the losing party the benefit of all
inferences raised by the evidence. Szczepanik, 883
S W.2d at 649; Jordan, 938 S. W.2d at 179. If there is any
conflicting evidence of probative value on any theory of
recovery, the instructed verdict was improper, and we
must reverse and remand for a jury determination of that
issue. Szczepanik, 883 S.W.2d at 649; Jordan, 938
S. W.2d at 179. We must affirm a directed verdict, even if
the trial court's rationale for granting it was erroneous, if
it can be supported on another basis. Kelly v. Diocese of
Corpus Christi, 832 S.W.2d 88, 90 (Tex. App.-Corpus
Christi 1992, writ dism'd [*3] w.o.j.).
Background

The construction project to build the pipeline (the
project) was a joint venture of the Williams Companies
and Tenneco, and was carried out under the auspices of
Kern River Gas Transmission Company. Kern River Gas
Transmission Company is a general partnership, in
which Kern River Corporation and Williams Western
Pipeline Company are partners, nl
The pipeline was to extend 900 miles, from Wyoming to
California.
nl We refer to appellees Kern River
Transmission Company, Kern River Corporation,
and Williams Western Pipeline Company
collectively as "Kern River."
Kern River contracted with Associated Pipeline
Contractors, Inc. (APC) to assist in part of the pipeline's
construction. Shane Erwin was APC's employee; Angela
Erwin is his wife. The entire project was divided into
eight sections, called "spreads." APC worked on spread
two, which contained Utah's Wasatch mountains (the
Wasatch area). Shane Erwin was injured in these
mountains.
Kern River wanted to have gas flowing through [*4]
the entire pipeline in a year, originally setting the
completion date for the Wasatch area at early October
1991. Kern River wanted to finish before winter set in,
which would preclude further work in the Wasatch area
until late spring of 1992. However, the Wasatch area
work was delayed for various reasons. Therefore, the
work schedule was accelerated to meet the completion
deadline.
On the day of the accident, Pete Logan, APC's
bending crew foreman, was pulling a truck, loaded with
pipe, up a steep grade in the Wasatch area with a
sideboom crane. A sideboom crane is not normally used
for this. As Logan was driving the sideboom crane down
the hill, one of its pivot pins fell out. This caused the
crane's boom to cock sideways. Logan and Shane Erwin
noticed the fallen pin.
This was a dangerous situation, because the crane's
boom could break and fall. Therefore, Logan stopped the
crane, at which point he and the workers around him
(including Shane Erwin) were temporarily safe. There
was not enough room to fix the crane's pin, so Logan
began backing the crane down the hill. Logan was
responsible for clearing the area before doing this. Shane
Erwin positioned himself in what he thought [*5] was a
safe place, on the opposite side of the boom. However,
the boom broke free, swung around the other side of the
crane, and pinned Shane Erwin's right leg to the ground.
His leg had to be amputated below the knee. No one
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pleaded nor asserted the workers's compensation
bar. See UTAH CODE ANN. § § 35-1-42, 35-160 (1994). The trial court's final judgment recited
the Erwins had proffered either no or insufficient
evidence.

from Kern River was present when the accident
occurred.
Shane Erwin sued Kern River for negligence in
causing his injuries. Angela Erwin sued Kern River for
loss of consortium and her husband's services.
Directed Verdict

[*7]

In point of error one, the Erwins claim the trial court
erred in granting Kern River's motion for directed verdict
because, under Utah law, they had proved a prima facie
case of liability against Kern River under three theories.
n2
These theories were that Kern River (1) negligently
exercised control over the project, (2) breached a
nondelegable duty of care to Shane Erwin, and (3)
assumed a duty of care to him.
n2 The accident occurred in Utah. Neither
party contested, on appeal or below, the
application of Utah substantive law. Texas law
governs procedural and evidentiary matters,
however. See Penny v. Powell, 162 Tex. 497, 347
S.W.2d 601, 602 (Tex. 1961); Paine v. Moore,
464 S.W.2d 477, 479 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler
1971, no writ).

We conclude a directed verdict was properly granted
on Angela Erwin's claims. Utah law does not allow the
spouse of a person injured by a third party to recover for
loss of consortium. n4
[HN3]
See UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-2-4 (1995); Cruz v.
Wright, 765 P.2d 869, 869, 871 (Utah 1988); Hackford
v. Utah Power & Light Co., 740 P.2d 1281, 1287-88;
Ellis v. Hathaway, 27 Utah 2d 143, 493 P.2d 985, 986
(Utah 1972); Wollam v. Kennecott Corp., 648 F. Supp.
160, 163 (D. Utah 1986) (applying Utah law). While the
Utah Legislature this year passed a statute allowing
spousal consortium claims, the statute applies only to
spouses of persons injured by a third party after May 4,
1997 . See UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-2-11 (Supp. 1997).
We hold, therefore, that the trial court properly directed a
verdict against Angela Erwin's spousal consortium and
service claims.
n4 It appears Utah would consider a claim
for loss of spousal services to be part of a spousal
consortium claim. See Hackford v. Utah Power &
Light Co., 740 P.2d 1281, 1290 (Utah 1987)
(Durham, J., dissenting, noting the definition of
"consortium"
includes company,
society,
cooperation, affection, and aid) (citing Black's
Law Dictionary 280 (5th ed. 1979)); Ellis v.
Hathaway, 27 Utah 2d 143, 493 P.2d 985, 985,
986 (Utah 1972) (treating wife's claims for loss
of support, companionship, love, and affection as
prohibited loss-of-consortium claims).

[*6]
A. Angela Erwinfs Consortium Claims
In a footnote to its brief, Kern River argues Angela
Erwin is not a proper party to this appeal, because Utah
does not recognize her loss-of-consortium claims. In an
oral motion for directed verdict, Kern River argued
Angela Erwin could not maintain a consortium claim
under Utah law. n3
Because the trial court's final judgment directed a verdict
against Angela Erwin, she may appeal it.
n3 In the oral motion, Kern River argued: (1)
Angela Erwin could not maintain a consortium
claim; (2) there was no evidence of Kern River's
negligence, or that Kern River controlled or
participated in the construction; (3) there was no
proximate cause between Kern River's actions
and Shane Erwin's injuries; (4) APC's employee's
negligence was an unforeseeable, superseding
cause of the injury; (5) no evidence supported a
gross negligence instruction; (6) and the
"inherently dangerous" exception, which the
Erwins argued would create a duty on Kern
River's part, did not apply. Kern River neither

[*8]
B. Kern River's Liability
[HN4] As a general rule under Utah law, a principal
employer is not liable for injuries caused by its
contractor's negligence, unless the principal actively
participates in the work's performance. See Dayton v.
Free, 46 Utah 277, 148 P. 408, 411, 412 (Utah 1914);
Sewell v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 606 F2d 274, 275-76
(10th Cir. 1979) (applying Utah law); Texaco, Inc. v.
Pruitt, 396 F2d 237, 240 (10th Cir. 1968) (applying
Utah law); Simon v. Deery Oil, 699 F. Supp. 257, 258
(D. Utah 1988) (applying Utah law). Utah law
recognizes three exceptions to this rule: (1) the injury is
the direct result of the stipulated work; (2) the work to be
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performed is inherently dangerous, and the injury is the
consequence of the contractor's failure to take
appropriate precautions; or (3) the injury was caused by
the non-performance of an absolute (nondelegable) duty
the principal employer owed the injured party,
individually or to the class of persons to which he
belongs. Gleason v. Salt Lake City, 94 Utah 1, 74 P.2d
1225, 1232 (Utah 1937); Dayton, 148 P. at 411.
1. Active Participation in Contractor's Work
The Erwins first [*9] argue Kern River actively
participated in the project.
[HN5] To make this
determination, we examine whether Kern River reserved
the right to direct, control, or superintend APC's work.
Dayton, 148 P. at 411; accord, see Callahan v. Salt Lake
City, 41 Utah 300, 125 P. 863, 865 (Utah 1912); cf.
Rustler Lodge v. Industrial Comm'n, 562 P.2d 227, 228
(Utah 1977) (under workers's compensation statute);
Dowsett v. Dowsett, 116 Utah 12, 207 P.2d 809, 811
(Utah 1949) (distinguishing independent contractor from
servant). We also examine whether Kern River in fact
directed or controlled the time and manner of doing
APC's work, or the means and methods by which the
results were to be accomplished. Dayton, 148 P. at 411;
see Gleason, 74 P. 2d at 1234; cf. Kippen v. Jewkes, 258
F.2d 869, 873 (10th Cir. 1958) (applying Utah law and
quoting Dowsett). The injury must be caused by the act
of performance, not merely the manner of performance
over which Kern River exercised neither direction,
control, nor supervision. See Dayton, 148 P. at 412;
accord Simon, 699 F. Supp. at 259.
The Contract's Terms
The Erwins initially argue the contract reserved
[*10] to Kern River the right to participate actively in
the project. We disagree.
First, the Erwins point to [HN6] the contractual
clause giving Kern River the right to retain ten percent of
any amounts invoiced by APC until the project's
completion. The Erwins argue this clause provided Kern
River economic leverage over APC. In Dayton, however,
the Utah Supreme Court held an almost identical
provision did not justify a finding that the principal
company reserved the right to direct, control, or
superintend the contractor's work. Dayton, 148 P. at
410, 411.
Second, the Erwins point to paragraph 11.4, which
[HN7] requires APC to fire any of its workers whom
Kern River, in its sole discretion, deems to be unsafe,
unqualified, or the like. The Dayton court found a similar
clause, when considered in the context of the entire
contract, not to be a reservation of the right to direct,
control, or superintend the independent contractor's

work. Dayton, 148 P. at 410, 411. Similarly, the
Callahan court found an almost identical clause not to
reserve such rights. Callahan, 125 P. at 863, 865.
Third, the Erwins focus on paragraph 19.5, which
allows Kern River's inspectors to stop [*11] APC's work
if, among other things, it is not being performed strictly
according to the contract's terms; APC's work is risking,
threatening, or damaging any property; or the work is not
being done safely. Such a provision has been found
insufficient to make the principal liable. See United
States v. Page, 350 F.2d 28, 30, 31 (10th Cir. 1965)
(under Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA)); Thompson v.
Timpanogos Metals, 762 F. Supp. 927, 929 (D. Utah
1991) (FTCA). The Dayton court found [HN8] a clause
requiring the contractor to remedy any imperfect or
insufficient work, when pointed out by the principal
employer's engineers, did not reserve the right to direct,
control, or superintend the contractor's work. Dayton,
148 P. at 411; see Eutsler v. United States, 376 F.2d
634, 635 (10th Cir. 1967) (holding right to prescribe and
impose safety regulations created no liability under
FTCA); Page, 350 F.2d at 31 (same); Thompson, 762 F.
Supp. at 929 (holding no liability even though principal
had right to inspect, and inspectors visited site weekly
and directed contractor to comply with safety
requirements); cf. Intermountain Speedways, Inc. v.
Industrial Comm'n, [*12] 101 Utah 573, 126 P.2d 22,
24 (Utah 1942); Angel v. Industrial Comm'n, 64 Utah
105, 228 P. 509, 512 (Utah 1924) (finding no "control"
under workers's compensation law when supervision was
to ensure work was being performed in workmanlike
manner). If, as in Dayton, no such right is reserved when
the contract allows the principal to dictate repairs, then
no such right is reserved when the principal, as here, has
the authority to stop work upon detection of safety or
other problems.
Finally, the Erwins argue [HN9] a clause allowing
Kern River to terminate the contract at will granted Kern
River ultimate control over the project. The Dayton court
rejected the argument that a clause allowing the principal
employer to terminate the contract, if the contractor
failed or refused to do the amount of work agreed upon,
reserved the right to direct, control, or superintend the
contractor's work. Dayton, 148 P. at 410, 411; cf.
Parkinson v. Industrial Comm'n, 110 Utah 309, 172 P.2d
136, 140 (Utah 1946) (finding unilateral right to
discharge not controlling factor under workers's
compensation law); Gogoff v. Industrial Comm'n, 77
Utah 355, 296 P. 229, 231 (Utah 1931) (finding [*13]
independent contractor relationship under workers's
compensation law when either party could terminate with
three-days's notice). In light of Dayton, we hold this
termination clause does not reserve to Kern River those
active participation rights.
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We also note that paragraph 24.1 of the contract
specifically stated APC was an independent contractor,
and that it alone was to select the means, manner of
performance, and methods for its work. See Gogoff, 296
P. at 230. The contract also left to APC the job of
procuring and servicing materials, equipment, and labor.
See Callahan, 125 P. at 863. Considering the contract as
a whole, we find the contract did not reserve to Kern
River the right to direct, control, or superintend APC's
work.
Actual Control
Alternatively, the Erwins argue Kern River actually
participated in the project, regardless of the contract's
terms. The Erwins's theory is three-fold: (1) Kern River
exercised economic pressure over APC, causing APC to
rush work and compromise safety; (2) Kern River's
acceleration of the work schedule set the stage for APC's
unsafe work practices, which led to the accident; and (3)
Kern River directly exercised [*14] control by directing
the construction of the Wasatch area right-of-way, the
negligent design of which the Erwins say was a cause of
the accident. We set out the applicable evidence, viewed
in the light most favorable to the Erwins, below.
The contract required Kern River to provide APC
with a right-of-way and access to it. For various reasons,
Kern River could not provide all the right-of-way and
access in spread two Kern River had originally promised.
Kern River and APC discussed these rights-of-way and
access problems. At some point, Kern River asked APC
to identify areas in spread two where additional rightsof-way were needed. APC did not always ask for
additional space, and it apparently did not ask for
additional space at what was later the accident site.
The Erwins rely on the testimony of Earl Harrison,
APC's foreman over the project's right-of-way. Harrison
and Shane Erwin testified the right-of-way bordering the
accident site was too narrow and insufficiently leveled.
Harrison testified Kern River's inspector and
construction supervisors would not let him build the
right-of-way in the manner he wanted, and that he had to
build it on Kern River's accelerated time schedule. [*15]
n5
He said Kern River's construction superintendent told
him the right-of-way should be built just to look like a
right-of-way from a forest ranger's helicopter. Harrison
also stated the same individual agreed the working
conditions were dangerous, that a right-of-way was not
being built, and that someone would probably get killed
on the job. Other than with respect to this right-of-way,
there is no evidence Kern River ever directed the
specifics of APC's day-to-day activities on the project.

n5 For example, Harrison testified Kern
River's superintendent told him he had to build a
12-mile right-of-way in under two weeks, or
about 1,000 feet a day with each bulldozer, or
Kern River would shut the job down. Harrison
told Kern River's superintendent it was
impossible to cut the right-of-way in that time.
Because the right-of-way was too steep and its dirt
was too loose, even a 4-wheel drive truck could not drive
on it. Trucks could not, therefore, climb the hill to reach
equipment needing service. The record [*16] discloses
that, on construction jobs like this, equipment
breakdowns are foreseeable, and it is important to have
trucks available to reach the equipment for repairs.
When a sideboom crane's pin comes out, the proper
procedure is to lay the boom down, bring up another
crane, and repair the pin. n6
However, this procedure could not be followed, because
two cranes could not drive at the same time on the rightof-way. The Erwins's safety expert said having sufficient
work space in the Wasatch area was critical to safety,
and the right-of-way was not wide enough for safety
purposes. Therefore, the expert concluded Kern River's
involvement in the right-of-way's construction affected
the work's safety. APC's former vice president admitted
the right-of-way's terrain bore on safety.
n6 If a sideboom crane's pivot pin is not
lubricated, it seizes up, putting the pin in a
position where it can break and fall out. It was
not uncommon for these pins to fall out,
especially in terrain like that in the Wasatch area.
It was undisputed that APC, not Kern River, was
responsible for greasing these pins and
maintaining the sideboom crane and its
equipment. Prior to the accident, APC did not
know these pins required lubrication.
[*17]
Kern River either requested or ordered APC to
accelerate the Wasatch work schedule, and APC agreed.
To meet the accelerated schedule, APC concentrated its
workers and equipment in the Wasatch mountain area.
Kern River knew of and condoned APC's mobilization
efforts. APC decided to concentrate its resources at the
location, at least in part, because it wanted to work for
Kern River again. Kern River also paid APC about $ 32
million extra for this change in schedule and work. APC
faced possibly great financial loss if it did not complete
the project in the time required. For example, Kern River
could have fired APC, which could have put APC out of
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business. APC also wanted to get along with Kern River
to get repeat business.
The Erwins's safety expert testified this mobilization
to the Wasatch area was in total disregard for safety. The
expert also testified time pressures such as those
experienced on spread two affect safety. The expert
further stated the accelerated schedule deprived the
Wasatch area crews of proper equipment. For example,
dozers would have been available to do what Logan had
been trying to do (incorrectly) with a sideboom crane had
the work schedule not been accelerated. [*18] The
expert thus concluded Kern River caused the accident,
although he agreed Logan's negligence was also a cause.
Kern River had various supervisors and inspectors
who periodically visited the project. It appears the
inspectors^ visits were to assure safety and workmanlike
performance, as provided in the parties's contract. APC
also had its own safety representative for the project.
Any work problems were to be reported to APC's on-site
foreman. APC's former vice president said APC did not
expect Kern River to check daily on APC's equipment or
to run its safety program; rather, it was APC's
responsibility under the contract. APC had experience in
building pipelines in the mountains. Its employees were
experienced and trained in laying pipe. APC's former
vice president said APC brought expertise to the project,
expertise Kern River did not have.
The Erwins argue these facts show Kern River
exercised economic pressure over APC, causing APC to
rush work and compromise safety. Closely related is
their argument that Kern River's acceleration of the work
schedule set the stage for APC's unsafe work practices,
which led to the accident. We examine these two theories
of active participation [*19] together.
An independent contractor undoubtedly always has
incentive to do that which its principal employer wants
done, within the time it wants that done. Such economic
pressure, which appears to exist here, is not tantamount
to Kern River's directing or controlling the day-to-day
manner of doing APC's work, or the means and methods
by which the results were to be accomplished. See and
compare Dayton, 148 P. at 411-12. Control of the
overall schedule should not suffice. This is especially
true where it is uncontested APC agreed to the
accelerated schedule and the mobilization to the Wasatch
area, and Kern River paid APC for this change. APC
could have told Kern River it could or would not carry
out its work under an accelerated schedule, but APC
chose not to. While there was expert testimony the
accelerated work schedule was unsafe, that it caused a
shortage of equipment, and that this shortage may have
led to Logan's using inappropriate equipment on the day
of the accident, the record does not show Kern River

actively participated in anything other than the ultimate
schedule. Indeed, under the contract and in practice, APC
was responsible for providing workers and equipment
[*20] regardless of the schedule.
The Erwins do not cite a case in which mere
economic incentive or coercion, or the acceleration of a
schedule, sufficed to show a principal's active
participation. Neither have we found a Utah case so
holding. In the absence of such a case, we find the
general rule on active participation of Dayton and its
progeny controlling. We hold any economic pressure
Kern River may have exercised over APC, and its mere
acceleration of the project's schedule, did not constitute
the sort of active participation contemplated by the
Dayton line of cases.
The Erwins also argue Kern River actively
participated in the project by directing the construction
of the Wasatch area right-of-way, the negligent design of
which they say caused the accident. Kern River relies on
the fact that, although Kern River was to provide the
rights-of-way, APC agreed to have some restriction in
the Wasatch area and did not request a broader one at the
accident site. We find this persuasive. We also find
persuasive that APC agreed to and was paid more for
working under the accelerated schedule. Although APC
advised Kern River of its mobilization in the Wasatch
area, it was APC's responsibility [*21] to provide
sufficient equipment and labor. The record further
discloses Kern River's only involvement in APC's dayto-day activities (other then Kern River's safety and
performance inspections) was its one-time involvement
with the right-of-way.
Additionally, even if Kern River actively
participated one time in the right-of-way's specifics, the
injury did not directly result from this participation. See
Gleason, 74 P.2d at 1232; Dayton, 148 P. at 411. The
boom swung free after the pin holding it broke. It was
undisputedly APC's responsibility to repair and maintain
these pins and its other equipment. Under the contract
and in practice, APC, not Kern River, furnished and
supplied all tools, labor, and equipment for the work.
Neither does anyone dispute that Logan should not have
used a sideboom crane to do what he was doing when the
crane's pin broke. No one from Kern River was present
or directed the manner or means of APC's work at the
time of the accident. There is no indication Kern River's
inspectors knew APC was using sideboom cranes for this
purpose. No one from Kern River advised Logan to use a
sideboom crane, to back it down the hill after the pin fell
out, or to [*22] do so without first ensuring everyone
was clear. APC, not Kern River, made these daily
decisions. The equipment's failure, and the negligent
decision to use the crane and to back it down the hill
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without clearing all workers, directly caused Shane
Erwin's accident.
Accordingly, we overrule point of error one on this
ground.
2. Nondelegable Duty: Inherently Dangerous Activity
Also in point of error one, the Erwins argue Kern
River is liable because the project was inherently
dangerous. See Dayton, 148 P. at 412. n7
We need not decide whether the project was inherently
dangerous, because we find Shane Erwin was not within
the class protected by the doctrine under Utah law.
n7 In addition to the facts set out above, the
Erwins point to the undisputed testimony that the
Wasatch area was the steepest, most dangerous,
and roughest part of spread two. Kern River knew
of the Wasatch mountains's steep and treacherous
nature.
[HN10] Utah law recognizes a principal will be
liable for injury caused to others [*23] by its contractor
when the work it hires the contractor to perform is
inherently dangerous and appropriate precautions are not
taken. Sullivan v. Utah Gas Serv. Co., 10 Utah 2d 359,
353 P.2d 465, 467 (Utah 1960) (in dicta, citing
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 427 (1965));
Gleason, 74 P.2d at 1232; Dayton, 148 P. at 411.
Whether the principal is liable to its contractor's
employees under this "inherently dangerous" exception is
another matter. Jurisdictions split on whether a
contractor's employees fall within the protected class
under this doctrine. See Francis M. Dougherty,
Annotation, Liability of Employer with Regard to
Inherently Dangerous Work for Injuries to Employees of
Independent Contractors, 34 A.L.R. 4th 914 (1984). The
Erwins claim Utah law applies the inherently dangerous
exception to a contractor's employees; Kern River claims
it does not.
Each party cites the Dayton decision and correctly
notes it is the only Utah decision discussing the issue. In
Dayton, the Utah Supreme Court addressed whether the
principal employer was liable for its contractor's
employee's injuries occurring during the blasting of an
underground tunnel. [*24] Id. at 411-12. The court first
cited various treatises and secondary sources for the
general rule that liability attaches only where inherently
dangerous work caused injury to "another" or "third
persons." Id. at 412; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 427 (1965). In dicta, the Dayton court
elaborated as follows:

But it is said developing an underground tunnel by
blasting is dangerous. Dangerous to whom? Here, only to
those engaged in and about the work. So is feeding a
threshing machine or working at sawmilling dangerous.
An inexperienced employe, unguarded against attendant
dangers and attempting such work, may possibly be
injured. Who, if anyone, owes him duties of warning and
protection? He who employed or directed or controlled
him, or directed or controlled the threshing or sawing.
Certainly not the farmer, who did no more than merely
contract with the thresher to thresh his grain, or with the
sawmiller to saw his timber.. .
Here, the stipulated work itself, constructing and
developing the tunnel, did not involve injurious or
mischievous consequences to others. And the injury to
plaintiff was not caused from the act of performance, but
from [*25] the manner of performance over which, as
has been seen, the company neither reserved nor
exercised direction, control, or supervision. We think,
therefore, that the case comes within the general rule that
[HN11] when a person employs a contractor to do work
lawful in itself and involving no injurious consequences
to others, and damage arises to another through the
negligence of a contractor or his servants, the contractor,
and not the employer, is liable.
Id. at 412. The Dayton court held that the principal had
no liability because (1) the work was not inherently
dangerous and (2) the manner of doing the work, over
which the principal had no control, caused the accident,
not the work's intrinsic nature. Id. at 412. However, we
find the Dayton decision strongly indicates, by using the
above-quoted language and by consistently speaking of
danger "to others," the inherently dangerous exception
would not extend to the contractor's employees. Id. at
412.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has, in dicta,
interpreted Dayton similarly. See Page, 350 F.2d at 3334. In Page, the district court had found the United
States liable for injuries to a contractor's [*26] employee
under the FTCA. Id. at 30. The district court had based
its decision in part on its conclusion the work was
inherently dangerous. Id. While noting Utah law did not
apply, the district court had nonetheless stated it believed
the government would be liable under Utah law, as
expressed in Restatement of Torts (Second) section 427.
n8
In reversing on other grounds, the Page court noted that
Dayton, like the law in other jurisdictions, casted serious
doubt on whether the doctrine applied to the contractor's
employees. Id. at 33-34. The dicta in Page supports our
interpretation of Dayton. See also Sewell, 606 F.2d at
279 (Doyle, J., dissenting) (quoting language from
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unpublished opinion on first appeal that inherently
dangerous exception likely does not apply to contractor's
employees); Eutsler, 376 F.2d at 636 (finding, under
federal law, no duty to contractor's employees for
inherently dangerous work).
n8 Section 427 provides, "One who employs
an independent contractor to do work involving
special danger to others which the employer
knows or has reason to know to be inherent in or
normal to the work, or which he contemplates or
has reason to contemplate when making the
contract, is subject to liability for physical harm
to such others by the contractor's failure to take
reasonable precautions against such danger."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 427
(1965) (emphasis added).
[*27]
The Erwins rely on Simon, which in turn relied on
Dayton, to conclude that an independent contractor's
employee falls under the inherently dangerous doctrine.
Simon, 699 F. Supp. at 259. The Simon court did not
discuss the above-quoted language from Dayton, which
we find actually undermines Simon's conclusion. Id
Additionally, the Simon decision inadvertently
misquoted Dayton by stating, "This is not to say that a
principal can never be liable for injuries sustained by an
employee of an independent contractor. The three
recognized exceptions to this rule in Utah are . . . ." Id.
(emphasis added). The Dayton court, however, had
defined "this rule" as applying to "third persons" or
"others." Dayton, 148 P. at 411, 412. The only other
cases cited by Simon with respect to the inherently
dangerous rule involved injury to a third person ( Wilson
v. Good Humor Corp., 244 U.S. App. DC. 298, 757 F.2d
1293, 1303 (D.C Cir. 1985)), or held the inherently
dangerous exception inapplicable to a contractor's
employees ( Vagle v. Pickands Mather & Co., 611 F.2d
1212, 1217-19 (8th Cir. 1979)).
The Dayton decision indicates [*28] a contractor's
employee does not fall under the protected class of
Utah's inherently dangerous doctrine. While the Simon
decision is to the contrary, we may not follow it when
the Utah Supreme Court has indicated otherwise.
Accordingly, we hold Utah would not recognize an
employer's liability to its independent contractor's
employee injured during the course of inherently
dangerous work. Therefore, Kern River cannot be liable
to Shane Erwin under this theory, and we overrule point
of error one on this ground.
3. Assumed Duty of Care

Also under point of error one, the Erwins claim Kern
River assumed a duty of care to Shane Erwin, which duty
Kern River breached. They argue that Kern River
expressly adopted a duty to APC's employees in an
operation plan, entitled the Construction, Operation, and
Maintenance Plan (COM Plan), Kern River devised for
the project. The trial court excluded the COM Plan and
testimony explaining it. If this document and testimony
were properly excluded, the record contains no evidence
to support Kern River's liability under this theory, and
we must affirm point of error one. If this evidence was
improperly excluded, precluding the record from [*29]
containing evidence to support the Erwins's liability
theory, a directed verdict would have been improper.
Therefore, we first examine whether the COM Plan and
the related testimony were properly excluded.
Exclusion of Evidence
In points of error two and three, the Erwins claim
the trial court erred in excluding certain testimony and
the COM Plan.
[HN12] The exclusion of evidence is committed to
the trial court's sound discretion. City of Brownsville v.
Alvarado, 897 S.W.2d 750, 753 (Tex. 1995); Felker v.
Petrolon, Inc., 929S.W.2d460, 467(Tex. App.-Houston
[1st Dist] 1996, writ denied). For the exclusion of
evidence to constitute reversible error, an appellant must
show (1) the trial court committed error and (2) the error
was reasonably calculated to cause, and probably did
cause, rendition of an improper judgment. McCraw v.
Maris, 828 S.W.2d 756, 757 (Tex. 1992). This standard
usually requires the complaining party to show that the
judgment turns on the particular evidence excluded.
Alvarado, 897 S. W.2d at 753-54; Stuart v. Bayless, 945
S.W.2d 131, 143 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist] 1996,
no writ) (op. on rehearing). Accordingly, the exclusion
[*30] of cumulative evidence is not reversible error.
Reina v. General Accident Fire & Life Assurance Co.,
611 S.W.2d415, 417 (Tex. 1981); British Am. Ins. Co. v.
Howerton, 877 S.W.2d 347, 350 (Tex. App.-Houston
[1st Dist] 1994, writ dism'd by agr.). We review the
entire record. Alvarado, 897 S. W.2d at 754.
COM Plan and Related Testimony
The resolution of the remainder of the Erwins's first
point of error depends on whether the COM Plan and
related testimony were correctly excluded. In point of
error two, the Erwins argue the trial court improperly
excluded the COM Plan and testimony relating to it.
Kern River had to adopt the COM Plan before
federal governmental agencies would grant Kern River
rights-of-way on federal land. See 43 U.S.C. § 1764(d)
(1995); 36 CF.R. § 25154(e)(4) (1997); 43 C.F.R. §
2882.3(m) (1996). Kern River perceived the COM Plan
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n9 "One who undertakes, gratuitously or for
consideration, to render services to another which
he should recognize as necessary for the
protection of the other person or things, is subject
to liability to the other for physical harm resulting
from his failure to exercise reasonable care to
perform his undertaking, if (a) his failure to
exercise such care increases the risk of such harm
" RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
323 (1965). Utah has adopted Restatement of
Torts (Second) section 323. See Weber v.
Springville, 725 P.2d 1360, 1364 n. 7, n. 8 (Utah
1986); DCR Inc. v. Peak Alarm Co., 663 P.2d
433, 436 (Utah 1983).

as a commitment or agreement with the governmental
agencies granting Kern River permits. By its own terms,
the COM Plan was drafted for the federal government
principally to address environmental concerns.
The Erwins rely on the following COM Plan section
to support their argument:
8.0 Safety [*31] Policies and Program
8.1 Purpose
The purpose of these policies and program is to provide
minimum requirements that shall be followed by Kern
River during construction operations. It is intended to
provide for the safety and welfare of contractor
employees, Kern River's personnel, and the general
public.
8.2 Plan
8.2.1 Kern River shall be solely responsible for initiating,
implementing, maintaining, and supervising all safety
precautions and programs in connection with
construction. This shall include employee safety training
and prompt elimination of all unsafe physical and/or
mechanical conditions. The contractors shall take any
precautions necessary to ensure the safety of all proposed
personnel and property.
The Erwins argue that Kern River assumed a duty to
them under Restatement of Torts (Second) section 323 by
adopting section eight of the COM Plan. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 323 (1965).
n9
As is clear from the text and its own commentary, this
section applies only to one undertaking a service to
another. The Erwins claim Kern River assumed the
following "services" to APC's employees, including
Shane Erwin: [*32] (1) "to provide for the safety and
welfare of contractor employees" (P 8.1) and (2) "[to] be
solely responsible for initiating, implementing,
maintaining, and supervising all safety precautions and
programs in connection with construction" (P 8.2.1).
However, the Erwins overlook paragraph 8.2. l's
explanation for which "safety precautions and programs"
Kern River took responsibility: "This shall include
employee safety training and prompt elimination of all
unsafe physical and/or mechanical conditions." The
COM Plan then clearly provides that contractors, not
Kern River, will be responsible for taking precautions to
ensure the safety of all personnel, such as Shane Erwin.
This was also APC's duty under article 17 of the parties's
contract.

[*33]
Therefore, even if the COM Plan could somehow
create a duty from Kern River to APC's employees,
which we need not decide, no such duty was created
here. The COM Plan was, therefore, irrelevant.
Accordingly, the trial court did not err in excluding the
evidence relating to the COM Plan. We overrule point of
error two.
Because the COM Plan and related testimony were
properly excluded, the record contains no evidence to
support the Erwins's assumed duty argument.
Accordingly, we overrule the final ground under point of
error one.
Testimony of Pipeline's Cost
In point of error three, the Erwins contend the trial
court erred in excluding the deposition testimony of
Cuba Wadlington, Kern River's vice president,
concerning the pipeline's cost, because they claim the
testimony was relevant to show Kern River's motive to
exercise improper control over the construction methods
causing the accident. The excluded testimony was as
follows:
Q: All right, sir. At the time that your company formed a
partnership with Tenneco, which became Kern River Gas
Transmission Company, what was generally the
projected cost of the project to completion so that the gas
could flow through [*34] the pipe, the entire project?
A: It seems to me that the cost of the pipeline was always
somewhere in the neighborhood of 800 plus million
dollars, was what we were looking at.
Q: All right, sir. Did you have . . . projections as to when
that cost could be recovered, how long that might take?
A: Well, it was just - it was really a function ~ a
function of the type of contracts that we entered into.
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And at the time we were doing the feasibility study, we
were looking at 20-year contracts with the intent of
having out all of our capital recovered by the 20th year.
Q: Without needing to know the actual figures, did the
project end up, ballpark, of what you expected, around
800 million, something like that?
A: Yes. The ultimate cost turned out to be 900 - I think
about $ 980 million. But that was a very acceptable
overrun for that size of a project.
The Erwins argued below this testimony was
relevant because it showed Kern River's motivation for
rushing the project: the sooner the project was done, the
sooner Kern River could start moving gas through the
pipeline. The Erwins argued that, based on the total
project cost, one could deduce the monthly profits [*35]
necessary to recover costs and the amount Kern River
would lose if the project were delayed by a few months.
We have already held that Kern River's economic
motivation for accelerating the project had no bearing on
whether Kern River actively participated in the day-today details of APC's work. Therefore, the testimony was
irrelevant. Additionally, while this testimony shows the
overall project's cost, it does not, as the Erwins claim,
state that specific, monthly profits from the pipeline's use
are necessary to meet Kern River's economic needs.
Further, Wadlington was not qualified as an economic

expert, and the excluded testimony did not consider
economic factors other than customers's use of the
pipeline that might allow Kern River to pay the pipeline's
costs. Finally, the jury later heard testimony that whether
the job was completed on schedule had an enormous
impact on Kern River's economics. Therefore, the
excluded testimony was cumulative of evidence already
before the jury. See Reina, 611 S. W.2d at 417. We hold
the trial court did not abuse its discretion, under these
circumstances, in excluding this testimony. See
Alvarado, 897 S W.2d at 753.
We overrule point [*36] of error three.
Conclusion
We affirm the trial court's judgment.
/s/Michael H. Schneider
Chief Justice
Justices Taft and Bass nlO also sitting.
nlO The Honorable Sam H. Bass, retired
Justice, Court of Appeals, First District of Texas
at Houston, sitting by assignment.

Opinion issued and judgment rendered
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28

1
2

Q

Thank you.

And that's for what part of the

Highland project?

3

A

The rough framing.

4

Q

And how much is that proposal?

5

A

$156,000.

6

Q

Does it include anything other than the rough

7

framing?

8
9

A

It talks about them installing framing

anchors, nails, framing hardware, things like that.

10

Q

All connected with framing; is that correct?

11

A

Yes.

12

Q

Does it have any provision there about timing?

13

A

This is not a very good copy of that.

14

Q • I understand, but it's the one that was given

15

to us.

16

A

17

timing.

18

I don't think it does say anything about

MR. MORIARITY:

If counsel has a better copy,

19

and you have an opportunity, we'd appreciate it, but

20

it's — .

21
22
23

MR. DAVENPORT:
I've got.

Off the record.

That's what

I don't have a better one either.
MR. MORIARITY:

I figured as much.

It
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24

appeared that it must have been folded or something and

25

come that way.

Thank you very much.

29

1

Q

(BY MR. MORIARITY)

You heard Maurice Egbert

2

testify regarding representations of a seven-week

3

completion time and number of framers on the job when

4

you were here this morning or earlier today, did you

5

not?

6

A

Yes.

7

Q

Do you know where that came from?

8

A

The seven-week process?

9

Q

Yes.

10

A

I believe we would have established a schedule

11
12
13

for the project.
Q

It would have come from that schedule.

Established by whom, the seven-week

scheduling?

14

A

Probably Joel.

15

Q

Okay.

16
17
18
19

And the number of framers on the job,

who would that have come from?
A

Are you talking about the letter, one of those

letters that was —
Q

Yes.

said that he promised 12 or --

Let me show you that letter, if it will
Ifm not talking about that

20

help refresh your memory.

21

letter specifically, sir, but herefs what —
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Q So did you actually know how to frame?
A No. I'd never framed a building before.
Q Okay. So your experience in carpentry
consisted of?
A I knew how to use the saw. I knew how to use
the hammer. I didn't know how to frame, though.
Q And you were hired?
A Yeah.
Q How much money did you make?
A I want to say eight. I believe eight bucks an
hour.
Q If you remember.
A I think it was eight.
Q And did Mr. Egbert or anyone else train you
after you got hired, before you started working on the
church?
A As we were working. It was kind of an
on-the-job training.
Q And what sort of training did you receive?
A When I was doing something wrong, somebody
would tell me. Pretty much that was it.
Q Who would tell you?
A Just one of the more experienced framers.
Sometimes ~ Ken Egbert really wasn't there very much,
so...

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
[0
11
L2
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

his name. And he told me -- they taught me -- they just
showed me how to raise the wall.
MR. DAVENPORT: Are you saying Maurice Egbert,
the general contractor, or are you saying ~
THE WITNESS: Well, Ken Egbert was actually
telling me to do it, but Maurice was there. I think he
was in the trailer or something. I don't know where he
was.
I
MR. DAVENPORT: There's a big difference
between ~
THE WITNESS: Okay, sorry.
Q (BY MR. BADARUDDIN) I'm just asking you, what
did Maurice, if anything, tell you to do?
MR. DAVENPORT: Keep in mind, distinguish Ken
Egbert and Maurice.
THE WITNESS: Really, nothing. Honestly, I
never talked to Maurice more than one or two words, more
than, you know, if I needed to ask him a question or
something. I never really talked to him very much.
Q (BY MR. BADARUDDIN) Did he ever tell you you
were doing something wrong and to stop it?
A No. That would more be the other framers.
Q Who showed you how to raise a wall?
A Ken Egbert.
Q Okay.
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Q Who else did you work with?
A Just the crew, Ken Egbert's crew.
Q Ken Egbert's crew, and who else did you say?
A Maurice Smith, I think was his name, was the
general contractor. Maurice something. I don't
remember his last name.
Q We can call him Maurice. And that was who?
A He was the general contractor.
Q And what, if any, instructions did he give
you?
A Really nothing. I mean, it was pretty much
on-the-job training. I remember, you know, they came
out and they would say, Look, here's an easier way to do
it. You can do it like uiis. And they would show me.
Q Who would show you?
A Any one of the more experienced people that
worked there.
Q Did Maurice ever show you how to do anything?
A No.
Q Did he ever tell you what to do?
A Well, actually that's not true, I better take
that back. There was - 1 think it was my first or
second day, and we were - there was like three of us
there standing a wall. I think it was like me and
Maurice and Ken. Oh, and another guy. I don't remember
-

:

———

.

.

,

;

- — - ,

.

,

_ _

:

,

{•• ,,•-.;

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
J

A He taught me the proper way, you know, how to
stand when you're holding the wall. You don't want to
stand right up to it. You've got to put your foot back,
you know, be ready to brace it, and bail if it goes out
of the way.
Q Okay.
A That's what he told me.
Q Do you remember Jason Smith?

A Yes.
Q How did you know Jason Smith?
A He had been working there for maybe like two
or three days. Just a couple of days.
Q Did he get trained along with you?
A No. He started after I did.
Q And what, if anything, did he do, if you know
what he did?
A He was the same as I was; he was a laborer.
Q And he worked for who?
A He worked for Ken Egbert.
Q And did you have any supervisors when you
worked with Ken Egbert?
A Oh, man. We had -- there was Ken, and I guess
one ofthe other supervisors, his name was Manny. And I
then there was this guy named Dale. And they were
always fighting with each other.
— — — -
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Q How, if at all, did they supervise you?
A Like I said, if I was doing something wrong,
you know, if I was cutting a board wrong, they'd come
tell me.
Q How did you know what boards to cut or what
walls to build?
A They would tell me. See, usually what I would
do is, I would cut the boards for them, and they would
actually put the boards together, because I was just
learning. That's kind of how it goes when you're in
that business.
Q And so you would cut the boards. They would
assemble the wall?
A They'd say, I need 10 boards at 82 and a half
inches or whatever, so I'd go cut 10 boards and bring
them over to them. Sometimes I would assemble the wall.
Q How did you know how to assemble a wall?
A I was taught how.
Q By?
A By Manny.
Q Do you know if Jason assembled any walls?
A You know, I thinkfrommost of what I saw him
doing, he did mostly cutting.
Q Okay. Did you stand up any walls?

Q Do you know who Brent Reynolds Construction,
Inc. is?
A I've heard of them.
Q From the court papers?
A Yeah.
ft
Q That I've sent you?
A Well, just in the construction business, I've
heard of them.
Q Do you remember August 13 of 1999?
A Was that the day of the accident?
Q Yes.
t
A Yes.
Q Tell me what happened on that day.
A Well, we had just finished eating lunch, and
there was a wall that had already been built, and
Manny - 1 think it was Manny - told me and Jason and a 1
guy named Jose to go put it up.
Q Okay. And then what happened?
A So we went over there, and we lifted it up,
and it wasn't quite onto the bolts, so Jason and Jose
were holding it, and I went to go get a board, and I was
going to, you know, try to use the leverage and jack it
up onto the bolts. And I put it under there, and as
soon as I put some pressure on there, the wall came
down. Jose bailed out of the way, and it was like

1
1
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Q Who told you how to stand up a wall?
A Ken Egbert.
Q And how do you stand up a wall?
A Well, you - just depending on the size of the
wall. Sometimes, if the wall was a real big wall, we
would use the forklift, and they'd suspend like tow
straps to the top of the wall and raise the wall with a
forklift. But if it was a smaller wall that we could
lift ourselves, we would stand it. Someone else would
go around and position the wall into the bolts. You
know, sometimes they'd use a board and jack underneath
it to lift the wall up onto the bolts if it wasn't quite
on there. You know, there would always be people
raising the wall.
And then once the wall was up, you put an
A-frame on it. Once you have it down on the bolts, then
you put an A-frame and a brace on it.
Q But not before?
A No.
Q Okay. Do you know who Brent Reynolds is?
A No. I recognize the name from the legal
papers, but that's it.
Q But you don't know how, if at all, he was
involved in theframingprocess?
A No.
: • • • . : ' .
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Jason, he tried to catch it, and he kind of crouched
down. I don't know if he was trying to catch it or
what, it just came down on him.
And they lifted the wall up, and Jason was
just laying there. There was already a puddle of blood
around his head like this. At first, I didn't know it
was going to be serious. I thought he was knocked out 1
or something, but I saw the blood.
And we started yelling for help, and Maurice
came out of the trailer, and the other guys, everyone
else was working on the east - yeah, the east side of
the church, and there was a big wall already built on
that side, so they couldn't really see into the church.
I don't know if you guys have been out there
and seen the site or anything, but it's more on the west 1
side of the church where it happened.
Q Okay.
A So they all came running over from there, and
Maurice got his cell phone, called the police, fire
department.
Q And an ambulance came?
A Yeah. And some guy came that - 1 guess he
had a scanner or something. He was just a doctor. He
was driving by, so he stopped. He got there way before
the ambulance did.
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Q The wall you were lifting, how big was it?
A Maybe like - 1 mean, it wasn't that big.
Maybe like six feet long, eight feet long, probably like
eight feet high.
Q Do you know how heavy it was?
A It was heavy. Heavy. I mean the three of us,
it took the three of us really trying to lift it. It
was made out of LVL.
Q LVL?
A It's a synthetic wood. It's much heavier.
Q Do you have an opinion as to whether or not
you needed more men to lift that wall than you had?
A Honestly, I don't think so. I mean, because I
framed for quite - for like two years after that, and I
would say no.
Q Do you know what, if anything, Jason did
wrong?
A He should have bailed. He should not have
tried to catch the wall. He should have bailed out to
the side.
Q And let the wall fall down?
A Yeah.
Q And did you have an opportunity to bail or not
bail?
A I was on the other side of the wall. I wasn't
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commercial site, make sure you're wearing your hard
hats, just stuff like that.
Q How many days were you on the crew before the
accident happened?
A You know, probably about a month.
Q Okay.
A We'd been working on it for quite a while.
Maybe not quite a month, but for a few weeks, at least.
Q Do you know how many men were on your crew,
men or women?
A At the time of the accident?
Q Prior to the accident.
Well, you said you were working on the crew
for some time prior to August 13; correct?
A Yes.
Q August 13,1999-A It was always changing. Guys were coming and
going. Ken would get new guys in. He'd hire - a bunch J
of temp workers would come in for like a week or so and
leave.
Q Were you there from the beginning?
A Yeah, I was there from ~
Q So approximately your first day at work, how
many men were on the crew?
A My first day at work, it was just me and Manny

1
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on the side that fell.
Q And how did you know to bail when the
circumstances called for it?
A That was pretty much the first thing Ken
Egbert told me when we were putting the wall up. He
said, If anything happens, if it starts to go, don't
worry about the wall, we can always rebuild the wall,
just get out of the way, let it fall.
Q And do you know if Jason received those same
instructions?
A I don't. I don't know if he did or I don't
know if he didn't.
Q Well, he wasn't present when you received
them?
A No.
Q Did you receive any safety instruction or
training?
A Not really. I mean, I think I remember a
couple of safety meetings, but that was before Jason was
ever on the crew. He was only on the crew for two or
three days.
Q You remember attending safety meetings before
Jason was on the crew?
A Yeah, I think so. And the safety meetings was
just, Okay, we have to wear hard hats, this is a
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and one other guy, one other kid that Ken had hired to
be a laborer.
Q Do you remember his name?
A I don't remember the kid's name.
Q Do you know whether it was Jose?
A No, it wasn't Jose.
Q And then at some point in time, Jason was
hired on?
A Yeah. I think because like his uncle worked
on there or something. I'm not sure.
Q Do you know how many men were on the crew by
the time Jason was hired on?
A There was probably like 15 or 20. I don't
know an exact number, I couldn't give you that, but an
estimate, 15,20.
Q Okay. Did you wear a hard hat when you were
working for Egbert Construction doing the framing?
A Most of the time.
i

19
Q Were you wearing one on August 13?
20
A No, I wasn't.
21
Q Do you know if Jason was wearing one?
22
A No, he wasn't.
23
Q Did you own one prior to August 13?
24
A Yes. Most of the time they really didn't
25 enforce it. Most of the time they made you wear a hard
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hat if you were working under somebody that was working
above you or something.
Q So it was at your option whether or not you
were going to wear a hard hat?
A Well, we were told to wear them all the time,
but, you know, I mean, they're not there to babysit us,
so . . .
Q Right. Did you wear any other - 1 call it
protective gear, but anything like a hard hat?
A Just a hard hat.
Q Goggles, gloves, steel-toed boots?
A Yeah, I did wear -- we had to have safety
glasses.
Q And you wore those?
A Yes.
Q Do you know if you were wearing them on the
13th?
A Probably. I wore them every day, because they
were my sunglasses. It got way too bright out there
without them.
Q Now, you were mentioning some documents you
signed - before we got started.
A Yeah, I believe so.
Q Well there's an affidavit of Michael Lewis and
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supposed to know? I don't know the legal part of it.
Q Okay. Well, why did you sign the affidavit?
A I don't know. At the time I thought it
sounded like a good idea.
Q All right.
A It just got on my conscience. You know, I
would be reading it over and just thinking about it. It
was just something that was eating away at me.
Q All right. Is there any other portion of that
Exhibit 40 that maybe you have some second thoughts
about?
A No.
Q Okay. And can you take a look at Exhibit 41?
A Is this the same one?
Q It's different. It doesn't have your
signature, but it's identical to the one that does.
MR. DAVENPORT: Is that the second affidavit?
MR. BADARUDDIN: Of Michael Lewis, correct.
MR. DAVENPORT: Actually, there's one that has
your signature.
THE WITNESS: Yeah, I remember you guys coming
out twice, I think.
MR. DAVENPORT: Well, one's related to Hales &
Warner and one is related to the Church of Jesus Christ
of Latter-day Saints, and the second one was prepared by
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can mark them, and then I'll ask you about them.
(Exhibit No. 40 and 41 were marked for
identification.)
Q (BY MR. BADARUDDIN) Take a look at
Exhibits 40 and 41.
A Yeah, I've seen this one.
Q Well, they're pretty similar.
A The only one I was a little concerned about
was No. 9, when it says, "In my opinion, Hales & Warner
Construction, Inc., including Maurice Egbert, were not
in any way at fault in the accident involving Jason
Smith."
I just - I've been feeling uncomfortable
making a judgment on that call, because I'm not a judge.
I don't know the legal proceedings of it. I don't know,
I just don't feel comfortable.
Q I smile, because that's more or less what the
judge said, at least as I can recall.
What, if anything, would you like to alter or
edit or change about No. 9?
A I was just thinking, if you could take it out,
it would be all right with me.
Q Do you know whether or not Hales & Warner was
at fault in the death of Jason Smith?
A I'm - like I say, I'm not a judge. How am I
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the Church attorney.
THE WITNESS: Okay. Is it pretty much the
same?
Q (BY MR. BADARUDDIN) It's a little different.
A Where are the differences?
Q Well, let me take a look at it. You're
welcome to read along. It looks like paragraph 8 is a
p
little different, and then there's a completely new 9.
Why don't you tell me whether you still stand
by the allegations in paragraphs 8 and 9.
A Okay.
MR. DAVENPORT: Is this of the second
affidavit?
MR. BADARUDDIN: Correct, Exhibit 41.
THE WITNESS: Well, eight, I would have to say 1
that sounds good, because I've never even met Dean
Schick.
Q (BY MR. BADARUDDIN) Okay.
A They had no control over any of that. No. 9,
you know, I guess that's the same thing. I'm not a
judge, but on the other hand, logic says to me, It's
just a person, how can they be responsible? You know
what I mean? Yeah, it was their building. But I don't
know. That's just -- like I say, it's not my position,
I guess, to make the call, because I don't know the law.
|
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I'm clear. So if you think, well, I already answered
that, you have, and ~
A It's okay, I understand that.
Q First, I want to make sure that you understand
that Ken Egbert and Ken Egbert Construction are separate
and apartfromMaurice Egbert, who was the employee of
Hales & Warner.
You understand that?
A Yeah, I understand that.
Q And in the deposition of Maurice Egbert, as
well as others that have been deposed, and the
affidavits of not only yourself, but the other people
we've obtained affidavitsfrom,fromKen Egbert, all
have indicated that Maurice Egbert, himself, the
employee of Hales & Warner, never gave instructions to
you or Jason Smith or Jose as to going and lifting that
wall. And that's consistent with your testimony today;
correct?
A Yes, that's right.
Q And also, everybody indicated that Maurice
Egbert did not teach you or Jason Smith how to lift the
wall; is that correct?
A Yeah.
Q Okay.
A Well, to be honest with you, no one really
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But I don't know. It just doesn't sound ~ it sounds
like quite a stretch trying to blame the Church for it,
to be honest with you.
Q Let me just ask you this. You're not swearing
to paragraph 9 at this time, are you?
A No.
Q You don't really have an opinion with regard
to whether or not the Church is or is not at fault?
A Well, my opinion is that they're not, but
my - is my opinion credible? No. That's what I'm
saying here.
Q All right. And then what does paragraph 8
say?
Paragraph 8, you don't know who Dean Schick
is?
A No. I've never even met him or Q Do you know who Paul Evans is?
A No.
Q Do you know whether or not he gave you or Ken
Egbert or Brent Reynolds any instructions?
A I never even talked to anybodyfromthe
Church. The only time I talked to anybody from the
Church was the stake president that was going to be over
the building. That was at Jason's funeral.
Q What did y'all talk about then?
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A Well, he was saying that he was going to put
up like a monument or something, a little something in
memory of Jason.
Q He expressed some remorse about Jason's death?
A Yes. I don't know if that ever happened or
not, but that's what he told us.
Q Okay. Do you know who the architect was on
this project?
A No.
Q Do you know whether or not you had any
discussions with him?
A No. I never personally, no.
MR. BADARUDDIN: Thank you, Mr. Lewis. Some
of the other gentlemen may have some questions, but I
don't. I appreciate you coming down.
THE WITNESS: I'm sorry I was late.
MR BADARUDDIN: That's all right.
MR. DAVENPORT: I've got some.
EXAMINATION
BY MR DAVENPORT:
Q Do you want me to call you Mr. Lewis or
Michael or Mike or what?
A Mike, whatever. I don't even care.
Q Mike, I'm going to probably ask you some of
the same type of questions, but I just want to make sure
—

—

.

_

.

,

taught Jason Smith how to do anything.
Q Okay.
A That's the problem I've got. It might be a
problem. I don't know who's at fault. Like I say, I'm
not the person to make that call, but the only training
he had as far as raising a wall was, we were raising a
wall and he wasn't doing it right, and he was just
coming over to help, and he was just standing right next
to it, he wasn't holding onto it that well. He didn't
have his foot out to brace in case it came back. One of
the otherframerssaid to him, Hey, you know, you should
kick your other foot back and brace yourself, hold the
wall, you know. As far as I know, that's all the
training he had.
Q Okay. And Maurice Egbert's testimony was - 1
think this is consistent with what you already said
today, is that at the time of the accident, he was in
the construction trailer.
A Yes.
Q That's your understanding, also?
A Yeah, that's where I think he was.
Q And you had previously indicated that the
initial stages of this job, as it relates to the
starting of the rough carpentry work, you were there
from the beginning; correct?
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problem as it relates to a particular wall, wherein your
supervisors went and talked to Maurice Egbert, and if
so, did you hear what they had to say?
A Well, I don't know any particular incident,
but I mean, it's —
Q I'm not asking you to say, well, you're sure
it happened. I want to know just what you actually
heard someone do.
A No, I never saw it happen, no. That's not
true, because they were always talking to each other.
That's part of the construction site. You know, the
general tells the subcontractor, the lead framer, Bruce
Lemmon, Maurice would tell him, Okay, we need to get
this done today. And then Bruce would hand the orders
down to us.
Q I guess what I'm saying is, I just wanted to
be clear as to what you actually heard versus what
you're just assuming, because you saw someone talking?
A I couldn't even tell you how many times I saw
them talking, but I don't listen to their conversations,
so I can't tell you what was said.
MR. DAVENPORT: That's what I'm getting at.
Thank you.
MR. BADARUDDIN: Nothing. Thanks for your
time and trouble.
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(Deposition concluded at 5:07 p.m.)

CERTIFICATE
STATE OF UTAH
)
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE)
THIS IS TO CERTIFY that the deposition of
MICHAEL LEWIS, the witness in the foregoing deposition
named, was taken before me, V K I E . HATTON, a Certified
Shorthand Reporter, Registered Professional Reporter and
Notary Public in and for the State of Utah, residing at
Salt Lake City, Utah.

1

j

That the said witness was by me, before
examination, duly sworn to testify the truth, the whole
truth and nothing but the truth in said cause.
That the testimony of said witness was
reported by me in Stenotype and thereafter caused by me
to be transcribed into typewriting, and that a full,
true and correct transcription of said testimony so
taken and transcribed is set forth in the foregoing
pages numbered from 4 through 55, inclusive, and said
witness deposed and said as in the foregoing annexed
deposition.
I further certify that after the said
deposition was transcribed, the original of same was
delivered to Mr. Lewis, the witness, for reading and
signature, signed before a Notary Public, and to be
returned to me for filing with the Clerk of the said
Court.
I further certify that I am not of kin or
otherwise associated with any of the parties to said
cause of action, and that I am not interested in the
events thereof.
WITNESS MY HAND and official seal at Salt Lake
City, Utah, this 10th day of March, 2003.
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V K I E. HATTON, C.S.R., R.P.R.
Utah License No. 93
My Commission Expires:
June 9,2006
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Restatement (Second) of Torts § 414 (1965)
Restatement of the Law — Torts
Restatement (Second) of Torts
Current through June 2003
Copyright © 1965-2004 by the American Law Institute
Division 2. Negligence
Chapter 15. Liability Of An Employer Of An Independent Contractor
Topic 1. Harm Caused By Fault Of Employers Of Independent Contractors
§ 414. Negligence In Exercising Control Retained By Employer

Link to Case Citations
One who entrusts work to an independent contractor, but who retains the control of
any part of the work, is subject to liability for physical harm to others for whose safety
the employer owes a duty to exercise reasonable care, which is caused by his failure to
exercise his control with reasonable care.
See Reporter's Notes.
Comment:
a. If the employer of an independent contractor retains control over the operative detail of doing
any part of the work, he is subject to liability for the negligence of the employees of the contractor
engaged therein, under the rules of that part of the law of Agency which deals with the relation of
master and servant. The employer may, however, retain a control less than that which is necessary to
subject him to liability as master. He may retain only the power to direct the order in which the work
shall be done, or to forbid its being done in a manner likely to be dangerous to himself or others. Such
a supervisory control may not subject him to liability under the principles of Agency, but he may be
liable under the rule stated in this Section unless he exercises his supervisory control with reasonable
care so as to prevent the work which he has ordered to be done from causing injury to others.
b. The rule stated in this Section is usually, though not exclusively, applicable when a principal
contractor entrusts a part of the work to subcontractors, but himself or through a foreman
superintends the entire job. In such a situation, the principal contractor is subject to liability if he
fails to prevent the subcontractors from doing even the details of the work in a way unreasonably
dangerous to others, if he knows or by the exercise of reasonable care should know that the
subcontractors' work is being so done, and has the opportunity to prevent it by exercising the power of
control which he has retained in himself. So too, he is subject to liability if he knows or should know
that the subcontractors have carelessly done their work in such a way as to create a dangerous
condition, and fails to exercise reasonable care either to remedy it himself or by the exercise of his
control cause the subcontractor to do so.
c. In order for the rule stated in this Section to apply, the employer must have retained at least
some degree of control over the manner in which the work is done. It is not enough that he has
merely a general right to order the work stopped or resumed, to inspect its progress or to receive
reports, to make suggestions or recommendations which need not necessarily be followed, or to
prescribe alterations and deviations. Such a general right is usually reserved to employers, but it does
not mean that the contractor is controlled as to his methods of work, or as to operative detail. There
must be such a retention of a right of supervision that the contractor is not entirely free to do the work
in his own way.
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